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PREFACE 
The decision to devote this work to the construction and 
presentation of a new world press theory emerged from my frustration 
with the inadequacy of existing world press theory and my growing 
awareness of the relevance of a significant body of sociological theory 
that has been underutilized by communication macro-theorists. 
As an undergraduate, majoring in journalism and minoring in Soviet 
studies, I was particularly sensitive to the theoretical shunting aside 
of the Soviet media system into its own slot, a pariah press, a "bad" 
press. As my intellectual commitment to the Soviet press deepened and 
my knowledge of international media broadened, I came to see that it was 
not only the Soviet system that was maligned in the language and 
assumptions of these theories; it was any system that was not firmly 
dedicated to Western, and particularly American press values. I also 
wondered if it was the business of theory to malign anyone. It seemed 
ironic that mass communication, a discipline obsessed with the issues of 
objectivity and balance, could accept so blithely its own assessment of 
other nations' institutions. 
Sociology revealed to me the power and possibility of 
11 Value-freedom11 --and also its elusiveness. Max Weber excited me, not 
because he necessarily achieved objectivity, but because he recognized 
its importance--especially in observing and understanding macro 
structures. I also took inspiration from his ability to bring grand 
1 i i 
theory down from the intellectual stratosphere and apply it to earthly 
institutions. It was Weber's ideas, above all, that served as the 
theoretical frame for the ideas that inform this work. 
But it was the phenomenological approaches of microtheorists and 
empiricists that made it possible to fill in that frame. The primary 
strengths of the world press theory advanced here--dynamism and 
validity--are derived from the concept of situated actions as precursors 
to articulated motives. Motives provide the key to the empirical 
methodology required to further test this theory--which I hope others 
will do. 
When this effort was first undertaken in the spring of 1988, few on 
either side of the 11 Iron Curtain" anticipated the imminent end of the 
Cold War within a few short years, nor the realigning of international 
priorities and the restructuring of political and economic alliances 
that followed in its wake. Even had these eventualities not come to 
pass, it was clear that a new theoretical approach was needed to come to 
terms with the power of the mass media in the age of the "global 
village. 11 But today, given the state of the not so orderly "new world 
order," the need for new analytical tools must certainly be recognized. 
It is in this spirit that the dynamic theory is presented here. 
iv 
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The long-standing inadequacy of mass communication theory to make 
sense of the world/s national press systems has become increasingly 
apparent in recent years as media behavior has been transformed to meet 
the exigencies of a new post-Cold War world. The point of departure for 
the present work is the assumption that underlying mass media activity in 
all nations is a structure of prioritized motives that continually shape 
and alter the character of the press. By delineating that structure and 
identifying its parameters, national press activity and policy can be 
viewed as voluntaristic responses to situations arising from social, 
economic, and political environments. 
The centerpiece of this dissertation, presented in Chapter IV, is a 
definition of that structure, a comprehensive and holistic theory that 
assumes context to be a prerequisite for understanding the world/s press. 
Intrinsic to this understanding is the perception of dynamism as a 
constant--a constant that transcends time, space, and, certainly, 
nationality. As background for the presentation of the 11 dynamic theory," 
Chapter II examines existing world press theory, with particular emphasis 
on United States and Western contributions. American theory not only 
forms the nucleus of journalism and mass communication scholarship and 
education in the United States, but throughout the world CDissanayake, 
1988). 1 Although empirical observation provided the impetus and 
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guidelines for the dynamic theory's construction, it was also informed by 
the interweaving of numerous strands of social theory, most notably Max 
Weber's social action theory and the dramaturgical concept of motives as 
integrative justifications for actions or behaviors already underway. 
Theoretical and methodological groundings of the theory are discussed in 
Chapter III. 
In the fourth chapter, the dynamic theory is introduced by positing 
three 11 primary motives 11 --survival, ideas, and instrument--as both the 
justifications and the perceived determinants of press action in any 
society. From this construction, the following premises are derived: 1> 
Press action and values are politically and socially explained, 
justified, and, thereby, created by primary motives--the same primary 
motives are shared by society, the government, and other institutions in 
stable national systems; 2> National societies, institutions, and their 
press systems subscribe to all three primary vocabularies of .motive, one 
of which predominates at any given time in stable systems; and 3) Nations 
and their presses vacillate continually from one prevailing primary 
motive in the direction of one or both of the other two. Significant 
social change can bring about a shift to another predominant motive, and 
a corresponding reformation of the press. Frequently, the press itself 
serves as both agent and object of major social upheaval. After a 
discussion of the premises, a visual model is proposed as a means of 
qualitatively conceptualizing press dynamism. Chapter IV concludes with 
a listing of press characteristics associated with each primary motive. 
The remaining chapters are devoted to empirical analyses of several 
national media systems, each of which serves as an exemplar for a 
particular primary motive or combination of motives. With the exception 
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of the United States, nations whose press systems are examined in these 
chapters have been selected deliberately because their activity is 
sufficiently problematic to test the validity of the proposed theory. 
This approach is consistent with the inductive qualitative methodologies 
of grounded theory <Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Charmaz, 1988> and analytic 
induction <Katz, 1988). Though in this work empirical analysis follows 
the presentation of theory, in the actual process of constructing the 
dynamic theory, data preceded explanation. 
The germ of the dynamic theory was born as the cataclysmic upheaval 
in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the socialist bloc 
began to shake the world in the mid 1980s and to draw attention to the 
power of the mass media to foment and accelerate social change. Perhaps 
because its beginnings were so neatly bracketed by Mikhail Gorbachev/s 
ascension to power in March 1985, or because the shift in press policy 
was interpreted as a Cold War victory for the West, or even, perhaps, 
simply because a graspable and exotic label, "glasnost, .. was attached to 
the new Soviet press philosophy at its inception, American journalists 
and political pundits were quick to posit an irrevocable link between a 
pluralistic press and democratic government. 
Predictably, U.S. commentators drew fewer conclusions on the meaning 
of the United States government/s unprecedented curtailment of press 
access to military activity in Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf, 
which took place during approximately the same time span. Even dimmer 
U.S. journalistic light was shed on a host of media restrictions proposed 
and enacted in Britain by the Thatcher government. And virtually no 
metajournalistic effort has been extended to suggest shared patterns of 
media dynamics from a transnational perspective. 
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Yet a common th~ead unites the p~ess phenomena noted above. In each 
society, national p~ess policy is being ~eve~sed and long-standing c~edos 
of p~ess philosophy a~e being igno~ed as the political and economic wo~ld 
~ealigns itself. Social scientists, with the luxu~y of lange~ lead times 
and a substantial body of p~ess theo~y at thei~ beck and ~ecall, have 
been only ma~ginally mo~e expansive o~ insightful in thei~ analyses of 
the wo~ld's p~ess than jou~nalistic commentato~s. Instead, academic 
specialists have tended to ~et~eat into the safe haven of 
mic~oanalyses--the time-wo~n positivistic method of seeking to captu~e 
the whole of p~ess activity by dissecting its many pa~ts. 
In sho~t, no ove~a~ching theo~etical inte~p~etation of the wo~ld's 
p~ess has been uncove~ed to desc~ibe o~ explain the ~ole of the media in 
the global tumult of the 1980s and 1990s. The concent~ation of media 
~esea~ch on na~~owly-defined topics at the expense of theo~y has been 
duly noted and deplo~ed fo~ decades. Dutch sociologist Denis McOuail has 
w~itten in his classic Towa~ds a Sociology of Communications: 
Although the study of communications can claim ve~y 
distinguished social scientists amongst its founding 
fathe~s--Ku~t Lewin, Ha~old Lasswell, Paul Laza~sfeld and Ca~l 
Hovland, ••• the co~pus of findings about mass communications 
bea~ the ma~ks of an enti~ely p~actical conce~n with two 
objectives: the counting and desc~iption of audiences and the 
measu~ement of di~ect effects on those exposed to communication 
(1961: 36). 
Finnish o~ganlzations and systems specialist Osmo A. Wile concludes, 
11 Actually the~e has been no such thing as communication theo~y but a 
pletho~a of sepa~ate ~esea~ch findings tied togethe~ with a ve~y loose 
~ope called 'communication ~esea~ch' 11 (1975: 7>. 
J. He~be~t Altschul I ~elte~ates the obse~vatlon in his mo~e ~ecent 
assessment of media schola~ship. 
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How ironical it is that although the avowed goal of 
communications scholars has been to build theories of 
communications, their research has often been so narrow that 
they have muddled rather than enhanced understanding (1984: 
148). 
Similar echoes appear in the critical work of sociologists in the 
1950s, addressing their broader field. Most notable of these are Pitirim 
Sorokin;s Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences 
(1956) and C. Wright Mills;s The Sociological Imagination (1959>. The 
latter warns of special pitfalls for those attempting cross-cultural 
analysis: 
The social scientist who spends his intellectual force on the 
details of small-scale milieux is not putting his work outside 
the political conflicts and forces of his time. He is, at 
least indirectly and in effect, ;accepting; the framework of 
his society. But no one who accepts the full intellectual 
tasks of social science can merely assume that structure. In 
fact, it is his job to make that structure explicit and to 
study it as a whole (1959: 78-9>. 
New technological advances, most notably satellite and cable 
transmissions of television programming across national boundaries, have 
dramatically expanded the concepts of "mass society 11 and 11 global society 11 
in the past 15 years, and yet the social impact of the media was 
recognized long before these developments. In 1910 Max Weber presented a 
proposal for a systematic study of the press as a societal institution at 
the second meeting of the German Association for Sociology <Mayer, 1956). 
But Weber;s 1910 address was far from the first acknowledgment of the 
symbiotic relationship between society and the press. In fact, the core 
of Weber;s remarks were drawn from his earlier undated plan for a press 
survey aimed at elucidating "the significant cultural problems of the 
present, 11 including the way the press influences minds and strengthens 
social conformity and exerts forces for change as well as for maintenance 
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of the status quo <Ka~l Webe~. 1937: 421>. If, as Talcott Pa~sons 
obse~ved <1966>, conditions of successful cont~ol p~ovide an app~op~iate 
focus of sociology fo~ Webe~, it is only natu~al that "the study of the 
p~ess and its agents as components of a social and political institution 
in mode~n society· becomes a majo~ task of sociological ~esea~ch 11 <Ha~dt, 
1979: 169). 
In his ~ema~ks to the Ge~man sociologists, Webe~ attempted to a~ouse 
inte~est among his colleagues in pu~suing an iRvestigation of the p~ess 
to dete~mine 
[wJhat does it cont~ibute to the cha~acte~ of mode~n man? 
Secondly, how a~e the objective, sup~aindividual cultu~al 
values influenced, what shifts will occu~, what will be 
dest~oyed and what will be c~eated anew of the beliefs and 
hopes of the masses: of the 11 life feelings" <Lebensgefuhle> 
--as they say today--, what is fo~eve~ dest~oyed and c~eated 
anew of the potential point of view? <1924: 441). 
Among many themes which still ~etain ~elevance fo~ p~ess schola~s 
today, Webe~ touched upon the insights to be gained f~om compa~ative 
study of national media. Although la~gely imp~essionistic and limited to 
the media of England, Russia, Ge~many, F~ance, and the United States, 
Webe~/s ove~view suggested the potential value of p~ess study fo~ 
I 
acqui~ing unde~standing of diffe~ent cultu~es. Fo~ instance, he noted 
that if an Ame~ican woman ma~~ies an English lo~d, 
one can find in the Ame~ican p~ess an account of the physical 
and psychological att~ibutes of the Ame~ican woman and, as is 
only suitable, a complete ~eview of he~ dow~y, natu~ally, while 
acco~ding to ou~ p~evailing ideas at least a newspape~ with 
self-~espect would ~eject this app~oach in Ge~many. Whe~e does 
this diffe~ence o~iginate? <Webe~, 1924: 436>. 
Likewise, he notes Ame~icans/ obsession with facts, and cont~asts it 
with the F~ench p~efe~ence fo~ inte~p~etation. 2 
Fo~ example, then, the Ame~ican wants nothing f~om his pape~ 
but facts. Whateve~ opinions a~e published in the p~ess about 
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these facts he regards as not worth reading; as a democrat he 
is convinced that, in principle, he can interpret as well as 
the newspaper writer, perhaps even better. But the Frenchman 
too wants to be a democrat. Where does the difference come 
from? In any event: in both cases the social function of the 
press is an entirely different one (1924: 439). 
Weber also expressed concern about the threat of news monopolies 
resulting from the merger of smaller newspapers and the growth of giant 
press cartels, a phenomenon he observed in his own country and identified 
as 11 Americanization•• in his earlier work <Karl Weber, 1937: 422). 
In his Association address, Weber acknowledged the inspiration of a 
work by Emil Loebel, Kultur und Presse <Culture and the Press>, which 
sought to promote the development of a scientific system of the 
periodical press <Zeitungswissenschaft> (1903>. But clearly Weber's 
thinking was influenced by other German scholars, whose theories and 
thinking were also passed on to many young American sociologists who 
completed their advanced educations in German universities during the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
Most notable of the early German theorists were Albert Schaffle, 
Karl Knies, Karl Bucher, and Ferdinand Tennies <Hardt, 1979). Schaffle's 
interests included symbolic communication, communication as a cohesive 
social force, and the press as an agent of social control. He drew 
heavily upon the organicism of Spencer and Comte, and had the most direct 
impact on American sociologists. Schaffle saw a need to bridge 
interpersonal communication and mass communication, and wrote: 
The spoken word and the gesture apply to what is by far the 
largest part of the communication of ideas, namely 
communication in small circles and for short-term purposes. 
Most of the expressions of ideas occur and end within a smaller 
circle and belong to the moment .... [Tlhe need for material 
symbols of longer lasting quality and with wider distribution 
is added ••• with a rising civilization (1881: 367). 
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Karl Knies's interest in communication as symbolic interaction 
remained ill-defined <Hardt, 1979: 78>; nevertheless, he anticipated an 
important aspect of the work of George Herbert Mead and the symbolic 
interactionists when he wrote in 1857: 
From earliest childhood on our efforts are directed at making 
ourselves proficient in social intercourse, to accept others 
and to communicate to others; these efforts, big or small, 
presuppose a mutual exchange of means with which to satisfy 
human needs <Knies, 1857: 1). 
Knies's major focus, however, was upon news itself and its transmission, 
both of which he saw as 11 forms in which men search for each other and 
meet 11 <1857: 48>. He also presaged contemporary theorizing on the 
"knowledge gap 11 within societies and the unequal distribution of 
communication resources between northern and southern hemispheres when he 
wrote 
not only those who cannot write or read, but also those who 
cannot pay, e.g., the extremely poor as those who lack 
disposable goods for such relatively superfluous service, are 
excluded from the communication of news <1857: 55). 
Bucher joined Weber and Knies in his fascination with the press as a 
business enterprise, noting the conflict between serving the public and 
earning a profit. "'Public interests,'" he concluded, "are cared for by 
newspapers only in so far as they do not obstruct the profit motives of 
publishers" <1922: 12>. Among the subjects Bucher explored were the 
relationship between the press and public opinion, the dubious role of 
advertising, and the ethics and practicality of shielding sources, a 
still problematic journalistic privilege identified by both Bucher and 
Weber as "Anonymit"at" <anonymity>. 
Though Tennies' reputation in sociology is well established, his 
extensive commentary on the role and function of the press in society is 
a 
less known. To the theory of communication and public opinion, he 
introduced the idea of voluntarism. In Einfuhrunq in die Sozioloqie. 
<Introduction to Sociology> <1931>, Tennies provided a well-developed and 
exacting formulation of signs and symbols, emphasizing differences 
between interpersonal and mass communication <Hardt, 1979: 138; Cahnman 
and Heberle, 1971>. 
According to Tennies' view the potential of the press transcended 
national boundaries .. In a particularly visionary analysis he wrote that 
the press, 
is definitely international, thus comparable to the power of a 
permanent or temporary alliance of states. It can, therefore, 
be conceived as its ultimate aim to abolish the multiplicity of 
states and substitute for it a single world market, which would 
be ruled by thinkers, scholars, and writers and could dispense 
with means of coercion other than those of a psychological 
nature •.•• [Sluch tendencies and intentions will perhaps never 
find a clear expression, let alone realization, but their 
recognition serves to assist in the understanding of many 
phenomena of the real world and to the realization of the fact 
that the existence of natural states is but a temporary 
limitation of the boundaryless society <Gesellschaft> (1963: 
221>. 
German perspectives on the media were brought into the fold of 
American sociology by scholars who made their way to universities in 
Berlin, Leipsig, and Heidelberg. Among these were such eminent men as 
Albion Small, E.A. Ross, Charles Sumner, John Dewey, Robert Park, G.H. 
Mead, and W.I. Thomas. 
However, as Jurgen Herbst noted in his study of the transfer of 
culture between Germany and the United States, some modification of these 
ideas was necessary before they could take root in America. 
[Tlhe Americans who went to German universities to acquire the 
tools of scholarship brought home not only tools but ideas as 
well. When the ideas proved difficult to assimilate to 
American conditions, the scholars sought to modify or discard 
them, only to realize that their scholarly equipment, torn from 
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its ideological setting, would no Ionge~ se~ve until a new 
context of ideas could be developed (1965: 232>. 
Ame~ican sociology, even mo~e than Eu~opean, came into being as a 
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~esponse to social p~oblems ~esulting f~om u~banization, immig~ation, and 
indust~ialization--an awa~eness pa~ticula~ly ma~ked among adhe~ents of 
the Chicago School. Thus almost immediately Ge~man philosophical 
idealism was diluted to accommodate the Ame~icans' p~agmatic commitment 
to amelio~ating the social evils of the time CHlnkle and Hinkle, 1954: 
2>. Anothe~ influence was the wide adoption of functionalist 
pe~spectives among ea~ly Ame~ican sociologists, fo~ as Small noted in 
1906, "St~uctu~al and functional analysis of activities within the state, 
o~ within society as a whole is p~e~equisite to classification of the 
associations that make up the state of society" CHlnkle and Hinkle, 1954: 
8-9>. One aspect of the Ame~icanization of Eu~opean ideas was a 
heightened emphasis on the individual and his behavio~. In keeping with 
the individualistic pe~spective was an emphasis on the volunta~istic 
natu~e of all communicative actions. 
As a ~esult, almost f~om the beginning, Ame~ican p~ess and 
communication study split in two di~ections. One, identified most 
clea~ly with symbolic inte~actionism, add~essed communication fi~st on 
the inte~pe~sonal level, and only then p~oceeded to apply it to the 
establishment of social no~ms. This avenue of theo~y and its attendant 
emphasis on qualitative ~esea~ch has gone la~gely, but not enti~ely, 
unheeded by those who engage in mac~oanalysis of the p~ess. 
The second movement ~emoved the study of communication f~om 
theo~etical abst~action and examined It empi~ically as a vehicle fo~ 
social bette~ent. Ea~ly media studies appea~lng in Small's American 
11 
Jou~nal of Sociology and othe~ academic jou~nals made f~equent ~efe~ence 
to the fact that sociologists had Han obligation to deal with the ~ole 
and function of the p~ess in society and should add~ess such p~oblems in 
thei~ wo~k" <Ha~dt, 1979: 191). F~ances Fenton, fo~ example, explo~ed in 
A.J.S. the effects of c~ime ~epo~ting on c~iminal behavio~ in a two pa~t 
se~ies (1910-11> and in a p~evious issue an anonymous autho~ questioned 
whether an ethical newspaper could survive in the American marketplace 
<"Is an Honest and Sane Newspaper P~ess Possible?•, 1909-1910). W.I. 
Thomas addressed 0 The Psychology of the Yellow Journal,M in Affierican 
Magazine. <1908) and E.A. Ross reported "The Suppression of Important 
News 11 in the Atlantic C1910>. Hardt notes, "While it was mainly an 
ideological force that dominated the social criticism of German scholars, 
it was an engagement in social ~eform which provided the focal point for 
the Ame~ican social sciences" <1979: 18>. 
This combative posture, however, is not to be confused with the 
social criticism that informs European scholarship in the Marxist and 
neoMarxist tradition. As James Carey points out, 
Operating within a different national tradition of schola~ship, 
a tradition with much more skepticism concerning the doctrines 
and consequences of the Enlightenment, German scholars found 
the press a problematic institution--its consequences unclear, 
its cont~ibution to f~eedom and enlightenment fa~ from 
automatic .... <Carey, 1979: 12>. 
Ame~icans, on the other hand, born into a state established under these 
principles, were less questioning. U.S. press scholars seemed to ope~ate 
under the general assumption that 
if the conditions of freedom we~e maintained then the con-
sequences of mass communications were relatively auto-
matic--an invisible hand leading the will of the individuals 
to the maximization of social good CCarey, 1979: 12>. 
American pragmatism manifested itself in indust~y-sponsored research 
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with specific and immediate goals--thus undercutting theoretical inquiry 
in the formative stages of the discipline. Though the mid-level theory 
construction of Lasswell, Lararsfeld, Lewin, Hovland, Sherif, Ashe, and 
others shaped the emerging mass communication discipline beginning in the 
1930s, by the late 1940s even Lazarsfeld observed 
[W]e academic people always have a certain sense of tight-rope 
walking: at what point will the commercial partners find some 
necessary conclusion too hard to take and at what point will 
they shut us off from the indispensable source of funds and 
data? (1972: 124>. 
The provincialism of press theory in the U.S. is addressed 
specifically by Thomas McPhail. 
Historically, American mass communication research isolated 
specific media purposes, messages, programs, and effects from 
overall social processes. It did not attempt to relate 
communication and communication needs to the overall social, 
ideological, political, cultural, and economic system in which 
they operated. Explanations about the specific communication 
data were seldom discussed in terms of the larger communication 
system or from a macro theoret i ca 1 mode 1 • A 1 i near, one-time 
analysis was indicative of the early stages of research and 
still afflicts the discipline (1981: 75>. 
James Carey argues that in the wake of World War II, when European 
universities, publishing houses, and research programs lay in disarray, 
American scholarship, priorities, and methods were exported as a kind of 
11 intellectual Marshall Plan 11 CCarey, 1979: 11>. Carey attributes the 
largely atheoretical nature of mass media research to this continuing 
undiluted American influence. Hardt perceives a crisis in mass media 
study and calls for an infusion of the major themes that traditionally 
have been the subject of scholarly attention--questions of power, social 
control, social change, social norms, and other broad issues. According 
to these scholars little had changed in the twenty years separating their 
observations from those of Bernard Berelson, who asked in 1959, 
Where do we go from here? Communication research has had a 
distinguished~ but what about its future? .•• It seems to 
me that the 11 great ideas" that gave the field of communication 
research so much vitality ten and twenty years ago have to a 
substantial extent worn out. No new ideas of comparable 
magnitude have appeared to their their place. We are on a 
plateau of research development and have been for some time 
CWiio, 1975: 13). 
Since these conclusions were presented, major contributions to mass 
communication theory have been made in a number of important areas, 
though empiricism continues to dominate the field. However, the 
development of world press theory has failed to keep pace with theory 
construction in other venues of media research and certainly it has 
proved to be inadequate to describe or explain the processes that have 
accompanied recent world press activity. In the following chapter, the 
existing body of theory that specifically and systematically links media 
structure and performance to world societies is reviewed and critiqued. 
Treated in most detail are the seminal ideas set forth in the 1956 
classic Four Theories of the Press: The Authoritarian. Libertarian. 
Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press 
Should Be and Do <Siebert et al .• 1956). This normative, functionalist 
paradigm has had a disproportionate influence in the field. Subsequent 
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global theories, many of which have been constructed either as extensions 
of or correctives for the ideas espoused in Four Theories. are then 
summarized and assessed. 
It will be observed that in the first chapter and in those to come 
the term press is used interchangeably with mass media and mass 
communication. This follows the usage adopted by the Commission on the 
Freedom of the Press in their report 45 years ago (1947). In that work, 
the word "press11 encompassed 11 Within its scope the major agencies of mass 
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communication: the radio, newspapers, motion pictures, magazines, and 
books" <1947: v>. The inclusion of television under this rubric is now 
conventional, despite vestigal Gutenberg images that a narrower 
interpretation of the term might suggest <Siebert et al .• 1956; 
Altschull, 1984; Hachten, 1987; McOuail, 1987: 111>. Also, for the sake 
of brevity, the world press theory presented in this work is referred to 
simply as "the dynamic theory, 11 though dynamism is seen as only one of 
its characteristics. 
Endnotes 
1. Dlssanayake cites findings from an Association of South East Asian 
Nations study showing that 71 percent of communication theory materials 
used in universities are of American academic origin. He also lists the 
top books used in the South Asia, according to a study he conducted that 
showed 78 percent of theoretical press materials were authored by 
Americans. The combined list, compiled by this author, is presented in 
approximate rank order below. Asterlsked titles appear on both lists 
(1988: 2-3). 
*1. The Process and Effects of Mass Communication. Schramm and Roberts; 
*2. The Process of Communication. Berlo; 
*3. Mass Media and National Development. Schramm; 
*4. Communication and Change in the Developing Countries. Lerner and 
Schramm; 
*5. Four Theories of the Press. Siebert et al.; 
*6. Responsibility in Mass Communicaton. Rivers and Schramm; 
7. Effective Public Relations. Cutlip and Center; 
B. Communcation of Innovations. Rogers with Shoemaker; Mass 
Communication, Schramm; 
9. Modernization Affiong Peasants: The Impact of Communication. Rogers 
with Svenning. 
10. Diffusion of Innovations. Rogers 
11. Introduction to Mass Communication. Emery 
12. Theories of Mass Communication. De Fleur 
13. The Effects of Mass Media. Klapper 
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The oldest publication date of the works cited is 1956 <Four Theories of 
the Press>; the most recent is 1971 <Rogers and Shoemaker,s Communication 
of Innovations.) Though the vintage of the books would seem to indicate 
that these undated surveys were not conducted recently, this is probably 
not the case, for Dissanayake reports them in 1988. Also, the titles, 
with a few more contemporary additions, most notably Altschull,s work, 
comprise the central core of most U.S. theoretical communication sources 
today. 
2. Weber's observation is supported by Alexis de Tocquevllle's 
assessment of the American newspaper, circa 1835: 11 ln America three 
quarters of the enormous sheet are filled with advertisements, and the 
remainder is frequently occupied by political intelligence or trivial 
anecdotes; it is only from time to time that one finds a corner devoted 
to passionate discussions like those which the journalists of France 
every day give to their readers 11 <1835a: 192>. 
An interesting parallel is found in the observation of Vitaly 
Korotich, then editor of the popular Soviet magazine Qgonek, reported in 
a 1989 interview: 11 To a large extent, Soviet journalism does not favor 
facts as much as interpretation of facts. Whereas in the West a 
newspaper includes a large number of facts, we usually have hardly any 
..•• The Soviet press is becoming more interesting, but commentaries, 
rather than facts, still predominate <Shabad, 1989: 25). 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF EXISTING WORLD PRESS THEORIES 
An Assessment of Four Theories of the Press 
The point of departure for any American literature survey of world 
press theory must be the mass communication classic Four Theories of the 
Press. which appeared in print for the first time in 1956 <1956). Since 
its publication, the work has been reprinted without revision 17 times, 
most recently in 1989. Co-authored by Fred S. Siebert, Theodore 
Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm, the slim volume of some 150 pages has 
molded scholarly perceptions and guided academic inquiry into world press 
systems more than any other work in the United States for close to four 
decades. Some significant mid-level theoretical work predated this 
volume but appears not to have informed it. Among the pioneering efforts 
were Walter Lippmann/s ideas on perception and public opinion <1922>, 
Harold Lasswell/s taxonomy of press functions <Bryson, 1948: 179>, 
Lazarfeld's and others' studies conducted in the 1940s on media influence 
and the two-step flow in communication <Lazarsfeld et al .• 1948 and 1968; 
Berelson, 1954>, and Hovland/setal. army work, first published in 1949 
(1965>. Nevertheless Four Theories was the first American attempt to 
inject world politics and national culture into the theory of mass 
communication. 
Despite its weaknesses, Four Theories remains for communication 
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educators and many scholars in the Western world and beyond the "rosetta 
stone" of world press theory. As noted by Donald Shaw and Robert 
Stevenson, 11 This typology soon powerfully fixed itself upon the Western 
scholarly mind11 (1984: 134). John C. Merrill likewise acknowledges that 
the book "has been immensely influential and continues to be read by 
succeeding generations of aspiring mass communication scholars and 
practitioners 11 <1991: 12>. A review of current undergraduate and 
graduate texts indicates that the typology continues to enjoy a strong, 
scarcely-diminished presence in the mass communication discipline. 
Four Theories does not present a single cohesive model, but rather 
suggests two or four normative types--depending upon one's 
interpretation--by which press systems in various nations may be 
categorized. Authoritarian and libertarian systems, drawn from 
historical models of government, are presented as the basic two, with 
Soviet communist proposed as a twentieth-century offshoot of the former, 
and social responsibility as a further development of the latter. 
The authoritarian theory, described as the 11 most pervasive, both 
historically and geographically,n is grounded sketchily in the 
political/philosophical writings of Plato, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Hegel, 
and in policies orchestrated by Hitler and Mussolini. The basic 
philosophy of authoritarianism dictates that, 
[sllnce authority rests in the state and since the 
responsibility for the solution of public issues follows 
authority, the first duty of the press is to avoid interference 
with the objectives of the state. These objectives are 
determined by a ruler or by an elite rather than in 'the market 
place of ideas,' as predicated by the libertarians (1956: 28>. 
Citing a 1954 Associated Press study, the authors note that 
authoritarian practices were still to be found in Latin American, the 
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Middle East, Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia, Iran, Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi 
Arabia <1956: 31-32>. 
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The libertarian type, traced to the Enlightment thinking of Milton, 
Locke, and Jefferson, is the most eloquently and positively presented of 
the four essays. In contrast to the authoritarian system in which 
duly-annointed authority monopolizes truth and its dissemination for the 
good of the state, the libertarian system is described as recognizing 
that man is rational. 11 The happiness and well-being of the individual is 
the goal of society, and man as a thinking organism is capable of 
organizing the world about him and of making decisions which will advance 
his interests 11 <1956: 40>. The United States and Great Britain are 
credited as being the chief custodians of libertarian or "free press" 
ideas, but other countries are seen as seeking to adopt the philosophy. 
The authors acknowledge, however, that •many of the underdeveloped areas 
of the world found it particularly difficult to transplant the western 
ideals of a free press11 <1956: 67-8). 
The clarity of libertarian press theory becomes somewhat muddied with 
the overlay of a new concept, social responsibility. This philosophical 
latecomer is an American post-war concept articulated in the report of 
the Commission on Freedom of the Press <1947> and in a parallel 
elaboration by commission member William Hocking <1947>. The concept as 
presented in the commission report was viewed widely by journalists of 
the 1940s and 1950s as an attack on the "free press," since in it the 
commissioners prescribed social responsibility as a self-imposed 
constraint on a licentious press run amok. Among the failings the 
commissioners set out to correct were shallow and inaccurate coverage of 
the days; events, insensitivity to minorities, and a blatant disregard 
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for such basic ideas as compassion and fairness. 
A major purpose for writing Four Theories was to argue that 
traditional free-press values, accepted as rote by the journalistic 
profession, were not refuted, but reinforced by socially responsible 
press behavior <Tankard, 1988: 12>. The basic difference between the 
libertarian and the social responsibilty concepts is that the libertarian 
relies on competition and the self-righting principle to correct for the 
excesses of unfettered capitalism. The debate focuses on the fact that 
social responsibility must be enforced by someone or somebody. The 
Commissioners suggested that the media police themselves, but feared this 
role would be taken up by government. 
The Soviet communist type is described by Schramm in the fourth and 
final essay as a mutation of the much older authoritarian press 
philosophy, shaped by Marxist-Leninist philosophy and Stalinist 
expediency. As its name suggests, this theory was seen as originating in 
the Soviet Union and imposed on client states in Eastern Europe and the 
developing world. A major difference between this system and the 
authoritarian is said to be that the 11 Communists place a greater emphasis 
on the positive use of the mass media as part of the agitation for the 
accomplishment for a world revolution 11 and state ownership of the media 
and all other property <1956: 27-28>. According to Schramm, 
One effect of this development is, therefore, to put basic 
responsibility for all mass communications in the hands of a 
small group of top [Communist) Party leaders. All the mass 
media in the Soviet Union become speaking trumpets for these 
leaders, and the editors and directors listen anxiously for the 
latest Olympian rumblings of 11 the truth" <1956: 119). 
He continues, 
There is no place in the Soviet concept for the idea of the 
press as a clear and independent mirror of events. Nothing is 
farther from Soviet intention than giving mass communication 
units any of the responsibility for orginating public opinion 
or pushing the state into a policy behavior (1956: 121-122>. 
Long before the revolution in the Soviet press of the late 1980s, 
Schramm's overstatement of the monolithic and unresponsive nature of 
Soviet communist press structure was apparent to students of the Soviet 
press, but as Altschul! observed in 1984, 
Many examinations of the Soviet press have appeared in the 
capitalist world since [ Four Theories was published], but it 
is Schramm's analysis that has become conventional wisdom in 
the United States and elsewhere <1984: 108>. 
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Before addressing the weaknesses of Four Theories. the question must 
be asked, why has the influence of this modest functionalist work endured 
for so long? One answer must lie in the credentials of the men who 
authored it and the paucity of competitors to be found in 
macro-communications research and theory, particularly in the decades 
following World War II. Schramm was the most prolific and well-known of 
the three co-authors, his primary recognition being in international 
communication. He authored, co-authored, or edited 29 books, several of 
them definitive classics such as Process and Effects of Communication 
<1954>, Responsibility in Mass Communcation <1957>, Mass Media and 
National Development <1964>, and Men. Messages and Media <1973>. He 
established communication research programs at the University of 
Illinois, Stanford, and the University of Hawaii, but his association 
with Siebert and Peterson began at the University of Illinois, where 
Schramm was the first dean of Communications. Siebert authored a history 
of press freedom in England (1952> and later became dean of the College 
of Communication Arts at Michigan State. Theodore Peterson followed 
Schramm as dean of Communications at Illinois and wrote Magazines of the 
Iwentieth Century <1969), among other works. 
Though the value of Four Theories is being questioned by 
contemporary scholars with increasing regularity and vigor, even the 
severest critics feel compelled to pull their punches, as in Altschull's 
disclaimer near the end of his critique: "It is not our intention to 
denigrate the work of Schramm and his colleagues in Four Theories of the 
~ 11 and his insistence in the endnotes that the book is 11 must 
reading" <1984: 109 and 319). 
Secondly, within the fledgling field of mass communication, loyalty 
appears to have enshrined the work of pioneers, such as Siebert, 
Peterson, Schramm, Charles Osgood, B. H. Westley, and M. S. MacLean, who 
made life-long career commitments to the discipline. Schramm himself 
lamented the fact that communication research was an oasis "where many 
have passed, but few have tarried. Scholars come into it from their own 
disciplines, bring valuable tools and insights, and later go back, like 
Lasswell to the central concerns of their disciplines" <Wiio, 1975: 8). 
Schramm listed as the 11 four founding fathers" of communication research 
sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld; political scientist Harold Lasswell, and 
psychologists Kurt Lewin and Carl Hovland <Tankard 1988: 16). 
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Finally, it appears that the longevity of Four Theories is primarily 
due to the provision of a common, fixed system for categorizing and 
labeling the unwieldy collection of national press systems and their 
untidy assortment of characteristics. As Altschul! notes in his analysis 
of Four Theories. 11 [The authors'] efforts to impose a classification 
system on the press are much to be applauded" (1984: 109). In a eulogy 
to Wilbur Schramm, who died in 1987, James Tankard wrote that, despite 
the fact that "[tlhe theories developed in the book were normative, 
rather than quantitative, ••• the volume nevertheless presented a set of 
standards for evaluating and comparing press performance that was used 
for many years" <1988: 12>. 
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Tankard's remarks and subsequent additions to and subdivisions of 
the original categories by other scholars suggest that the utility of the 
categories themselves is of limited value; rather it can be argued that 
the primary value was the typological approach. That is to say, it is 
not the nature of the divisions per se, but the methodological 
construction of types that has been perceived as the most useful 
contribution of the Four Theories. 
If the inherent virtue of typologies is their capacity to bring 
order out of empirical chaos; their inherent vice must be their tendency 
to generalize, oversimplify, and, thereby, distort the complexity of 
reality. Positivists, valuing parsimony in their theories, might relish 
the two- or four-fold divisions presented in Four Theories; but even so, 
a growing number of social scientists questions the validity of any 
generallzation. 1 Werner Severin joins his colleague Tankard in 
issuing the caveat that the Four Theories are 11 'normative theories' 
derived from observation, not from hypothesis testing and replication 
using social science methods ..• " <Severin and Tankard, 1988: 209). 
Subsequent modifications call into question the quality and rigor of 
those observations, for the categories seemingly fail to encompass the 
wide range of press performance and policy observed empirically. McQuail 
advises that, 11 lt may be that the original 'four theories' are still 
adequate for classifying national media systems, but as the original 
authors were aware, it can often be that actual media systems exhibit 
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alternative, even inconsistent, philosophical principles• <1987: 111). 
From the foregoing discussion, one must conclude that the theoretical map 
doesn't match the territory and/or that the categories set forth are 
neither mutually exclusive nor all inclusive, though they are purported 
to be both. It is useful to recall the warning of Jakob Burckhardt, the 
Swiss historian, who railed against the "terrible simplifiers" <1898). 
Flawed methodology is central to identifying the book's weaknesses, 
since it seems to underlie the historicism, marginalism, and atheoretical 
nature of the paradigm. And though more recent scholars have addressed 
and sought to correct other shortcomings in Four Theories. none appears 
to have focused on the fundamental methodological error. The decision to 
employ a normative typology must be examined. If, indeed, the authors 
envisioned their organization schemata as 11 ideal types," the uti 1 i ty of 
that more universally accepted approach must also be examined. Normative 
types are drawn from the authors' notions of how the media ought to 
function in certain ideological environments and of the nature of those 
environments. Functionalist assumptions account for the model's failure 
to address the dynamism of the press and to ignore the voluntaristic 
nature of audiences, journalists, legislators, advertisers and others 
associated with the operation of the media. 
Preoccupation with "function," which appears frequently in the press 
scholarship of the German sociologists discussed above and in the 
writings of their American heirs, is traceable, of course, to Comte, 
Spencer, and Darwin. Lasswell's work on press functions and Merton's 
foray into the field of media dysfunctions also strengthened this 
approach in the 1940s. Whereas functionalism is at low ebb in most of 
the social sciences at this time, following the intellectual unseating of 
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Parsons et al. in the early 1960s, it has achieved a near-monopoly on 
American thinking in the province of world press theory, legitimized by 
the wide adoption of the normative approach presented in Four Theories. 
Interestingly, the term "functionalism" is not applied to this approach 
by mass communication scholars in general, with the known exceptions of 
Sri Lankan theory specialist Wimal Dissanayake and the Dutch sociologist 
Denis McQuail. 
McQuail identifies normative theory as, in effect, a branch of 
social philosophy. While noting its importance in media study, <1987: 
4), he nevertheless reminds his readers of the 11 limited value of 
normative theory for describing the reality even if it does shape the 
reality and perceptions of it, especially on the part of those who 
control, or work in, the mediau <1987: 124>. McQuail emphasizes the 
importance of distinctions between normative and social scientific theory 
of the press. He defines soclal scientific theory as 
general statements about the nature, workings and effects of 
mass communication, derived from systematic and, as far as 
possible, objective observation and evidence about media and 
often reliant on other bodies of social scientific theory 
(1987: 4). 
The exclusion of "other bodies of social scientific theory" greatly 
limits the scope of understanding to be derived from normative theories 
and accounts for what may be termed the theoretical isolation of American 
world press paradigms. Though the validity of all type-based methods of 
inquiry are subject to growing criticism because of their assumption of 
generalizability <Denzin, 1989; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Schwartz and 
Ogilvie, 1979>, adoption of Max Weber/s "ideal types, 11 developed from 
observation rather than prescribed according to current political 
morality, would have helped promote the 11 rational understanding of 
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motivation, which consists in placing the act in an intelligible and more 
inclusive context of meaningu <Weber, 1904: 8-10). As Turner observes, 
Weber explicitly stated he did not intend for [ideal types] to 
have a normative connotation. Rather they were designed 11 to be 
perfect on logical grounds, .. most of the time by summarizing a 
"conceptually pure type of rational action" <Turner et al .• 
1989: 194; Weber, 1904/49: 10>. 
The potential contribution of Weber's methodology and social action 
theories will be analyzed in greater detail in Chapter III, along with 
other sociological and political ideas that may hold relevance for 
understanding how press systems work. 
The perils of oversimplification inherent in deduced typologies are 
compounded by the power of the attached labels to exaggerate differences 
and reify misconceptions. Altschul! observes that 11 one of the most 
critical of all difficulties we face in efforts to avoid the perils of 
global confrontation lies in labeling and in the language of conflict 11 
<1984: 108>. Extending social-psychological labeling theory to the macro 
level in his discussion of American and Soviet press analysis, he 
continues, 
The labels we place on behavior and on ideas contribute to 
misunderstandings, and to passionate disputes about meanings 
and substance as well .••. Sociologists have pointed out that 
11 deviant behavior 11 is often in the eyes of the beholder, based 
on the way 11 deviant 11 is defined ..•. To the Soviet analyst, 
the American environment is deviant; to the American analyst, 
it is the Soviet environment that is deviant •... and hence the 
citizen is perceived to be alienated <1984: 108-109). 
While the dysfunctions of labeling and stereotyping constitute 11 an 
attractive nuisance" in all normative typologies, the potential is 
particularly marked in Four Theories because of the Cold War assumptions 
that pervade the work. Published three years after Stalin's death,~ 
Theories was strongly colored by post-war anti-communist attitudes and 
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the McCarthy Era in the United States. While this bias has become 
particularly obvious in light of recent events, its pro-American stance 
was always clear and might have been expected to arouse misgivings in 
serious scholars from the outset. Commenting on Schramm;s treatment of 
the Soviet communist press, Altschul} describes the analysis as 
"hostile." 11 Its approach is within the us-verus-them framework that also 
bedevils the Soviet analysis of the American press, .. he observes 0984: 
108>. Stevenson and Shaw note that, "The book leaves little doubt as to 
which theories are ;good and which ;bad.; It obviously is an American 
study" <1984: 135-136>. A manifestation of the effect that this 
perspective has on mass communication students is a tendency in class 
discussions for participants to dispense with the multi-syllabic labels 
prescribed in Four Theories and simply substitute the words "good" and 
"bad," with no loss of meaning among their classmates and considerable 
savings in time. 
Another sign of the times apparent in Four Theories is its 
minimization of the special challenges and functions of media in 
developing nations. This neglect was probably less purposeful and less 
conscious than the anti-Communist bias and may have resulted in part from 
obsession with the East-West conflict. Also, at the time the book was 
written, the full import of decolonization by Great Britain and other 
Western allies had not yet been realized and euphemistic "development" 
concepts were still in their heady formative stages. 
Another serious flaw of Four Theories is the authors; assumption of 
stasis. Although the four types are chronologically presented, thus 
incorporating history and time into their development, the authors do not 
suggest how a press system might evolve or deviate from its designated 
type. Indeed, the designation for the Soviet communist type is attached 
nominally to a specific nation--one that no longer exists at this 
writing. Does the type still exist if the prototype and namesake has 
been dissolved? Will the 11 types 11 themselves continue to evolve in 
response to new technologies, new environmental constraints, and the 
vicissitudes of political and social reality? Will new types of press 
systems emerge and are they to be recognized if they do? Shouldn 1 t 
theory anticipate or at least accommodate changes in situations? 
In the introduction, the authors state that Four Theories is 
predicated on the assumption that 
the press always takes on the form and coloration of the social 
and political structures within which it operates ..•. 
especially the system of social control whereby the relations 
of individuals and institutions are adjusted. We believe that 
an understanding of these aspects of society is basic to any 
systematic understanding of the press (1956: 1-2>. 
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This thesis, however, seemingly overlooks the indisputable fact that 
the press also determines the form and coloration of social and political 
structures--and always has. Also to be considered are the uses and 
effects of foreign media on the domestic front, admittedly a more 
apparent phenomenon in recent decades than in the mid 1950s. While 
William Hachten 1 S observation in World News Prism is essentially true, 
"[tlhe trend toward internationalization notwithstanding, print and 
broadcast systems are still controlled and regulated by their own 
national governments 11 (1987: 16>, the influence of transnational media on 
domestic affairs and on the conduct of the domestic media themselves is 
indisputably on the rise. 
Four Theories. then, can be criticized for presenting an 
oversimplistic and impressionistic view of the world1 S press systems that 
has impeded and distorted understanding and enshrined largely unexamined 
American perceptions and misconceptions held in the 1950s. Failure of 
the paradigm to acknowledge the dynamism of the press and that of the 
national systems with which they are affiliated has resulted in the 
paradox of a widely-acclaimed theoretical perspective that seldom has 
found application in empirical studies. 
Other Theoretical Perspectives on the World Press 
Perhaps best known of American scholarly attempts to modify Four 
Theories is William A. Hachten's reworking of the normative types. In 
The World News Prism, first published in 1981 <1987>, Hachten expands 
the original typology to encompass five categories, which he correctly 
identifies as normative concepts, rather than theories. These 
five--authoritarian, Western, communist, revolutionary, and 
developmental--are less delineated than the original four and suggest 
some overlap. Hachten proposes that 11 all press systems exist somewhere 
along a continuum from complete control <absolute authoritarianism> at 
one end to no controls <pure 1 ibertarianism) at the other 11 <1987: 16>. 
This hint of progression does not imply a linear dynamism, however, and 
indeed, analysis quickly reveals that such an evolutionary progression 
cannot be supported empirically. 
Hachten defines the revolutionary press as 11 illegal and subversive 
communication utilizing the press and broadcasting to overthrow a 
government or wrest control from alien or otherwise rejected rulers 11 
<1987: 27>. Transitional by its very nature, the revolutionary concept 
is interesting because it links such geographically and culturally 
diverse phenomena as the ''patriot 11 press preceding the American 
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Revolution, the pre-Revolutionary Bolshevik press, and more contemporary 
dissident media in the USSR, Iran, Northern Ireland, Yugoslavia, and 
other volatile spots in both hemispheres. Hachten~s most important 
contribution is the creation of a conceptual framework that accommodates 
press systems in developing countries, which he refers to sympathetically 
as "have nets" in terms of media resources. Another important 
modification is his broader definition of what he identifies as the 
Western press concept to include both libertarian and social 
responsibility. 
Under the Western rubric, Hachten includes brief mention of Robert 
Picard/s democratic-socialist press and a more detailed discussion of 
McQuail/s democratic-participant concept. Picard suggests a revision of 
the original four theories by introducing democratic-socialist as a 
Western press subtype <1982, 1985>. He argues that a democratic 
socialist consensus in Western Europe is legitimizing increased 
government intervention in press affairs, rationalized as necessary to 
ensure plurality of press ownership, social accountability, and public 
access. Interestingly, Picard locates his democratic-socialist system to 
the left of the libertarian and social responsibility systems, 
"balancing" it between the Western and communist philosophies <1985: 
67-69>. His interpretation of what can be viewed as the "social 
responsibilityu concept is analogous to anti-trust legislation in the 
sphere of laissez-faire economics. 
McQuail 1 s democratic-participant concept represents both a reaction 
to existing theory and a recognition of its marginality to understanding 
actual practice. While embracing the Hachten~s perspectives with some 
reservation, McQuail sees democratic-participation as a positive move 
toward new forms of media organization, accompanied by a sense of 
disillusionment with established political parties and with a system of 
parliamentary democracy which has seemed to become detached from its 
grass-roots origins, to impede rather than facilitate involvement in 
political and social life <1972: 99-116; 1987: 122>. McQuail focuses on 
the audience, rather than the media themselves. Somewhat idealistically, 
he identifies a movement away from ••uniform, centralized, high-cost, 
highly professionalized, neutralized, state-controlled media, .. toward 
11 mu 1 tip 1 i city, small ness of seale, 1 ocal i ty, deinst i tutional izat ion, 
interchange of sender-receiver roles, horizontality of communication 
links at all levels of society, interaction, commitment .. <1987: 122>. 
Ralph Lowenstein posits a two-tiered approach to world press theory, 
presented in Media. Messages. and Men <Merrill and Lowenstein, 1971 and 
1979> and in Macromedia: Mission. Message. and Morality <Lowenstein and 
Merrill, 1990>. On one tier, ·Lowenstein marks differences in ownership 
types--private, multiparty, and government. On the second level, he 
overlays authoritarian and libertarian press types, adding 
social-authoritarian, social-libertarian, and social-centralist, which 
correspond to Soviet communist, social responsibility, and a combination 
of Picard~s social-democratic and McQuail~s social-participant. Clearly, 
among Lowenstein~s aims is the removal of the negative connotations and 
tautology associated with the term communist and a lessening of the 
ambiguity he perceives in the term social responsibility. At the same 
time, his model creates less pejoratively-defined niches for socialist 
and developing countries and acknowledges the potential for governmental 
intrusion in the social responsibility concept. 
Though Lowenstein~s co-author, John Merrill, considers Lowenstein's 
model ''more sophisticated and realisticu than the Four Theories scheme, 
Merrill holds that Lowenstein's social-libertarian concept Jacks logical 
consistency because he believes a press cannot be at the same time free 
and subject to government regulation. He expands on this idea: 
The only way a "theory" of social responsibility could have any 
significance in any country is for governmental power elite to 
be the definer and enforcer of this type of press. Since in 
any country the organization of society--its social and 
political structure--determines to a large extent what 
responsibilities the press Cand the citizen> owe society, every 
country's press quite naturally considers itself Cor might 
logically be considered> as being socially responsible (1974>. 
In The Imperative of Freedom (1974: 25-33> and the Dialectic in 
Journalism (1989: 97-130>, Merrill argues that Lowenstein's model, like 
that of Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm and many others, has consigned 
press systems around the world nto various pigeonholes based on the 
degree of freedom they possess" C1989: 97>. The model Merrill himself 
proposes is a "political-press circle," with libertarianism at one pole 
and authoritarianism at the other, and both extremes and their offshoots 
divided into authoritarian-tending or libertarian-tending. The two 
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tendencies are interdependent "in the sense that the path from freedom to 
statism may proceed in either direction, moving through socialism or 
capitalism1 (1991: 18>. 
Another less-developed model, proposed by Shaw and Stevenson, 
likewise seeks to eliminate the bias of Four Theories by consciously 
substituting the terms "pluralistic," "stable," and "mixed" for "free,w 
"not free," and "partly free" press characteristics C1984>. Their 
efforts at congruence ascribe differences between national types to the 
degree of overlap between government, press, and public, with pluralistic 
presses, such as the United States, Iceland, and Turkey, showing less 
overlap than mixed presses, for example, Mexico, Brazil, and Egypt, and 
stable systems, such as the Soviet Union, Zaire, and Thailand, showing 
the most overlap. Their theory is employed in an empirical study of 
several press-coverage variables in 16 countries <1984>. 
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As McQuail has observed, the functionalist approach, with which all 
of the normative typologies presented to this point can be identified, 
"has been beset with difficulties, both intellectual and political 
<because of its seeming conservatism).•• McQuail notes the tautology 
inherent in perspectives that assume that "any recurrent and 
institutionalized activity serves some long-term purpose and contribution 
to the normal working of society" <1987: 69>. The functionalist paradigm 
also presupposes an agreed version of society, an assumption of right and 
wrong, "since the same media activity (e.g. mass entertainment> can 
appear in a positive light in one social theory and negatively in 
another .. C1987: 69>. Though the attempts to arrive at a more value-free 
and "rea 1 i sti C 11 mode 1 for ana 1 yz i ng the wor 1 d 1 s press have succeeded in 
reducing some of the more egregious shortcomings of Four Theories. the 
fundamental contributions of this type of theory construction remain 
rudimentary and problematic. 
Of all the American theoretical constructs, the one that comes the 
closest to approaching those of the European social critics is Herbert J. 
Altschull 1 s. In Agents of Power: The Role of the News Media in Human 
Affairs. Altschu11 makes a conscious and largely successful effort to 
avoid value-laden terms in his presentation of a three-part typology that 
consists of market, Marxist, and advancing press systems. The three 
movements, which he compares to a somewhat cacophonous symphony, parallel 
First, Second, and Third World designations and embrace 11 all the 
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realities of the environments in which the press exists, historical, 
political, social, cui tural, and--important 1 y--psychol ogical .•• An 
important aspect of Altschull's typology is his insistence on points of 
congruence among the three types, shared "laws of journalism .. or press 
roles <1984: 279-299). 
Altschull brings to his theorizing an assumption not widely shared 
by his U.S. colleagues, that the American Constitution, and more 
specifically the First Amendment, may be no more than "a semantic con 
game whose objective is the acquisition of dollars in the grubby 
marketplace of the exchange of goods11 <1984: 11-12>. His view of the 
Enlightenment notion of a "self-righting principle 11 is, likewise, 
cautious and he finds less truth in Milton's <more accurately Oliver 
Wende 1 1 Ho 1 mes' s > 11 marketp 1 ace of i deas 11 than in John Stuart M i 1 1 's more 
measured observation: 11 The dictum that truth always triumphs over 
persecution is one of those pleasant falsehoods which men repeat after 
one another till they pass into commonplace, but which all experience 
refutes 11 <Mill, 1859: 189). 
The real issue for Altschull is universal cooptation of the press by 
those in positions of power. As he writes in his chapter 11 Birth of a 
Legend,• on the creation of the myth of a free and independent press, 
The point to remember as we examine the folklore of the press 
is that the flow of information has been widely viewed over the 
centuries as of transcendent importance with regard to both 
liberty and power. Of course, there is great strength in 
language; words are indeed mighty instruments. The error is to 
proclaim the independence of the press, to fail to recognize 
that the news media are agencies of some else's power. The 
folklore, in fact, blinds us to the reality, and if on occasion 
evidence is assembled to direct our attention to it, the 
temptation Cas with all legends> is to ignore the existence of 
the evidence <1984: 19). 
Citing Weber's address to the German Sociological Association, noted 
34 
earlier in this text, Altschul) notes that 11 Sociologist Max Weber 
recognized the agency role of the press early in the twentieth century. 
He argued that 'so-called public opinion' in a modern democratic state 
was for the most part stage-managed by political leaders and the press" 
<1984: 202>. Likewise Altschull draws upon Tennies' observation that 
11 [tlhe press is the real instrument of public opinion, a weapon and tool 
in the hands of those who know how to use it and have to use it; it 
possesses universal power as the dreaded critic of events and changes in 
social conditions 11 <1984: 202). 
Thus Altschull's emphasis on commonalities and his somewhat 
empathetic description of press systems that differ markedly from that of 
the United States are not to be taken as endorsements of those systems, 
but rather as his recognition that power figures as a primary determining 
force in all national media systems. This non-partisan stance separates 
Altschull's analysis from that of the pro-Western theorists and the 
critical theorists identified with Marxist views. Altschull's work is 
also marked by its inclusion of a broad range of ideas and theories from 
other social science disciplines, most notably sociology, political 
science, and history. His integralist view is acknowledged in the 
introduction to his book From Milton to McLuhan: The Ideas Behind 
American Journalism <1990>. Though purportedly addressing mass 
communications students, he might well have been lecturing his academic 
colleagues when he wrote: 
It is among the tasks undertaken in the writing of this book to 
bring mainstream concepts into sharper focus by iluminating 
their historical roots. For the ideas described and examined 
in this study are products of other times, born in response to 
specific sets of problems and conditions and tested in the 
cauldron of the Great Debates of their eras before being handed 
down to us. As we study the origins of these ideas, we begin 
to hear in our own discussions of journalism and public affairs 
the voices of those who have gone before us C1990: 4-5>. 
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Though Agents of Power addresses and corrects many of the weaknesses 
noted in other non-critical typologies, it, nevertheless, sheds no light 
on how any system might move from one classification to another. It also 
retains labels that limit its application to the Cold-War world that 
prevailed at the time of its publication in 1984. By stressing 
commonalities, Altschull appears to transfer his own convergence 
attitudes to his press model, thus limiting its utility in identifying 
and describing the undeniably divergent behaviors of the world's presses. 
Another set of normative theories known as the political, 
neoMarxist, or "critical 11 school of communication evolved in tandem with 
the general revival of Marxist ideas in the late 1960s. As Wiio reports, 
primary support for this perspective was found in Scandinavia, Western 
Germany and England "with some names in U.S.A., Canada, France, etc." 
( 1975: 14>. 
Much of the tradition of this perspective can be traced back to the 
Frankfurt School and the culturalist approach framed by Theodore Adorno 
and Max Horkheimer (1972> and Herbert Marcuse (1964>. Marcuse used the 
term "one-dimensionaJU to describe society created by the "culture 
industry," and, paraphrasing Tunstall, for these theorists, the 11 culture 
industry• is American. 
The goal of critical theorists is, in Wiio's words, "to make people 
aware of their suffering, needs and interests" 0975: 14). Their main 
emphasis is on determining how those occupying positions of wealth and 
power implant social values by using the media. The phenomenon is 
observed both within societies or nations, and cross-culturally--as 
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industialized nations impose their culture and ideas on less-developed 
societies. Though sharing some basic· assumptions with Altschull, the 
authors of this body of work differ in that they see Western media policy 
and performance as not only deceiving the masses in the core, but also as 
blocking advances in the periphery and semi-periphery, to use 
Wallerstein/s designations. Interestingly, these scholars are 
particularly opposed to positivism or positivistic empiricism and tend to 
dismiss other schools of thought out of hand <Wiio, 1975: 14>. Herbert 
Schiller, in a 1974 UNESCO report, charged the Western powers with 
employing the media to reimpose cultural imperialism: 
If these comments suggest that we are introducing values into 
the discussion, I say 11 yes," we introduce values at ill times 
•••• It is equally desirable to recognize that there is no such 
thing as an objective, valueless television system, a system in 
which decisions are made by experts who have absolutely no 
relationship to the social order. I consider the notion of 
value 11 neutrality 11 to be fraudulent. Is it possible, really, 
to conceive to TV programming anywhere, that is unaffected by 
the social system within which the TV establishment operates? 
<Wiio, 1975: 14>. 
In a similar vein, Nordenstreng <1968 and 1974>, Ahmavaara <1974>, and 
Tunstall <1977>, and Soviets Grachev and Yermoshkin <1984> and Petrusenko 
<1976> in their pronouncements reiterated the Frankfurt School/sand 
Marxist notion of praxis. that is the blending of theory and practice, 
particularly in their analysis of the Western press and its impact on 
developing countries. 
Other neoMarxist perspectives on media and society reflect tension 
between ideological and economic determinism. Perhaps most well-known of 
those who emphasize economic structure over ideology is British 
sociologist Raymond William, usually identified as a Marxist. His 
typology, presented in Communication <1966> and elaborated in 11 Base and 
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Superstructure" C1973) is premised on the assertion that, in practice, no 
press system can be totally free C1966: 124>. He argues, 
In one way, the basic choice is between control and freedom, 
but in actual terms it is more often a choice between a measure 
of control and a measure of freedom, and the substantial 
argument is about how these can be combined (1966: 24>. 
Williams then proceeds to define authoritarian, paternal, and commercial 
press types, which correspond in a less naive way to the Four Theories' 
authoritarian, Soviet communist, and social responsibility. Williams 
also describes a utopian democratic type which, "we can only discuss and 
imagine" C1966: 128>. The major contribution of Williams is his 
recognition of the potential for tyranny in profit-based (commercial> 
systems, a propensity toward control that rivals that of authoritarian 
and paternal systems. Nevertheless, he prefers a commercial system, but 
one in which there is no private ownership. Williams calls for a "public 
system," overseen by a series of councils made up of government and media 
representatives. 
Similar views on the tyranny of personal ownership inform the work 
of N. Garnham (1979> and G. Murdock and P. Golding (1977). The latter 
hold that those who profit from the media work consistently to exclude 
"those voices lacking economic power or resources" C1977: 37>. Golding 
argues that 
the underlying logic of cost operates systemically, 
consolidating the position of groups already established in the 
main mass-media markets and excluding those groups who lack the 
capital base required for successful entry. Thus the voices 
which survive will largely belong to those least likely to 
criticise the prevailing distribution of wealth and power 
( 1977: 37>. 
Other proponents of the critical approach advocate policy in their 
writings and are active in the production of position papers and 
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critiques; however, little systematic theory has emerged from their work. 
NeoMarxists who see more control vested in ideological rather than 
economic monopoly and manipulation are said to subscribe to the hegemonic 
media theory, hegemony being Antonio Gramsci's term for a ruling ideology 
<1971>. Although Stuart Hall is more clearly identified with the less 
politically strident social-cultural approach, he nevertheless shows an 
understanding for the hegemonic perception that 
the direct imposition of one framework, by overt force or 
ideological compulsion, on a subordinate class, was not 
sophisticated enough to match the complexities of the case. 
One had also to see that dominance was accomplished at the 
unconscious as well as the conscious level: to see it as a 
property of the system of relations involved, rather than as 
the overt and intentional biases of individuals in the very 
activity of regulation and exclusion which functioned through 
language and discourse (1982: 95>. 
With Altschul I, L. Althusser and N. Poulantzas are, perhaps, most 
clearly identified with focusing attention on the mass media as conduits 
of state power and social control. In "Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses" <1971>, Althusser examines linguistic tools to reveal how 
underlying meaning and covert language structure have given legitimacy to 
the relationships of capitalism. 
Though considered an outgrowth of the Frankfurt School and generally 
Marxist in outlook, the social-culturalist approach to the press and the 
social sciences in general takes a far more positive approach to mass 
culture and their interpretation than Adorno, Berkheimer, or Marcuse. 
Adherents tend to see little distinction between economic and ideological 
hegemony, and, therefore, reject some aspects of classic Marxism <Hall~ 
~ 1987: 7-11>. Located at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies in Birmingham, England, these qualitative scholars come from a 
variety of disciplines in the humanities and social studies. The focus 
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of their work is upon audiences and messages, with special priority given 
to the effects upon minorities and other subgroups of society. The 
assumption that the media are power conduits in capitalist societies is 
central to the culturalist paradigm. Stuart Hall, recognized spokesman 
for the Birmingham School, stresses the holistic nature of the School's 
approach. 
[Iln its different ways ... , [social culturisml conceptualises 
culture as inter-woven with all social practices; and those 
practices, in turn, as a common form of human activity •••• It 
is opposed to the [Marxist] base-superstructure way of 
formulating the relationship between ideal and material forces, 
especially where the base is defined by the determination by 
the 'economic' in any simple sense <Gurevitch, 1982: 26-27>. 
An intellectual perspective that has some potential for world press 
theorizing is information-society theory, though its application to 
empirical research or practical policy-making is not well-developed at 
this time. Information society theory discards many of the assumptions 
that underlie both functional and critical theory, focusing not on the 
content of messages, the intent of senders, or the interpretation of 
receivers, but rather on the means of conveying the message <McQuail, 
1987: 75-78). The work of Marshall McLuhan, though now out of vogue, 
best summarizes this view <1964, 1967>. McLuhan maintained that it is 
the technology of communication that has the greatest impact on humans 
and the way they think and not the content of that communication. For 
instance, McLuhan maintains that the printing press <and the alphabet> 
ushered in a rational, linear way of thinking that characterized the 
"modern age." Rationality has become obsolete with the all-around, 
three-dimensional perception called for in the video or ... information 
age." McLuhan viewed this development with some alarm and saw 
civilization returning to the aural patterns of traditional and 11 Third 
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WorldH societies. Obviously, the concept of nationalism has little 
meaning in the context of a single, global information society. 
Nevertheless, J.L. Salvaggio proposes a world press theory that 
defines four primary international models: competition, public utility, 
communist, and Third World. The major determinants in the scheme are 
ideology, economy, political party, and external factors <1985). 
Information-society views are also incorporated in many of the writings 
of postmodernist sociologists <Giddens, 1990; Stauth and Turner, 1988). 
A final approach, the contingency model, was presented with some 
optimism by Osmo Wiio in 1975 <1975: 7-22) and included in L. John Martin 
and Anju Chaudhary/s Comparative Mass Media Systems <Martin and 
Chaudhart, 1983; Wiio, 1983); however, it has received minimal attention 
in the United States, perhaps because it yields unpredictable and 
ambiguous conclusions. The contingency theory proposes that the number 
of internal and external variables accompanying any communication act 
make it impossible to establish cause or predict outcomes in all 
situations. Based on research conducted at the Helsinki Research 
Institution for Business Economics, of which Wiio is director, the 
contingency model is derived from organization theory. The primary 
assumption is defined in the "motto11 : 
Rather than searching for the panacea of the one best way to 
organize under all conditions, investigators have more and more 
tended to examine the functioning of organizations in relation 
tothe needs of their particular members and the external 
pressures facing them. Basically, this approach seems to be 
leading to the development of a "contingency" theory of 
organizations ith the appropriate internal states and processes 
of the organizations contingent upon external requirements and 
member needs <Lersch and Lawrence, 1970: 1). 
The communication theory Wile proposes for the world/s press is 
comprised of two-by-two comparisons of variable pairs. For example, 
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press systems .might be examined to determine whether they have open or 
closed receiver system <anyone can be the audience or a select few can be 
in the audience>, or an open or closed messenger system (it is easy or it 
is difficult to send messages>. Other variable pairs are ownership 
(public or private> and control (centralized and decentralized>. The 
binomial pairings are thus similar to the on-off programming of computer 
circuits. 
Wiio views the contingency model as freeing press study from the 
constraints of more rigid typologies. Using his model, national press 
systems might find themselves categorized with different bedfellows in 
different studies, depending upon the dimension or variable used to 
measure them. He concludes that, for example, 11 there really is no 
/Western model/ for mass communication; it all depends on what dimensions 
have been selected for analysis. Possibly the clearest difference is 
between a 11 monolithic model/ and a /pluralistic model/ <1983: 92>. This 
model has heuristic potential for dynamism and, more than any other 
non-critical approach, avoids the pitfalls of functionalist paradigms. 
In reviewing the ideas and concepts that define current approaches 
to understanding the world/s media, it becomes clear that the vast body 
of social theory that has informed and united scholarship in other social 
science disciplines has not been incorporated into the study of mass 
media. With the exception of Herbert Altschull and, perhaps, John 
Merrill, most of those probing the mysteries of the international press 
have approached their task without the benefit of the historical maps 
that guide theorists in other fields. Perhaps these mass communication 
scholars, most of whom spent their early years in the trenches as 
professional journalists, have brought with them into academe the 
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philosophy of the "burning present,u or retained the notion, as Gaye 
Tuchman writes, that ll(p]rocessing ne.ws leaves no time for reflexive 
epistemological examination• <1972: 662>. 
Many of the social phenomena that have attracted recent theoretical 
attention, e.g., agenda setting, the knowledge gap, two-step flow, 
cognitive consistency, attitude-change, diffusion, uses and 
gratifications, and cultivation theory, were identified and, at least, 
tentatively explored by sociologists and other scholars early in the 20th 
century before mass communication became a recognized discipline. The 
contributions of these early thinkers and relevant ideas from other 
disciplines go uncited in many recent mass communication works. This 
phenomenon, which Sorokin has identified as the "discoverer/a complex, .. 
is the manifestation of 11 a sort of amnesia.•• Sorokin might well have 
been addressing directly the communication scholars of today when he 
wrote that the new generation of social scientists 
claims that nothing important has been discovered in their 
fields during all the preceding centuries; that there were only 
some vague 11 arm-chair philosophies11 ; and that the real 
scientfic era in these disciplines began only in the last two 
or three decades with the publication of their own researches 
and those of members of their clique <Sorokin, 1956: 3-4>. 
Three centuries ago, Sir Isaac Newton conceded, 11 1£ I have seen 
further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants." Robert Merton 
explained: 11 In its figurative meaning, [Newton/s remark] explains the 
growth of knowledge and culture in virtually every area of learning you 
can mention. Newton/s aphorism means that no investigator starts out 
with a tabula rasa or clean slate•• <Whitman, 1976>. 
In the following chapter, a number of areas of social theory will be 
explored that hold promise for the construction of a dynamic and holistic 
theoretical model of the world/s press. Among methological and 
theoretical ideas examined will be Weber/s ideal types, grounded theory, 
social action theory, phenomenological and situational analysis as 
applied in macroanalysis, symbolic interactionism and dramaturgy, 
dramaturgical motive, and the sociology of knowledge. 
43 
Endnotes 
1. The attraction of simplicity in theory can be compared to the 
tendency of media gatekeepers to select simple, clear, and unambiguous 
new stories over more complex ones that may be deserving of attention, 
but are inconsistent with newsroom needs, e.g., speed of reporting, ease 
of verification, and audience expectation CGaltung and Ruge, 1970; Gans, 
1979; Tuchman, 1972, 1978>. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL GROUNDING 
OF A DYNAMIC WORLD PRESS THEORY 
Derivation and Explanation of Method 
Introductory Thoughts on the Integration 
of Method. Theory. and Empiricism 
Were this text to be chronologically ordered, the process of 
grounding the dynamic theory would begin with a summary of empirical 
observations on the world's press. A panoply of variables might be 
examined to illustrate how one national system could be distinguished 
from another or how characteristics of a single national system today 
might differ from those it exhibited at some previous point in time. 
Among the findings that could be reported would be analyses of media 
content; ratios of information, entertainment, and persuasion; 
definitions of news; breakdowns of audiences and audience effects; 
financing and ownership patterns, organizational structure, news 
gathering processes, newsroom socialization, attitudes toward foreign 
media fare, proportional coverage of international news, historical 
traditions, relations to other social institutions, and myriads of other 
quantitative and qualitative analyses generated by mass media 
researchers. 
Clearly the blitz of data that could be brought to bear on a subject 
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as broad as national press systems has the capacity to overwhelm and 
frustrate understanding, as well as the potential to facilitate 
meaningful interpretation. Observation not only preceded, but also 
outweighed theoretical and methodological components in the construction 
of this theory. However, the end product of this endeavor is informed by 
existing methodologies and social theories--as well as by empirical 
evidence on how press systems go about their daily business. And since 
an ultimate goal of all theory is to enable observers to assign 
contextual meaning to fact, the empirical portion of the present work, 
comprised of case summaries, follows the presentation of the theory 
itself. In this way the dynamic theory provides an interpretive frame 
for observations and the case summaries test and illustrate the 
credibility of the theory. 
Paradoxes apparent from the outset of the project dictated the use 
of an eclectic methodology derived from micro- and macroanalytical 
approaches and positivist as well as postpositivist perspectives. Jack 
Katz, in his essay on analytical induction, warns of the risk of 
11 ignor[ing] diver·sity in methods and focus[ing] on one qualitative 
research strategy 11 (1988: 130>. 
Reconciling Ideal Types and Grounded Theory 
The methodology used in the formulation of the dynamic theory is a 
blending of Max Weber's ideal types <1904; 1921a>, and the more recently 
formulated 11 grounded theory, 11 a systematic approach to theory 
construction first articulated by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss 
<1967>. Weber's and Glaser/Strauss's approaches are compatible; that is, 
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grounded theory's "categories" may be equated with Weber"s types and both 
champion the inductive process. However, the former is generally 
associated with the construction of middle-range substantive theory 
emerging from fieldwork, such as Charmaz"s study of people suffering from 
chronic illnesses <1980, 1982>, Glaser and Strauss"s treatment of the 
terminally ill <1964> and, in retrospect, Howard Becker"s ethnography of 
medical students, Boys in White <1961>. In contrast, ideal types tend to 
be identified with more detached observation, macro structures, and 
formal theory, notably Weber's classic works on forms of legitimized 
power <1921b: 941-1372> and the links between Protestantism and the 
development of captalism <1905/1906>; Durkheim"s writings on solidarity 
(1884> and suicide <1897>; and Merton's anlysis of the nature of social 
deviance <1957>. Despite the formal overtones of these studies, their 
focus on substantive issues must be acknowledged. 
The chief value of the grounded theory method as a qualitative 
strategy is its integration of fact, theory, and process and its 
rejection of logico-deductive reasoning. Data collection and analysis 
proceed simultaneouly, though data retain the upper hand. Analysis 
<theorizing) leads to new strategies of data collection and theoretical, 
or purposive, sampling, which in turn redirect or sharpen the focus of 
analysis. Thus a cyclical process is prescribed, from which meaningful 
categories emerge as "core variables" which, as Charmaz notes, 11 fit the 
data, rather than forcing the data 11 <1988: 112>. The process continues 
until all conceptul categories are exhausted, fully elaborated and 
refined. Termination of the process is problematic, since purposive 
sampling is potentially infinite. Nevertheless, the systematic 
application of the method results in higher and higher levels of 
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abstraction. The degree of abstraction, then, eventually suggests an end 
point. 
Though Glaser and Strauss enumerate step-by-step procedures for 
coding, memo-writing, categorizing, filing, and shuffling, in practice, 
the grounded-theory process took on a life of its own, for distinctions 
between observation, theory, and process soon blurred among the flurry of 
notes and diagrams. As Charmaz suggests, "Each researcher who adopts the 
approach likely develops his or her own variations of technique" <1988: 
125). 
In the final chapter of Grounded Theory. the authors conclude that 
The root source of all significant theorizing is the sensitive 
insights of the observer himself. As eveyone knows, these can 
come in the morning or at night, suddenly or with slow dawning, 
while at work or at play <even when asleep>; furthermore, they 
can be derived directly from theory <one 1 s own or someone 
else 1 s) or occur without theory (1967: 251). 
As its micro focus suggests, the grounded theory method is 
commonly associated with perspectives of the Chicago School and 
symbolic interactionism <Charmaz, 1988; Rock, 1979). However, by 
centering so fixedly on the priority of data, Glaser and Strauss 
imply that the data speak for themselves. A more phenomenological 
approach, such as that advocated by Charmaz, yielded more fruitful 
findings <1988: 112). CharmaZ 1 S reference to the notion that 
actors 1 accounts can be accepted at face value <Schutz, 1967; 
Blumer, 1969) may also be applied at the macro level <Weber, 1921b: 
941-1372; Mills, 1940; Merton, 1957>, particularly in the study of 
mass media, whose stock in trade is symbolic communication. 
Ideal-type methodology, though more obviously germane to the 
endeavor at hand because of Weber 1 s interest in "big empirical 
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questionsu <1904: 80>, is far less specific in its instructions than 
Grounded Theory. Whereas Glaser and Strauss present a research 
instruction manual, Weber provided a philosophy--or rather 
philosophies, for his conception of ideal types embraced two 
approaches with different analytical goals. Most of his writing on 
ideal types advocated the construction of historical types based on 
specific events and situations. His last work, however, signaled a 
radical reconceptualization to broader, universally-applicable types 
that were intended to encompass all social action. <These are 
discussed and differentiated below.> 
For Weber always, the sociologist/s task was to concern himself 
"with the interpretive understanding of social action" and ideal 
types were seen as providing an "analytical ordering of reality"--an 
abstracted and streamlined construction intended to elicit 
"rational" meaning from the complexity of the social world, but not 
to recreate the social world. For, as Weber insisted, the 
delineation of types was not to be confused with "historical reality 
nor even the /true/ reality. It is even less fitted to serve as a 
schema under which a real situation or action is to be subsumed as 
one instance," he wrote <1904: 93>. 
Weber/s views on "causal explanation for the course and 
consequences of social action,A are often misinterpreted as a search 
for social laws that parallel the force of physical laws recognized 
in the natural sciences. But that kind of causation, Weber 
maintained, could only be apprehended by logic and the artificial 
rationality inherent in ideal types. However, he wrote, 
Asociological investigation attempts to include in its scope various 
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irrational phenomena, such as prophetic, mystic, and affectual modes 
of action 11 C1921a: 20>. Clearly, Weber was not concerned with 
establishing absolute causality in the "narrower exact natural 
science sense, but [rather] with adequate causal relationships 
expressed in rules and with the application of the category of 
'objective possibi 1 ity"• CWeber, 1904: 80>. One need not accept 
Weber's inference of the apprehension of absolute rationality on a 
theoretical plane to understand his argument that absolute causality 
cannot be imputed to or derived from observed social action. 
Weber saw ideal types, then, as theoretical constructs based on 
the fiction or •• ideaP of rational social action. In a sense, ideal 
types serve as hypothetical control groups against which 11 real 11 
social action can be measured. The work of the analyst is, as Weber 
argued, to measure, compare, and eventually understand how and, 
11 approximately,•• why observed social action deviates from these 
theoretical constructions. 
While adopting Weber's general methodological strategy, the 
dynamic theory does not adhere to Weber's notion that ideal types 
embody 11 true•• rationality, as indicated in his observation, 11 The 
construction of a purely rational course of action in such cases 
serves the sociologist as a type Cideal type) which has the merit of 
clear understandability and a lack of ambiguity ... He follows this 
assertion by juxtapositioning 11 actual action•• to assess its 
deviation from the ideal caused by ••irrational factors of all sorts, 
such as affects and errorsu (1921: 6>. Weber's implication that 
11 actual action 11 is deviant or, by inference, 11 pathological, 11 must be 
rejected. 
In his earlier methodological writings and in his well-known 
substantive works, Weber proposed and utilized time- and 
space-specific ideal types in the analysis of historical events 
(1904; 1905/1906; 1921a1 ). His rationale for the emphasis on 
11 pure 11 or historical types was stated in terms of their utility in 
providing concrete understanding of historical events. At this 
point Weber was critical of more expansive typological schemes, 
arguing that 
(flor the knowledge of historical phenomena in their 
concreteness, the most general laws, because they are most 
devoid of content are also the least valuable. The more 
comprehensive the validity,--or scope--of a term, the more it 
leads us away from the richness of reality since in order to 
include the common elements of the largest possible number of 
phenomena, it must be necessarily be as abstract as possible 
and hence devoid of content. In the cultural sciences, the 
knowledge of the universal or general is never valuable in 
itself (1904: 80>. 
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Had Weber's development of ideal types stopped here, he might have 
endorsed the narrow perspective of world-press typologies that order the 
world's press into political- and time-specific categories that reproduce 
11 the richness of reality" to their time and place. 
However, as Weber also observed in The Methodology. the danger of 
such historical specificity lies in the fact that uhistorical knowledge 
here appears as a servant of theory instead of the opposite role. It is 
a great temptation for the theorist to regard this relationship either as 
the normal one or, far worse, to mix theory with history" C1904: 102>. 
Weber also wrote that such specificity necessitates "attempts to discover 
ever new aspects of significance by the construction of new ideal-typical 
concepts •••• " (1904: 97>. 
Arguing against the concept of "normative types"--presumably of the 
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nature of the press types presented in Four Iheories and its 
derivatives--, Weber wrote that the 11 ideas" of a given historical epoch 
are not interchangeable with the abstracted "ideals11 of that epoch. 
In this sense, however, the 11 ideasu are naturally no longer 
purely logical auxiliary devices, no longer concepts with which 
reality is compared, but ideals by which it is evaluatively 
judged. Here it is no longer a matter of the purely 
theoretical procedure of treating empirical reality with 
respect to values but of value-judgments which are integrated 
into the concept •••• (1904: 98>. 
He also suggested that the scholar 
who on one hand seeks to 11 understand.. the epoch of which he 
speaks 11 in its own terms,.. and on the other st i 11 seeks to 
11 judge 11 it, feels the need to derive the standards for his 
judgment from the subject-matter itself, i.e. to allow the 
.. idea .. in the sense of the ideal to emerge from the 11 idea11 in 
the sense of the 11 ideal 11 type C1904: 98>. 
In his last writings, Weber seemingly abandoned the notion of 
historical types, perhaps because of the historicity and bias he saw as 
unavoidable in their derivation and application. In Part One of Economy 
and Society Weber advocated deriving more generally-applicable ideal 
types that might be applied to all social action. 
We have taken for granted that sociology seeks to formulate 
type concepts and generalized uniformities of empirical 
process. This distinguishes it from history, which is oriented 
to the causal analysis and explanation of individual actions, 
structures, and personalities possessing cultural significance 
•.•. An important consideration in the formulation of 
sociological concepts and generalizations is the contribution 
that sociology can make toward the causal explanation of same 
historically and culturally important phenomenon. As in the 
case of every generalizing science the abstract character of 
the concepts of sociology is responsible for the fact that, 
compared with actual historical reality, they are relatively 
lacking in fullness of concrete content (1921a: 19-20>. 
Weber sought to distinguish the focus of the sociologist more 
clearly from that of the historian. As Turner et al. note, "There is 
same indication that Weber intended to rewrite .the earlier material in 
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terms of the system of concepts he had recently developed• CTurner, et 
~ 1989: 196>. The most outstanding feature of his revised approach 
was apparent acceptance of the notion that useful generalization was 
possible on a broader though more abstract level. 
Another intended aim of ideal type methodology was the maximization 
of objectivity, for Weber remained committed to the disputed proposition 
that value-free research was indeed feasible. Carrying this point 
further then, as Weber himself did in his later elaborations, it would 
seem that researchers constructing ideal types on the basis of behavior 
or actions Cor their justifications> would be less prone to confuse the 
substance/subjects of analysis with the heuristic device of ideal types. 
In the present work, action-derived ideal types are adopted as analytical 
tools for understanding the world's press systems, directing attention to 
what national media do and are perceived to be doing rather than to who 
each nation is and to which geopolitical camp it belongs. This shift in 
perspective carries with it the corollary assumption that a nation's 
media behavior is more subject to fluctuation and change than its 
geopolitical identity. 
In his initial discussion of ideal types, Weber's only bow to 
dynamism was his admission that the development of new types may be 
necessary from time to time (1904: 97>. In The Protestant Ethic. which 
Weber conducted as a quasi-experimental study with other major religions 
serving as control variables, categories were mutually exclusive. That 
is, Weber assumed that societies or individuals were either all 
Protestant, or all Roman Catholic or all Taoist. The assumption of 
mutual exclusivity also informed Durkheim's typologies on suicide and 
solidarity. In his conceptualization of power reiflcation, however, 
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Weber does suggest movement, as from charismatic leadership to either 
traditional or rational systems. A significant contribution of this last 
work is the acknowledgment of overlap in empirical findings. Citing as 
illustration the likelihood that the same historical phenomenon may be 
"in one aspect feudal, in another patrimonial, in another bureaucratic, 
and in st i 11 another charismatic, 11 Weber observes that 11 it is probab 1 y 
seldom if ever that a real phenomenon can be found which corresponds 
exactly to one of these ideally constructed pure types 11 C1921a: 20>. 
Although it is always difficult to 11 type" Weber himself, he is 
generally associated with positivism because of his perceived emphasis on 
empiricism, causality, generalizability, and objectivity. However, there 
is ample reason to question this characterization, as the foregoing 
discussion suggests. Weber's view of sociological inquiry incorporates 
many of the postpositivist views espoused by Glaser and Strauss. 
Ironically his emphasis on 11 Subjective meanings 11 is perhaps more in tune 
with the phenomenological approaches of Schutz and Garfinkel than Glaser 
and Strauss are--though in fact Weber had difficulty incorporating this 
strategy into his research. 
Furthermore, Weber's concern with establishing 11 approximate" causal 
explanations is mirrored in grounded theory's tendency to •focus on 
constructing mode 1 s which serve both to describe and exp 1 a in the system. 11 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 205; Reason and Rowan, 1981: 185-86>. 
Explanation in this sense is viewed simply as identification of observed 
patterns of relationship or interconnectedness; predictability, then, 
extends to the likelihood, but not the certainty, that such patterns will 
be repeated under similar conditions. On the subject of generalization, 
naturalistic inquirers Yvonne Lincoln and Egon Guba acknowledge that 
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"many [of today's postpositivistsl have subscribed to the proposition 
that generalization is among the most basic of scientists' goals" <1985: 
111>--this despite their stated view that "the only generalization is 
there is no generalization." The suspicion raised here is that, except 
for the level of theory addressed, little separates the methods proposed 
by postpositivists Glaser and Strauss, Lincoln and Guba from those 
advocated by Weber. 
In acknowledging and stressing the centrality of "subjective 
meaning," Weber argued that social action can only be understood when "it 
is placed in an intelligible and more inclusive context of meaning" 
<1921: 8). Lincoln and Guba embrace grounded theory because of its 
rejection of all "a priori assumptions" and because "grounded theory is 
more likely to be responsive to contextual values" (1985: 36-37, also see 
202-211). 
At the same time, Lincoln and Guba note in their discussion of 
"emergent design" that theorists bring with them a bank of tacit 
knowledge of both a factual and theoretical nature. 
The investigator may possess a great deal of tacit knowledge 
that is germane to the phenomena to be studied. And as the 
inquiry proceeds, it becomes more and more focused; salient 
elements begin to emerge, insights grow, and theory begins to 
be grounded in the data obtained." <1985, 209>. 
Tacit knowledge, both factual and theoretical, undoubtedly colored 
the selection of methods employed in the construction of the dynamic 
theory. Separating theory from facts may well be a linguistic illusion. 
Lincoln and Guba write, 
It seems clear that in a naturalistic investigation tacit 
knowledge can and does come into play; the units of data upon 
which grounded theory is ultimately based may emerge because of 
the investigator's implicit apprehension of their importance 
rather than because a specific theoretical formuation brought 
them into focus <1985: 208>. 
Expectations and Assumptions Guiding Method 
With tacit and expressed knowledge come opinion, assumptions, and 
perhaps most important, expectations for the utility of the theory to be 
derived. Without some minimal expectations, no serious theorizing would 
ever be undertaken. In contemplating the creation of a new world press 
theory, many of the expectations represented reaction to the perceived 
failure of existing theory. Discussed below are the five most salient 
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expectations, that were noted at the outset of this project. Assumptions 
inherent in each expectation are also included. 
Foremost among these was the expectation that the theoretical map 
must closely match the actual territory, a somewhat less ambitious goal 
than Katz's desire to establish "a perfect relation between data and 
explanation" <1988: 130>. Implicit in this expectation is the assumption 
that what people perceive and symbolically define as 11 real 11 .!.§. 11 real," 
and that this reality can be cognitively snared and understood. 
Second, a new theory was expected to address and accommodate the 
potential dynamism and potential transformational capacity of the press. 
The assumption is that the press is a social institution and necessarily 
adjusts to and justifies social change. Press activity that works to 
maintain the status quo is viewed as process and a form of ongoing 
adjustment. Concomitant with this assumption is another: all social 
institutions, the press among them, behave in a voluntaristic manner, as. 
extension of personal interaction. 
Third, an evolving theory was expected to be bring about an 
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"analytical ordering of reality" from the chaos of empiricism. The 
assumption arising from this expectation is one that all would-be 
theorists must make--that the distortion inherent in a parsimonious model 
is significantly less than the error inherent in the interpretation of 
unstructured and unrelated findings. 
Fourth, in reaction to the Cold War biases that polarized the world 
since 1945, and to a lesser extent since 1917, a new theory was expected 
to be po 1 it i ca 11 y "va 1 ue-neutra I." That is, the theory might and wou I d 
be applied in an interpretive way, but in its conception it must be value 
neutral so as to not preclude the possibility of objectivity, as elusive 
as that goal might be. This expectation carries with it the assumption 
that objectivity is achievable and desirable at the theoretical level. A 
corollary assumption is that objectivity cannot be achieved in empirical 
research if the theoretical grounding is skewed. 
Finally, a new theory was expected to be holistic in scope and 
accommodate all the world's presses across time--hence the attraction of 
a social-action frame. Not ruled out was the possibility that a holistic 
theory might also be extended to describe and contrast different 
communication industries and practices within national systems. The 
assumption implicit in this expectation is that press behavior and 
national policy toward the press can be generalized across time and 
space. 
The present work to some degree reconciles postpositivist and 
positivist approaches, merging the former's quest for a network of 
"'working hypotheses' that describe the individual case" with the 
Weberian notion of ideal-types and generalization drawn from his later 
interpretations. For it is proposed here that, within an over-arching 
macro canopy, press motivation may be regarded as springing from a 
universal social action scheme--a non-deterministic typology that is 
sufficiently broad to withstand the onslaughts of time, geopolitics, and 
other manifestations of social change. 
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Though press systems themselves denote cultural and institutional 
constructs in the macro realm, the emphasis on situational contingency, 
voluntarism, and subjectivity of social action incorporates the 
social-psychological focus stressed by Mead and symbolic interactionists. 
The great appeal of this multi-layered approach was its potential 
for deriving a theory general enough to include all of the world's press 
behavior, yet specific enough to be of some actual use. The challenge 
was to avoid what C. Wright Mills identified in Parsons's work as "a 
level of thinking so general that its practitioners cannot logically get 
down to observation" <1959: 33>. 
Application of Relevant Social Thought 
to World Press Theory 
Overview of Theoretical Groundings 
Nowhere is the linkage between method and theory more clearly 
illustrated than in Weber's presentation of social action theory as an 
extension of ideal types <1921a>, for as Turner et al. point out, Weber's 
scheme enabled the achievement of two goals: increased understanding of 
the elements of social action and discovery of unique variations in 
specific empirical cases <1989: 198). In this section, the basic frame 
for the dynamic theory is grounded in basic ideas advanced in Weber's 
social action theory. Modifications to Weber's typology are appended 
from similar ideas proposed by Bronislaw Malinowski in A Theory of 
Culture and Other Essays, published posthumously <1944>. Motive theory, 
more specifically the dramaturgical concept of motive as subsequent to 
action, is another body of existing social thought that informs the 
emerging construct. Although dramaturgical and phenomenological 
perspectives on motives and accounts are generally associated with micro 
levels of analysis, motives and motive vocabularies are interpreted as 
essential strategies for coordinating social action at the macro level. 
They are also shown to be consistent with Weber's central notion of 
11 Subjective meaning" and 11 interpretive understanding.n 
Although treated in less detail, aspects of the sociology of 
knowledge and symbolic interactionism are also noted in this section. 
The relevance of these concepts to the process of understanding the 
world's press is illustrated in the course of the theoretical grounding, 
although their relationship to the dynamic theory is documented in 
Chapter IV, in which the dynamic theory is formally presented and 
explained. 
Social Action Theory as Analytical Device 
59 
As a prelude to presentation of his social action theory, Weber paid 
minimal tribute to the utility of the functionalist frame of reference 
for "purposes of practical illustration and for provisional orientation." 
However, he maintained, "if [functionalism's] cognitive value is 
overestimated and its concepts illegitimately 'reified,' it can be highly 
dangerous 11 • 2 Weber observed that whereas the study of biological 
organisms must be restricted to observation of functional relationships 
(from which generalizations may be made>, "subjective understanding is 
the specific characteristic of sociological knowledge... He wrote, 
We can accomplish something which is never attainable in the 
natural sciences, namely the subjective understanding of the 
action of the component individuals .... This additional 
achievement of explanation by interpretive understanding, as 
distinguished from external observation, is of course attained 
only at a price--the more hypothetical and fragmentary 
character of its results C1921a: 15>. 
Clearly Weber went to special pains to disassociate his action 
theory from the functionalist-organicist paradigm; yet because Talcott 
Parsons traced his functional determinism to Weber;s work, 3 there is 
a tendency in the discipline to identify all approaches to social action 
and, occasionally, symbolic interaction CHuber, 1973; Kanter, 1972; 
Nicolaus, 1970> with structural-functionalism. This indiscriminate view 
is reinforced by Malinowski;s association with both functional 
anthropology and social action theory. 
Functionalist assumptions are rejected in the dynamic theory. 
Rather, the bases of the new construct are motive. rather than function; 
voluntarism and situation rather than determinism. 
Although the formal nature of the dynamic theory perhaps suggests 
broad application to various national institutions, such breadth is 
beyond the scope of this work. By deliberately focusing the substantive 
content of this work on national press systems, the intention is to 
minimize the abstract, 11 hypothetical and fragmentary character" of the 
explanation the theory provides and to test its utility by employing it 
to describe and explain specific behaviors and characteristics of the 
mass media. 
In his analyses, Weber defined social action as including overt 
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behavior, failure to act, and passive acquiescence to the behavior of 
others. Furthermore, he believed that social action "may be oriented to 
the past, present, or expected future behavior of others" (1921a: 22>. 
However, he did narrow his interpretation by excluding action solely 
oriented toward inanimate objects and actions where behavior is not 
meaningfully oriented to that of others. He cited as an example an 
unanticipated collision between two cyclists, which he compared to "a 
natural event" <1921a: 23>. 
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In interpreting the world press, "social action" of the media is 
manifest in media content, editorial and advertising policy, codes of 
ethics, financial and organizational structures, response to available 
technology, and interaction with various constituencies, such as domestic 
audiences, government, the economic community, and world opinion. 
Weber saw social action, and indeed all action, as oriented in four 
ways: 1> instrumentally rational; 2> value-rational; 3> affectual, that 
is, emotional; and 4> traditional. While affectual orientation, to which 
Weber gave only cursory treatment, is relevant to the behavior of 
individuals, it has little if any application to institutions and macro 
structures, the focus of the present study. Affect, it may be argued, is 
subsumed by the other ideal types and Weber minimizes it by considering 
such behavior as only marginally meaningful <1921a: 24-25>. 
Traditional action, Weber maintained, is determined by ingrained 
"habituation," and, like affectual action, "lies very close to the 
borderline of what can justifiably be called meaningfully oriented 
action." It is the "almost automatic" nature of traditional behavior, 
suggesting action that is not self-conscious, that accounts for Weber's 
lack of interest in in-depth examination of this type, which he 
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identified somewhat dismissively with "the great bulk of everyday action'' 
and with primitive, 11 pre-industrial social systems" C1921a: 24-25>. 
Despite his expressed interest in interaction at the personal level, 
Weber's primary concentration throughout his work was on institutional 
and other macro social structures, and more pointedly on what he saw as 
the "rational" action of modern, industrialized nations, or 
"rational-legal societies." His analysis, therefore, focused on 
instrumentally rational and value-rational action, the dualism he saw as 
circumscribing contemporary capitalist institutions in Western Europe and 
the United States. 
Instrumental behavior, then, was described by Weber as action 
prescribed by "expectations as to the behavior of objects in the 
environment and of other human beings ••. for the attainment of the 
actor's own rationally pursued and calculated ends" C1921a: 24.) 
Economic, or perhaps more broadly, material attainment for its own sake. 
rather than to satisfy the most basic physical needs for subsistence, was 
posited as one of the two primary justifications of social action in 
industrialized nations. The other, in opposition to Karl Marx's more 
narrow determinism, was value-rational behavior, "determined by a 
conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, 
aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its 
prospects for success• C1921a: 25>. 
The dynamic theory incorporates these two orientations--referred to 
hereafter as instrumental and value Cor.ideational> orientations--as 
essential bases for understanding and describing the world's press 
systems. However, Weber's scheme does not adequately account for social 
action and press behavior in less developed, less industrialized nations 
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in what is now commonly, if unfortunately, labeled the Third World. The 
proposition that social action in these countries is 11 determined by 
ingrained habituation,. and is, therefore, governed by some mysterious, 
non-reasoning instinct cannot be credited. The very concept of 
nationhood is incompatible with non-self-consciousness and habituated 
instinct. And certainly any national society that aspires to communicate 
with itself via the mass media has broken with tradition. 
Yet, the behavior of developing nations~ exhibit characteristics 
that indicate a primary orientation other than the values and material 
attainment that Weber ascribes to industrialized nations. Bronislaw 
Mal inowsky proposed three ''system levels 11 that meet the basic requisites 
of social systems. His functionalist scheme posited the "structural 
system level," paralleling Weber/s instrumental orientation; "symbolic 
level," comparable to Weber/s value orientation; .anQ 11 the biological 
level." The biological level, as Malinowsky viewed it, formed the base 
of a hierarchy upon which instrumental and symbolic needs represent 
successively higher levels of development. Whereas both Weber and 
Malinowsky concentrated on instrumental and value-oriented action, it is 
proposed here that survival itself is perceived as justification for 
national action in a large portion of the world. 
Survival is usually viewed by organicists and functionalists as an 
underlying precondition of human existence, necessarily antecedent or 
concomitant with other needs CMaslow, 1970: 35-58; Parsons, 1978; 
Spencer, 1895, among others>. Here it is argued that survival is 
perceived as a legitimate justification for action that usually, but not 
always, takes precedence over instrumental and value motives. When 
continued survival of the nation, its society, institutions, and/or its 
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leadership are seen as being in jeopardy, action tends to be predicated 
almost totally on survival. Obviously, survival orientation comes into 
play not only in the highly vulnerable emerging nations of the Third 
World, but in "rational-legal" nations as well, when military or economic 
threat is perceived as imminent. In integrated and stable societies, 
press systems are seen as sharing and embodying these national 
orientations--instrumental, ideational, and survival. 
Motivation Theory and the Justification 
of Press Activity 
The central component of the dynamic theory is the linkage of motive 
and motive vocabularies to the action types of of instrumental, value, 
and survival strategies. McQuail sees the focus on motive as providing 
common ground in comparative press study that functional analysis is 
unable to deliver. He strengthens his argument by suggesting that 
motive-based theories can be tested 1> by observing "media activity (a 
/task/ of the media), which can be more or less objectively named;" and 
2> by examining "statementrsl of purpose, value, utility or end provided 
by one or other of the users, or expected beneficiaries." In the second 
point, media content and self-analysis must be included, for as McQuail 
adds, 
Although there is an objective element in this version of media 
function, the construct as a whole is essentially subjective 
.... Thus what the audience member thinks he or she derives 
from media is part of "commonsense theory" and what media 
practitioners think of as their purpose is part of "working 
theory", while sociologists or social theorists try to render 
what society expects or receives from the activities of the 
media (1987: 70>. 
John Dewey;s description of human activity obtains to a description 
of its institutions, and he might well have been describing the activity 
of the media when he wrote of 11 man" in 1922, 
In truth, man acts anyway, he can;t help acting. In every 
fundamental sense, it is false that a man requires a motive to 
make him do something ••• It is absurd to ask what induces a 
man to activity generally speaking. He is an active being and 
that is all there is to be said on that score <1922: 119). 
In contemplating the world;s press, the assumption is made that 
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simply by existing and functioning, media and media systems act, that is, 
they engage in activity that can be observed and commented upon. If 
media or media organizations fail to act it can only be because they no 
longer exist. The focus then moves to motives--that is verbal and 
subjective justification of acts already underway or completed. The 
stuff of motives is words, or 11 accounts, 11 to use Marvin Scott and 
Stanford Lyman;s term. More specifically, the term 11 motives 11 refers to 
the ability of talk <or written words> 11 tO shore up the timbers of 
fractured sociation, its ability to throw bridges between the promised 
and the performed, its ability to repair the broken and restore the 
estranged <Scott and Lyman, 1968: 46>. 
Within the context of this dramaturgical definition of motive, 
stress is placed not on how activity originates, but how it is directed 
and interpreted by the actor/s. As Dennis Brissett and Charles Edgley 
observe in Life as Theatre. motives are viewed as ways people rationalize 
acts 11 to make conduct meaningful to those around them and to themselves, 
anq typically they do so retrospectively 11 <1974: 152>. The 
interpretation of motive adopted in this text and incorporated into the 
dynamic theory is that people likewise rationalize after the fact the 
acts of institutions such as the press, with which they interact. 
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The acceptance of the a~ticulated motive as the u~eal motiveu is an 
essential tenet of this pe~spective, fo~ as C. W~ight Mills a~gues, 
"The~e is no way to plumb behind ve~balization. 11 The only empirical 
check on 11 motive-mongering," Mi lis maintains, is noting an articulated 
motive;s confo~mity to typical 11 Vocabula~ies of motives that a~e extant 
in types of situations of actions .. C1940: 910>. Mills;s allusion he~e is 
pa~allel to Webe~'s identification of motive as 
a complex of subjective meaning which seems to the actor 
himself o~ to the obse~ve~ an adequate g~ound fo~ the conduct 
in question. The inte~pretation of a cohe~ent cou~se of 
conduct is .. subjectively adequate .. Cor 11 adequate on the level 
of meaning"> insofa~ as, acco~ding to ou~ habitual modes of 
thought and feeling, its component pa~ts ... a~e ~ecognized to 
constitute a 11 typica)ll complex of meaning. It is mo~e common 
to say "co~~ect'" C1921a: 11). 
Fo~ Webe~ this situational patte~n constitutes only a small leap to 
app~oximate causality. The d~amatu~gical inte~pretation, bypassing 
causation and seeking only to establish linguistic connections between 
simila~ situations, obviously finds g~eate~ ~esonance in the 
phenomenological sea~ch fo~ subjective meaning in acto~s' fi~st-hand 
accounts. 
A second assumption of the motive-based d~amatu~gical theory of 
action is that most human acts a~e pe~fo~med automatically and 
non-consciously, until and unless that activity is challenged o~ 
questioned. Motive a~ises then to justify and defend action that is 
p~oblematic. Because disputed actions a~e f~equently embedded in the 
context of belief, beliefs too may requi~e justification when they a~e 
flagged by questionable behavio~s. A motive succeeds when the th~eat is 
~emoved o~ when disputed acts are accepted by a significant constituency 
a significant portion of the time. The logical corollary of this 
assumption is that unchallenged acts or behaviors are unmotivated. 
Weber~s views support this general proposition, for he writes, 
In the great majority of cases actual action goes on in a state 
of inarticulate half-consciousness or actual unconscious of its 
subjective meaning. The actor is more likely to "be aware" of 
it in a vague sense than he is to "know" what he is doing or be 
explicitly self-conscious about it" (1921a: 21>. 
Motives are hierarchically ordered and operate at all levels of 
social relationships. Individuals subscribe to multiple motives and 
their attendant vocabularies, encompassing personal, familial, social, 
religious, political, and national motives. Because motives are 
constructed to justify challenged acts or behaviors, by definition there 
are no universal motives--whereas there are many shared patterns of 
behavior. 
Ironically, the dramaturgical perspective on motive does not find 
consistent support in the work of George Herbert Mead. His 
interpretation of motive or 11 impulse" in the Philosophy of the Act 
places it as the first of four "stages of the act,u culminating in 
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consummation <1938: 3-25>. Tamotsu Shibutani describes the impulse phase 
of the act as "the condition of disequilibrium that first sets an 
organism into motion (1962: 65>. Nevertheless, Mead~s impulse is sharply 
differentiated from instinctive response, being proscribed by social 
conditioning and selective perception. 
Weber~s use of the words "motive" (das Motiv> and .. motivation" Cdie 
Motivierung> in his discussion of the impetus for social action is close 
to Mead~s interpretation, though on the whole, Weber~s treatment of the 
concept is rather casual and peripheral to other closely-related 
concerns, namely causality, generalization, and rationality. In much of 
Weber~s writing, motive is assumed to precede the act in the very way 
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that he perceives likely cause as preceding effect. For example, he 
observes that "we understand the motive of a person aiming a gun if we 
know that he has been commanded to shoot as a member of a firing squad, 
that he is fighting against an enemy, or that he is doing it for revenge" 
<1921: 9). Weber~s emphasis on "subjective explanation" comes closest to 
the idea of motivation that informs the dynamic theory, for his concept 
of action is confined to behavior to which "the acting individual 
attaches a subjective meaning"--although that meaning may or may not be 
verbalized to others. 
The extension of the basically interactionist perspective on motives 
to the macro sphere is made most convincingly by Mills. In his,classic 
essay, "Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive," motives and 
complexes of motives, that is vocabularies of motives. are described as 
action strategies consciously employed to "undo snarls and integrate 
social actions." For as Mills explains, "In many social actions, others 
must agree, tacitly or explicitly •••• Diplomatic choice of motive is 
part of the attempt to motivate acts for other members in a situation 11 
(1940: 907). . 
••stable and widely shared vocabularies of motives 1 ink anticipated 
consequences and specific actions," he writes. 11 Through such 
vocabularies, types of societal controls operate" <1940: 906). 4 This 
view of "constructed" mass response evokes comparison with Karl 
Mannheim~s concept of ideology, developed in Ideologv and Utopia. <1936> 
and with other works associated with the sociology of knowledge <Bell, 
1960; Merton, 1957 and Nietzsche, 1901; Scheler, 1925>. Similar 
theoretical grounding informs sound empirical works on the international 
media by Herbert Altschul I <1984> and the Soviet media by Thomas 
Remington <1988>. Clearly, mass media have played and will continue to 
play an essential role in creating, maintaining, changing, and adhering 
to national vocabularies of motive. 
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An interactionist who expands and adds dynamism to the concept of 
motive vocabularies imposed on the individual is R.S. Perinbanayagam. In 
an especially insightful but little-known article, he proposes that in 
social relationships, "there are standard vocabularies of motive for 
standard identities: identities in fact are predicated on vocabularies of 
motives" <1967: 68>. Among these he includes individual identity 
strongly defined by religious affiliation, nationality, and 
ethnicity--going so far as 11 See the point of" Marx/s view of false 
consciousness embodied in his maxim that religion is the "opiate for the 
masses" <1967: 69>. The crucial link between micro and macro structures 
for Perinbanayagan is the assumption that man is a symbol-using animal. 
Changing identities and changing society are accomplished through 
redefinition of vocabularies of motives, he maintains. Other 
interactionists employ motives to explain individual action within the 
context of social norms <Burke, 1945; Foote, 1951; Hewitt and Stokes, 
1975; Stokes and Hewitt, 1976; Hall, P.M., 1987>. 
The integration of dramaturgical-phenomenological motivation theory 
with the modified interpretation of Weber/s social action theory forms 
the theoretical structure for the dynamic theory of world press 
motivation. However, whereas Weber perceived four ideal types of 
"rational" social action, the new construct posits three ideal types of 
motives that rationalize and order an infinite array of media acts, 
behavior, beliefs, laws, policies, and responses. The selection of the 
press as the substantive focus of this formal theory is particularly apt, 
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fo~ the wo~ld's media content p~esents an abundance of spoken and w~itten 
motives and vocabula~ies of motive, p~ovided by media p~actitione~s, 
audience, the cou~ts, co~po~ate acto~s, and disp~opo~tionately, the state 
appa~atus. In the following chapter, the dynamic theory of the world's 
press is presented and explained. 
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Endnotes 
1. Accot'ding to Tut'net' et al •• 11 Economy and Society C1921a and 1021b> 
was left in a highly disot'ganized state at Webet''s death in 1920 •••• 
Pat't 1 is actually the last section he Wt'ote, appat'ently between 1918 and 
1920, while pat't 2 appear's to have been Wt'itten sevet'al year's eat'liet', 
between 1910 and 191411 (1989: 196>. 
2. Echoing Webet''s intet'pt'etation, Peter' Bet'get' and Thomas Luckmann 
identify 11 t'e if i cation.. as 11 an extt'eme step in the pt'ocess of 
objectivation, whet'eby the objectivated wot'ld loses its compt'ehensibility 
as a human entet'pt'ise and becomes fixated as a non-human, 
non-humanizable, inet't facticity 11 (1966). Reification of abstt'action is 
widely pet'ceived to be the gt'eat flaw that deflated the value of Talcott 
Pat'sons' major' wot'ks. 
3. As Joseph F. Scott at'gued in Affiet'ican Sociological Review. Pat'sons's 
attempt to come to tet'ms with 11 Social t'ealityn shifted mat'kedly dut'ing 
the cout'se of his long cat'eet' (1969). Pat'son's fit'st major' wot'k, The 
Stt'uctut'e of Social Action (1937>, is dt'awn most dit'ectly ft'om Webet''s 
11 Conceptual Exposition .. C1921a>, Or' his intet'pt'etation of it. 
Consequently its assumptions about the voluntat'istic natut'e of the social 
wot'ld, the salience of symbolic stt'uctut'ing of t'eality, the t'ejection of 
causality, and the mutability of social not'ms stand at odds with his 
later' ideas. 
4. In The Sociological Imagination. Mills tt'aces what is, in essence, 
his concept of motive vocabulat'y as stt'ategy for' social contt'ol to 
well-known political and philosophical ideas, among them Locke's 
"pt'inciple of sovet'eignty, 11 Sot'el's 11 t'uling myth, 11 Dut'kheim's 11 Collective 
t'ept'esentatlons, 11 Mat'x's 11 dominant ideas, 11 and Rousseau's "genet'al wi 11. 11 
Nietzche's 11 hor'izons 11 also seem appt'opt'iate to this gt'ouping. 
CHAPTER IV 
TOWARD A DYNAMIC THEORY OF WORLD PRESS 
ACTION AND MOTIVATION 
The Centrality and Utility of Motive 
In Realizing Action 
This chapter begins with a discussion of motive, the theory's 
central and most highly-evolved construct. Following this exposition, 
three major premises are introduced. In the process, ideal motive types 
are posited at the macro-national level and a dynamic conceptual model is 
proposed. In the concluding section, the three ideal motive types are 
then operationally defined in terms of national situations and associated 
characteristics of press behavior. 
"SubJective Interpretation" and Media Research 
Max Weber's identification of motive with "subjective understanding" 
and C. Wright Mills's view of motive as "the vocalized expectation of an 
actn (1940: 907> underscore the phenomenological underpinnings of motives 
as verbal constructions that rationalize and give meaning to action. In 
the present work, the focus of analysis is on characteristic world press 
behaviors. Included in behavior are activities, policies, ethics, 
beliefs, and taboos. While characteristic behaviors may be identified by 
analyzing and interpreting media acts and media content, such 
observations are enriched by drawing upon verbal accounts provided by the 
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actors themselves, that is metajournalism. Related to these 
self-justifying explanations are the challenges that inspired them, 
issued by various media constituencies--that is, by domestic and foreign 
audiences, governments, critics, scholars, advertisers, and other vested 
interests--economic and ideological. Accepting Mills's dictum that it is 
not possible to plumb behind verbalization to determine the "real motive" 
or the "real reasons" for behavior <1940: 910), it is proposed that the 
character of a nation/s press is what people say it is. 
Several properties of the press as national institution tend to make 
its analysis particularly amenable to the interactionist, 
phenomenological approach. First of all, public communication is the 
stock-in-trade of media organizations. Media serve as chroniclers of 
public events and issues, and their record is readily accessible across 
time and space in print, microfilm, and video archives. 
Secondly, the press is hardly a faceless institution. Like the 
arts, media structures are associated with and represented by 
"personalities" and, for purposes of analysis, they may be identified as 
actors. And just as Howard Becker was able to perceive organizational 
structure through the study of individual actors in Art Worlds.x1z the 
press provides a similar bridge between interaction and structure in 
political and economic spheres. Stokes and Hewitt propose that motives 
are key to the resolution of a major issue for contemporary sociology 
theory-- 11 inconsistencies and contradictions between two major paradigms 
of sociological analysis, the structural and the interactionist" <1976: 
838). 
Thirdly, throughout the history of mass communication, the media 
have exhibited an inordinate preoccupation with self-analysis and 
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introspection, and an almost neurotic sensitivity to criticism--real or 
anticipated. Perhaps the earliest illustration of this response appears 
in what is widely believed to be Johan Gutenberg's colophon (in Latin) to 
Catholicon. a 13th century Italian manuscript, which would be the third 
and last book Gutenberg published in his brief but legendary career as a 
printer. Standing at the brink of the Modern Age, catalyzed by his 
revolutionary invention, Gutenberg sought to justify his innovation to 
those who identified its mysteries with the Devil's work. The vocabulary 
of motives he employed was drawn from the late Medieval period that 
comprised the only world he knew: 
By the help of the Most High, at whose will the tongues of 
infants become eloquent, and who ofttimes reveals to the lowly 
that which He hides from the wise, this noble book, Catholicon. 
in the year of the Lord's Incarnation, 1460, in the bonteous 
city of Mainz of the renowned German nation, which the clemency 
of God has deigned with so lofty a light of genius and free 
gift to prefer and render illustrious above all other nations 
of the earth, without help of reed, stilus, or pen, but by the 
wondrous agreement, proportion, and harmony of punches and 
types, has been printed and finished. 
Hence to Thee, Holy Father, and to the Son with the 
Sacred Spirit 
Praise and glory be rendered, the threefold Lord and One; 
For the praise of the Church, 0 Catholic, 
applaud this book, 
Who never ceasest to praise the devout Mary. 
Thanks be to God (Berry and Poole, 1966: 15). 
The proclivity to justify and legitimize its own activity seemingly 
is intrinsic to the press in all societies--as inherent as its 
practitioners' compulsion to verbalize. In contrast, other national 
institutions--governmental bodies, economic enterprises, the law, 
education, organized religion, and other social entities--tend to be 
premised on members' discretion, and external communication usually is 
filtered through subsidiary public relations organizations. In the 
United States some forms of "institutional loyalty" are enshrined in law 
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and court decisions that prohibit the public airing of institutional 
dirty laundry--rationalized by national security and protection of 
personal privacy and industrial secrets. 2 
Challenged Behavior and Identifying 11 Differences 
That Make a Difference .. 
In his classic general semantics text, People in Quandaries. Wendell 
Johnson approached his analysis of interpersonal communication with the 
assumption that 11 We are set to expect differences--because in a 
process-reality no two things turn out to be the same and no one thing 
stays the same 11 (1946: 37-38). Wi 11 iam James created a pragmatic 
rationale for concentrating on differences that matter when he wrote, 
If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the 
alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute 
is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be able to 
show some practical difference that must follow from one side 
or the other/s being right (1907: 45). 
These notions guide the present inquiry, for, indeed the nettlesome 
suspicion that with sufficient effort one can detect 11 differences that 
make a difference 11 is the impetus for most sociological attempts to 
create cognitive order--on micro and macro scales--out of apparent human 
chaos. 
However, the tendency to overgeneralize is another outgrowth of that 
compulsion. In an admirable attempt to correct for Cold-War analyses 
that have exaggerated the disparity between world press types, J. Herbert 
Altschul} likens the roles assigned to various national media to 
movements of a global symphony, "with their many themes, melodies, and 
variations. 11 He continues, 11 0ne perhaps surprising truth that emerges 
. . • is that their simi 1 ar it i es are often as great as their di fferencesn 
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(1984: 279>. In the hope that t~e world's media might cease serving as a 
divisive force and instead unify the international community, Altschull 
presents 11 The Seven Laws of Journalism,u which, he suggests, transcend 
national boundaries. First among these is his assertion that, 11 ln all 
press systems, the news media are agents of those who exercise political 
and economic power 11 <1984: 279>. Other shared characteristics he 
observes are the linkage of media content to financial interests; 
espousal of beliefs in press freedom and social responsibility, variously 
defined; a perception that other national press systems are deviant; the 
legitimization of press ideology and social values in journalism 
education; and the imperfect alignment of press theory and practice. 3 
A less politically conscious analysis by Harold Lasswell posited 
three functions of the mass media in all societies: surveillance of the 
environment, correlation of the parts of society in responding to the 
environment, and the transmission of the social heritage to new 
generations <1948). To this, Charles W. Wright added the function of 
entertainment <1959: 16). Others have identified a number of universal 
media dysfunctions <Boorstin, 1961; Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1948; Severin 
and Tankard, 1988: 217-220>. 
As commendable as Altschull's efforts may be, and as irrefutable as 
the dysfunctionalists' conclusions may appear, these approaches yield 
universalities of such broad and inclusive nature that they do little to 
increase understanding of the world's press. In the case of Altschull's 
laws, essential manifestations of difference are glossed over, such as 
which elements of various societies exercise political and economic 
power, what are the interests of those who finance the press, and how is 
social responsibility defined in different countries. Similarly, 
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Lasswell/s functions mask i~portant distinctions: how does the perception 
of threat differ from one national environment to the next and from one 
time period to another? And why are some norms and values handed down 
from one generation to the next while others are stripped away and 
replaced? Though both Altschul! and Lasswell recognize the media to be 
agents of the powerful, neither can account for such apparent aberrations 
as a charismatic Soviet leader who exhorted the press to call into 
question the very power structure that brought him to office. 
Still broader in application are a number of mathematical and 
stimulus-response models that purport to illustrate the communication 
process at all levels--from the intrapersonal and interpersonal to mass 
communication. The most well known of these all-purpose diagrams are 
Claude Shannon and W. Weaver's "Mathematical Theory of Communication" 
<1949> and Bruce Westley and Malcomb MacLean/s 11 A-B-C-x feedback" model 
<1957>. These were joined by an array of similarly mechanistic 
constructs proposed by well-known scholars in the 1950s <Gerbner, 1956; 
Newcomb, 1953; Osgood, 1954; and Schramm, 1954>. Of the lot of their 
ideas, Altschul! writes dismissively, 
Borrowing from the truth trees of philosophers, the 
stimulus-response diagrams of psychologists, and the 
mathematical models of physicists, communications scholars have 
adopted as their universal symbol the arrow. Some run in 
straight lines; some are curved; some even bend back upon 
themselves. They are alleged to describe the flow of 
communications from source <stimulus> to receiver <response>, 
with elaborate cross-arrowed mechanisms to illustrate single or 
multiloop feedback systems. The arrows have the fortuitous 
characteristic of impressing fellow scholars with the rigor 
behind the graphic design but do lamentably little to resolve 
the crucial international <and domestic) peril that lies at 
hand <1984: 148>. 
The fact that these schemata raise more questions than they answer is 
illustrated most clearly in Lasswell's 11 verbal model, .. widely hailed as 
catalyst fa~ the p~ofusion of c~yptotheo~ies that followed: 1 Who says 
what in which channel to whom with what effect?" C1948L 
By focusing theo~etical analysis on ideal types of motives used to 
justify p~ess behavio~, the notion of challengeable--and the~efo~e 
diffe~ent and significant--behavlo~ is b~ought into sha~p ~elief. It is 
p~oposed he~e that diffe~ences in pe~ceived consequences of actions, 
a~ticulated as vocabula~ies of motive, account fa~ obse~ved diffe~ences 
in the wo~ld's p~ess systems. As Mills noted, 11 [T1he~e a~e diffe~ent 
a~eas of population with diffe~ent vocabula~ies of motive C1940: 906>. 
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Un i ve~sa 11 y sha~ed p~ess 11 1 aws 11 and act i ens a~e not cha 11 enged and, 
the~efo~e, play a minimal ~ole in the dynamic theo~y. Altschull's "law11 
that 11 p~ess p~actices always diffe~ f~om theo~y" b~ings as little insight 
to inte~national media study as Lasswell's unive~sal who-what-which 
que~ies, o~ the empi~ical obse~vation that "newspape~ copy is p~inted in 
black ink all ave~ the wo~ld.". All may be t~ue, but none expands 
unde~standing of the wo~kings of the wo~ld's media. 
At the same time, the concept of motive-based ideal types tends to 
distinguish 11 diffe~ences that make a diffe~ence 11 f~om national and 
cultu~al ideosync~acies, that, though adding colo~ and pe~sonality to the 
study of national media, in fact deflect attention f~om fundamental and 
meaningful va~iation. Fa~ example, whethe~ television ancho~s conclude 
thei~ b~oadcasts with humo~ous anecdotes o~ p~efe~ mo~e staid sign-offs 
undoubtedly ~eflects national mo~es and conventions, but is unlikely to 
elicit inte~national challenge. The size and f~equency of newspape~ 
photog~aphs a~e mo~e likely to indicate the level of p~ess technology and 
financial ~esou~ces than delibe~ate choice subject to question. 
While the majo~ dete~minant of p~ess behavio~ is identified as 
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situational, cultural influences are incorporated into the dynamic theory 
as aspects of situation and as macro-level equivalents of voluntarism on 
the personal/psychological level. Stokes and Hewitt refer to motives as 
11 aligning actions 11 and see them as 11 Crucial to the process in which 
people create and sustain joint action by aligning individual lines of 
conduct when obstacles arise in its path ... Thus they propose that 
vocabularies of motive pla¥ a major role in _..sustaining a relationship 
between culture and conduct <1976: 838). 
Thus, for the theorist and researcher, attention to motive rather 
than behavior is rewarded by the identification of problematic and, 
therefore, meaningful characteristics of world press behavior. As these 
discernments are made, clusters of motivated, meaningful activity appear 
from which ideal types emerge. 
Vocabularies of Motive as Cohesive Strategies 
Thus far, the discussion of motives has focused on their heuristic 
value -for social scientists seeking to identify and distinguish 
significant action. In their social context, motives and vocabularies of 
motive <complexes of compatible motives> have utility in synthesizing 
public opinion, promoting social harmony, and justifying social control. 
Shared vocabularies of motive are essential for shared identity and are 
key to the creation and maintenance of overarching national identity that 
unites disparate ethnic, class, age, and gender interests <Foote, 1951; 
Perinbanayagam, 1967). 
The mass media are th~primary conveyors of national vocabularies of 
motive. In this capacity they play a pivotal role in selecting elements 
of a motive vocabulary to emphasize or play down. In times of radical 
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paradigm shift, the press is the primary vehicle for promulgating whole 
new motive vocabularies. Some scholars and media critics, alarmed by 
what they see as an overextension of press power, believe that the media 
create motive vocabularies and, thereby, construct social reality. An 
example of such reasoning was observed in a message displayed on an 
electronic signboard in front of a Chevrolet dealership in Roanoke, 
Virginia, in the spring of 1991: "Want to stop the recession? Quit 
watching the 6 o'clock news!" A more positive, but equally deterministic 
view of media power was expressed by Vladimir Lenin in 1901 as he sought 
to implement his party's revolutionary goals in tsarist Russia: 
In our opinion, the starting point of all our activities, the 
first practical step toward creating the organization we 
desire, the threat that will guide us in unswervingly 
developing, deepening and expanding that organization, is the 
establishment of an all-Russian political newspaper .... Unless 
we are able to exercise united influence upon the population 
and upon the government with the aid of the printed word, it 
will be .•• impossible to fulfill our task, namely, to 
concentrate all the elements of political discontent and 
protest, and with them fertilize the revolutionary movement of 
the proletariat (1901: 313-314). 
Whereas structuralists and functionalists seemingly perceive shared 
motives as an organic--almost biological--force, and interactionists tend 
to concentrate on individual responses to entrenched norms, Mills 
suggests that motive vocabularies are constructed deliberately by power 
interests <his power elite). Similar ideas are expressed by Marx's false 
consciousness and Mannheim's ideology. "Through such vocabularies types 
of societal controls operate," Mills writes, and continues 
Diplomatic choice of motive is part of the attempt to motivate 
acts for other members in a situation. Such pronounced motives 
undo snarls and integrate social actions .... When an agent 
vocalizes or imputes motives, he is influencing others .•.. 
Motives are common grounds for mediated behaviors ... <1940: 
906-907). 
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Describing urban America at the end of the 1930s, Mills identified 
individualistic, sexual, hedonistic, and pecuniary motive vocabularies 
and contrasted them with religious motives of the medieval period <1940: 
910). <Similar comparisons, though not identified with motives, are made 
by Pitirim Sorokin in his utopian works on ideational and sensate 
cultures [1941)). 
At the macroanalytical level, abstract and parsimonious action 
schemes take on relevance. One reason the structure of social action is 
more readily apparent on the national level than on the personal level is 
that for most people involvement is physically and emotionally distanced 
from action. Another is that those who define national motive 
vocabularies and the media who promulgate them seek to engage the masses 
by communicating on a general rather than a specific plane and by framing 
complex events and interconnected structures in their simplest, most 
"common-denominator 11 terms. 
The emphasis on macro interpretation, appropriate to press analysis, 
is not meant to deny the operation of motives at interpersonal levels of 
social interaction. Individuals subscribe to multiple and sometimes 
conflicting layers of motive vocabularies. At the interpersonal level, 
these categories are obscured by the multitude of behavioral options that 
arise in the course of social interaction, e.g., rationales for smoking 
or not smoking, driving a domestic or foreign automobile, attending 
church or sleeping in on Sunday mornings. In contrast, at the macro 
level, abstraction frequently and conveniently obscures the micro 
activities of those in power positions, reversing the process as it 
occurs in the micro sphere, in which complexity obscures structure. In 
all cases, though, vocabularies of motives are constructed to justify 
action to someone else and can be viewed as persuasive, coordinating 
devices. 
The Situational Aspects of Motives 
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It is the situational specificity of motivation that gives the 
concept its dynamism. New situations elicit unaccustomed and, therefore, 
conscious actions that may be at odds with existing motives. The 
imp! ication here, as Mi lis argues, is that motives are not "fixed 
elements 'in' an individual," but rather responses to unanticipated or 
previously unexperienced situations. Echoing Mead's anti-Freudian idea 
of approaching human conduct socially and from the outside, Mannheim too 
notes that "both motives and actions very often originate not only from 
within but from the situation in which individuals find themselves 
<1940 : 249). 
When applied at the level of nation states and their institutions, 
the dynamic theory redirects attention from the geopolitical identity of 
states and their "bloc"-defined roles to actions taken in response to 
domestic and international situations. When problematic situations 
prompt actions involving minor or infrequent change, they do minimal 
damage to the existing motive rationale and are regarded as mere "blips" 
in otherwise normal patterns of behavior, explained away as "disclaimers" 
by Hewitt and Stokes <1975). 
In the case of national press systems, focus on behavior as 
adaptative strategy facilitates the perception of change as ongoing and 
inevitable. Furthermore, observed press similarities and differences are 
seen to be as temporal and temporary as the situations that spawn them. 
To center on the political philosophies "out of which" the world's press 
developed, as Siebert et al. do in Four Theories of the Press. <1956) is 
an ill-conceived attempt to explain "why" they developed. The relevant 
question is "how" they developed and are continuing to develop in today"s 
rapidly changing world. This is not to propose an ahistorical approach, 
but rather to suggest a processual approach that recognizes that history 
did not end with the Enlightenment ideas of John Milton or Thomas 
Jefferson, or with the revolutionary visions of Karl Marx and Vladimir 
Lenin, with the United States" Commission on Freedom of the Press, or 
even with the dismantling of the Berlin Wall. 
The question arises then, if motivated behaviors emerge from 
problematic situations and not from intrinsic qualities of the actor, is 
the process a mechanistic one resulting in a predictable, chartable 
end-product? The answer is no--though action-based analysis certainly 
provides greater correspondence between "reality" and theory than 
retro-theoretical pigeon-holing. Clearly, the voluntaristic assumptions 
of Herbert Blumer inform the present work to a far greater degree than 
the more deterministic views of Manford Kuhn and the Iowa School of 
symbolic interactionists. As Stokes and Hewitt observe, 
The way in which cultural standards apply to a particular 
problematic situation is a matter of negotiation among people 
interacting with each other and not simply a question of 
applying rules or principles of conduct. If culture exists, 
its application to any particular problematic situation is 
established through interaction among people who are as likely 
to disagree as agree about its relevance and not by a simple 
process of "looking up" a particular situation in a "cultural 
catalogue" of problematic situations and events <1976: 844). 
Nevertheless, it is proposed here that situations are significant 
determinants of action that have long been overlooked in theoretical 
explorations of the international media. Mills wrote more than 50 years 
ago, "It is a hypothesis worthy and capable of test that that typal 
vocabulaLies of motive foL diffeLent situations aLe significant 
deteLminants of conduct 11 (1940: 906>. The pLesent waLk accepts Mills/s 
challenge in its attempt to diffeLentiate Significant woLld pLess 
conduct. In the next section, the dynamic theoLy/s thLee pLemises aLe 
pLesented, seLving as extensions of his "woLthy 11 hypothesis. 
ThLee MajoL PLemises 
1. Negotiated vocabulaLies of motives link PLess activity with actions 
of etheL national stLuctuLes and social institutions. 
2. Nations and theiL pLess systems subscLibe simultaneously to thLee 
pLimaLy vocabulaLies of motive--suLvival, ideational, and instLumental, 
one of which usually pLedominates at a given time. 
3. Nations and theiL PLess systems vacillate continually fLam one 
pLevailing pLimaLy motive in the diLection of one OL both of the etheL 
two. 
The FiLst PLemise 
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To geneLate a theoLy that has the capability to disceLn, descLibe, 
and, to some degLee, explain woLld media systems, it is necessaLy to 
acknowledge not only the fact that goveLnments, institutions, and society 
aLe linked, but how that linkage has come about and how it is is 
maintained. To do so motives must be identified that have pLeceded OL 
accompanied the development of national stLuctuLes. This is not to deny 
the on-going effects that these stLuctuLes and the PLess have on each 
etheL, but LatheL to pLebe moLe deeply, in the hope of identifying 
undeLlying Lationales that have been successfully negotiated in Lesponse 
to commonly-expeLienced situations. By accepting connections as faits 
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accomplis. the larger question is ignored: why do certain press systems 
tend to co-exist with certain patterns of governments, that is, with 
certain economic/political/value structures. 
Hachten voices the widely accepted view that 11 all press systems 
reflect the values of the political and economic systems of the nations 
within which they operate" (1987: 16>. While not disputing the logic and 
supportability of this observation, it must be noted that this perception 
is incomplete, for it does not take into account that connectedness is 
not an organic function of states, their institutions, and their people, 
but the consequence of negotiated response to shared events and 
situations. 
Altschull emphasizes that verbalized justifications of action are 
the creation of the political and economic elite and that media impose 
these views on the public. For, he writes, 
the abstractions that people believe come not from within 
themselves but from without, from their parents, their friends, 
their teachers, their leaders, and from what they read in their 
newspapers, hear on radio, and see on television <1990: 206). 
The .. trick 1 e down 11 theory of press in f I uence does not acknowledge 
sufficiently the reciprocal nature of interaction between between the 
people and the press, government, and economic sectors. The masses, that 
is the citizenry, voters, work force, consumers, and audiences, are both 
subject and object of social institutions, including the press. Mass 
power, by dint of sheer numbers, is exhibited in electoral choices, 
public opinion polls, purchasing behavior, and audience ratings--as well 
as more direct and radical physical actions. 
One well-known historical example of national action rationalized by 
popularly-based ideational motives is the 18th and 21st amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution, first creating and then repealing the ban on the 
manufacture, sale, or transportation of alcoholic beverages. The 
situation in which temperance activities arose was the social betterment 
obsession of the 19th century, including public education, the abolition 
of slavery, and expanded suffrage. The about-face on prohibition was 
rationalized in terms of a modified vocabulary of motives that emerged 
from situations that came about during the enforcement period of the 
Volstead ~ct--increase in crime, decline of rural values <decrease in 
rural population>, large non-Protestant immigration, and a perception 
that temperance advocates were growing increasingly radical. The impact 
of public opinion was also evident in popular rejection of 
government-defined survival motives used to justify prolonged Soviet and 
~erican military involvements in Afghanistan and Vietnam. 
Nevertheless, the dominant direction of power and influence in all 
societies is from the top down, and certainly government-defined actions 
are implemented more quickly than popular ones. ~s media access grows 
more costly and complicated, the hegemony of those who can garner its 
resources increases over the masses who cannot. But even in traditional 
and absolutist societies, public opinion cannot be and is not ignored. 
For as Niccolo Machiavelli advised princely colleagues in 151'3, "Not to 
be hated by his subjects is the best fortress a prince can have. If the 
people hate him, a fortress will not save him .•.. <1513: 76>. 
Furthermore, he explained, rational perception of consequences of action 
is not a monopoly of the highly-placed: 
And it is not without reason that the voice of the people has 
been likened to the voice of God, for popular opinion is 
amazingly reliable in its prognostications, so much so that the 
people would seem to have hidden powers by which to foresee 
their future ills and triumphs <1513: 110> 
86 
87 
Stability of motive vocabularies is a relative concept, achievable 
only on a theoretical plane. For perfect stability, in this sense, 
refers to a perfect correlation of motive vocabularies among national 
institutions and social sectors. Nations may be described as unstable 
when different structures or social segments subscribe to different 
motives to a significant degree. Northern Ireland and South Africa are 
unstable nations at this time, because major institutions and segments of 
their society perceive the same situation differently and subscribe to 
different motives. Nazi Germany, from the early 1930s until defeat in 
the mid 1940s, and Israel today, though beset with military and economic 
problems, can be described as relatively stable nations because their 
structures were/are aligned along shared motive vocabularies. 
The concept of stability employed in the dynamic theory, however, 
does not preclude adaptation and change, which are continuous, but rather 
indicates that the various national institutions/ response to change is 
rationalized in similar terms, that shifts occur in tandem. Motive 
vocabularies can change dramatically and swiftly as new situations arise, 
as when a war suddenly looms or when economic downturns occur, but 
national stability is retained when the motive switch occurs uniformly 
through all social structures. 
If situations remain relatively constant over extended periods of 
time and challenge abates, the actions, ideas, knowledge, and beliefs 
justified by the vocabulary become reified into 11 Culture 11 in the 
traditional sense. 4 No longer subject to question, actions are no 
longer in need of rationalization or defense. The Cold War is a recent· 
example of a situation of several decades/ duration which lulled many 
observers into reified thinking. One consequence has been shown to be a 
proliferation of world press theories that could not accommodate a new 
order of things. 
The Second Premise 
a a 
The dynamic theory establishes survival, ideational, and 
instrumental motives and the actions they justify as ideal types. Motive 
vocabularies are consciously created by national leaders, the press, and 
persons associated with other macro structures to justify problematic 
actions likely to affect and engage large numbers of people. More 
specificially, governments and their press systems rationalize 
problematic actions in terms of how these strategies sustain and preserve 
the existence of the nation, reinforce its ideas and values, or 
contribute to the attainment of goods and services. Though all three 
primary types combine to characterize national patterns of action, 
usually one motive vocabulary predominates at any given time. 
As elaborated in Chapter III, the action scheme is derived from 
theories proposed by Max Weber and Bronislaw Malinowski, who argued that 
all rational human action falls within similarly delineated categories. 
The primary difference between the theoretical concepts informing the 
dynamic theory and the earlier typologies is that the latter identify 
nations according to their political stripe and global associations. 
Here, the typology is drawn from action--revealed to a large degree 
through articulated motives. Indeed, the clusters of press 
characteristics that the present theory seeks to recognize are patterns 
of behavior; however, motives are viewed as surrogates and equivalents of 
action. Thus the motive types proposed here are winnowing devices to 
separate out meaningful subjectivized action from the chaff of 
unconscious, objectivized action. 
As Weber reiterated, ideal types are constructions and do not 
represent reality. Whereas specific behaviors can be typed with some 
degree of confidence as motivated by survival, ideas, or instrument, the 
notion that any nation, by virtue of its behavior can serve as a pure 
example of an ideal type is an illusion. 
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National vocabularies of motives, though articulated primarily by 
power and economic interests, are promulgated and interpreted by the 
press. Mass media are guardians of the predominant national motive and 
apologists for alternative motives--thus justifying acts and attitudes to 
domestic and foreign challengers--real and apparent. The success and 
longevity of motives are measured by the duration of problematic 
situations and by public receptivity, assuming situations are 
sufficiently sustained and intrusive to elicit feedback. 
The Survival Motive Vocabulary. The presence of an external 
threat--real or apparent--is the situational stimulus for national 
behavior that is justified by survival motive vocabularies. The threat 
to national security or survival may be economic or military or both. 
Challenge to survivalist behavior is frequently issued by foreign powers 
or international organizations; or it may take the form of 11 WOrld 
opinion, .. reported in the international media. More commonly, however, 
survivalist actions must be defended at home, for the most direct and 
unavoidable challenges and the most persistent doubts arise from the 
effects of survival strategies on domestic policy and programs. 
The main tenet of the government's survival vocabulary intended to 
satisfy domestic critics is that collective and cohesive action is 
essential to insure the continued existence of the nation. Government, 
as chief coordinating body, is characterized by high visibility and low 
accountability--an efficient strategy that facilitates swift decisive 
action, but also arouses suspicion and opposition if sustained over a 
significant period of time or if ineffective in achieving the collective 
goals. When survival vocabularies dominate, threats to the rulers, 
government, or nation are seldom differentiated from threats to the 
citizenry and national institutions. 
Countries throughout the world are imperiled by chronic economic 
backwardness and entrenched poverty. Developing nations tend to 
attribute their precarious economic situations to the colonial legacy, 
foreign exploitation, and unfair international monetary and trade 
practices. This is particularly the pattern ln emerging nations of the 
southern hemisphere with histories of colonial domination, such as Iraq, 
Nigeria, Indonesia, and Haiti. 
Such reasoning finds support in Peter Worsley's analysis of the 
economic problems confronting many impoverished former colonies. A 
dependency theorist, he traces underdevelopment in former colonial 
nations to capitalist economic tyranny and usurpation of resources. In 
The Three Worlds. he writes: 
[Third World] underdevelopment, today, is not a natural 
condition, but an unnatural one, a social state which is the 
product of history; not a passive condition, but the 
consequence of conscious action; not something that just 
happened, governed by the logic of an impersonal system, but 
something that was done to people by other people <1984: 3>. 
Because motives are social constructions meant to influence the 
9(1 
actions of other people, they arise in response to social challenges, 
rather than from threats situated in the natural 
environment--earthquakes, floods, crop failures, and, formerly, 
pestilence--which do not respond to human reasoning. Since economic 
vulnerability often attracts military intervention from neighboring 
states, impoverished nations are frequently twice-afflicted. 
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But even the most prosperous nations respond quickly and decisively 
to threats to their national security, and survival usually emerges 
immediately as the primary motive in time of war. Instrumental and 
ideational behaviors subsequently become subordinate to the expediency of 
survival. However, survivalist goals are limited in scope and focus, and 
struggling governments expend little energy or attention monitoring 
activity that falls outside the realm of strategic concerns. Though 
cohesion is vital to survival, social control is limited to prohibiting 
and restraining negative activities that weaken or subvert survival 
efforts. 
Functionalists and other social analysts using organistic metaphors 
tend to see the survival motive as the first or underlying motive of all 
nations. However, nations and nationalism are creations of the Modern 
Age; and national identities and loyalties are social constructions, not 
the product of biological drives. The proliferation of newly-created 
countries following divestment by imperialist powers following World War 
II, the break-up of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe, and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union illustrate just how tenuous national 
survival is and how subject national loyalty is to redefinition. 
Many newly-created governments must struggle not only with 
self-perpetuating economic problems exacerbated by poor infrastructures, 
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poor agricultural production, illiteracy, and inadequate health and 
educational programs, but also with ethnic and tribal unrest. While 
leaders seek to build national identity and strive for social cohesion as 
bulwarks of survival, ancient cultural identities and allegiances play 
havoc with the "nation-building" strategies of national leaders. 
Interestingly, survival motives prove to be ineffective in quieting 
dissent and putting down domestic insurrection, since the opposing side 
has no interest in preserving the nation under the incumbent regime--or 
perhaps under any circumstance. Rather, ideational motives in support of 
a belief or cause are used by both sides in internal conflicts to win 
adherents to their positions. The absolutist nature of belief systems 
justifies stronger social controls and demands more commitment than 
survival vocabularies. 
Though history does not abound with examples of peoples or nations 
that willfully submit to extinction, the 900-day German seige of 
Leningrad in World War II, like the two-year seige of the Masada garrison 
by the Roman legion in AD 70, indicate that ideational motives sometimes 
supplant survival motives in selling problematic courses of action. <In 
much the same way, Durkheim's altruistic suicides choose values over 
survival at the individual level and the Jonestown sect opted for group 
suicide over anticipated dispersal in 1978.) In addition, the growth of 
transnational companies in recent years suggests that national identity 
is not always a predominant value and that instrumental motives may be 
used to validate alternative loyalties. 
More frequently, when instrumental or ideational motives predominate 
over the survival motive it is because nations do not perceive threat as 
imminent. Not all countries have their existence challenged to the same 
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degree or with equal consistency at all times. Consequently some nations 
may have the luxury of making either of the other two motives predominant 
much of the time. 
The Ideational Motive Vocabulary. Values, in the sense that the 
term is used to describe the ideal type, are an extension of German 
idealism and the Weberian notion of ideational as opposed to economic 
determinants of behavior. The most basic tenet of this ideal motive type 
is that all behavior and all truth is oriented by a pervasive idea or 
belief system. Ideational motives rationalize and justify behavior 
undertaken for its own sake in light of these values, independent of the 
apparent logic of survival considerations and material attainment, or the 
chance of success. Because of their transcendent and absolutist 
presumptions, idea-dominated nations tend to be viewed as fanatic and 
irrational by nations which do not share the belief system. 
Idea-dominated nations perceive alien ideas and influences as heretical 
and potentially evil. 
Weber wrote that "value rational action always involves /commands/ 
or /demands/ which, in the actors/ opinions are binding." Thus, in 
idea-dominated nations, a unified idea system constitutes the basis for 
all social and personal actions and relations. Ironically, from this 
perspective, economic or instrumental considerations are relegated to 
what Karl Marx identified as the "superstructure." 
Weber associated values most closely with religious belief and, 
indeed, fundamentalist Islam, Catholicism, and other religions with 
evangelical aspirations are met with challenges that elicit elaborate 
vocabularies of motive. In the 20th century, other nationally-seated 
ideas that have required international justification are 
Marxism-Leninism, Zionism, the quest for a Palestinian homeland, 
apartheid, fascism, and Irish home-rule. Challenge is the catalyst and 
condition of motive formulation and only value systems that elicit 
challenge acquire the strength of motive. 
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Idea-dominated nations allow and encourage activity that strengthens 
strict adherence to the value system, prohibit activity that would erode 
or corrupt it, and correct detached, uncommitted behavior. The concepts 
of relativism and pluralism are rejected. Even compatible or neutral 
values are viewed with suspicion because they dilute the force of the 
''idea. 11 Even more than in survival-motivated nations, collective and 
cohesive action is essential and individualism is viewed as irrational 
and immoral. In the Soviet Union, communist derision of individualism 
was expressed in the old peasant proverb: 11 In a field of wheat, only the 
head that is empty of grain stands above the rest. 11 Social control 
extends not only to prohibiting negative activity, but to imposing 
positive courses of action. Total authority is given to the judgment of 
those entrusted to guard, interpret, and enforce the belief system. 
Moral leaders prevail over political leaders or may preside over both 
ideational and political affairs. 
Clearly, ideational motives do not predominate in all countries, 
though all nations espouse ideational vocabularies. The more pervasive a 
belief system is in terms of the demands it makes on its adherents/ 
social and personal behavior, the more influence it exerts on national 
policy and goals, and the closer that nation comes to the ideal type. 
In deference to the idea of 11 national sovereignty," 
instrumentally-oriented nations are not likely to challenge other 
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nations; belief systems as long as they do not interfere with 
instrumental activity or threaten national security. For instance, the 
U.S. government might be expected to question the morality of 
incorporating unpaid prison laborers into the national workforce of the 
Peoples Republic of China. Certainly slave labor is at odds with the 
American belief system. However, no challenge is issued because other 
situational exigencies assume priority, such as the anticipated 
instrumental consequences of interrupted trade with China. In contrast, 
during the administration of President Jimmy Carter, the moral value of 
"human rights" assumed priority over instrumental behavior, as when the 
decision was made to prohibit the sale of American grain to the U.S.S.R. 
as a protest to Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. This motive 
shift did not succeed on the American homefront and was abandoned by the 
Reagan administration. In contrast, rationales for restricting 
less-lucrative economic intercourse with South Africa, in response to 
racist policies, have been widely accepted by the majority of the world 
community, based on the belief that the human rights of the black 
majority are being violated. 
Historians view the medieval period in Western Europe as dominated 
by a single idea--the Christian religion. Francis Fukuyama argues that 
the demise of communism signals the advent of a single world 
idea--democracy <1992>. Wallerstein gives universal status to the 
economic idea of capitalism <1976, 1979>. All of these single-idea 
interpretations deny the impact of differently situated societies. If 
ideas become truly universal, they are not challenged, at which point 
they lose their motivation and potency. 
Thus, in the dynamic theory, unlike other world press typologies, 
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Marxism or Soviet Communism does not constitute an ideal type, though the 
U.S.S.R. was an ideationally-dominated nation throughout most of its 
history. The assumption here is that it is not the specific content of a 
pervasive idea that produces its effects, but the accompanying behavior 
it rationalizes and justifies--conformity, social cohesion, social 
control, and intolerance for other ideas and motives,--that is, 
absolutism. 
The Instrumental Motive Vocabulary. Nations that are not required 
to focus their primary activity on survival, that have achieved a level 
of economic sufficiency that transcends subsistence, and whose energies 
are not concentrated on strengthening a non-economic idea system, orient 
their primary activity to the attainment of wealth and material goods. 
Although instrumental activity may be advanced via other approaches, the 
"invisible hand" economic strategies of laissez-faire capitalism 
characterizes the ideal type. The ideal type is most closely exemplified 
by motive vocabularies embraced by the United States, and to a Jesser 
extent, by Western Europe. 
Instrumental activity is justified by selective adoption of 
Enlightenment philosophies and, more specificially, utilitarian and 
pragmatic rationales which hold that behavior and beliefs are morally 
correct when they maximize pleasure and minimize pain for the greatest 
number of people. Mills, in his explanation of situated actions and 
motives wrote, "The ,profits motive' of classical economics may be 
treated as an ideal-typical vocabulary of motives for delimited economic 
situations and behaviors" <1940: 908). He then noted that "noneconomic 
behavior and motives" are modifications added to advanced monopolistic 
and regulated capitalism. 
Unlike the ideal types of survival and idea motives, the 
instrumental ideal type places great emphasis on the individual and 
sanctifies individualism in the motive vocabulary. In Wealth of Nations. 
the Scottish economic philosopher Adam Smith wrote, 
[The individual] intends only his own gain .•• he is in this, 
as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an 
end which is not part of his intention ••.• By pursuing his own 
interest he frequently promotes that of the society more 
effectually than when he really intends to promote it <1776: 
423). 
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Andrew Skinner, in the introduction to a recent edition of Wealth of 
Nations. notes that critics of capitalism charge that Smith's arguments 
"lend a certain sanctity to the self-interested pursuit of gain, by 
showing that such activity was productive of benefit to society at large 
<1985: 11). Regarded as a philosophical empiricist, Smith's major work 
may be regarded as a constructed vocabulary of motives justifying the 
unfettered commercial activity he saw developing in Western Europe and 
"our North American colonies• during the latter half of the 18th century. 
Innovation and efficiency are seen as central to instrumental vitality 
and are promoted by actions and ideologies articulated in a motive 
vocabulary that justifies weak government, a strong work ethic, 
differential reward, and competition. Ideal-typical instrumentalists 
regard government with mistrust and the motive vocabulary rationalizes 
action aimed at restraining and decentralizing centralized authority. 
A unique characteristic of the instrumental ideal type is its 
accommodation of conflicting ideational motives that run counter to the 
predominant motive. Religious tolerance is one example. Christianity 
and Asian religions, despite some interpretations to the contrary 
<Bellah, 1957; Morishima, 1982; Weber, 190511906> encompass many 
anti-materialist, collectivist values that are at odds with instrumental 
orientations. 
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At the present time in the United States racial tolerance and sexual 
equality are moral ideas coexisting uneasily with the Spencerian notion 
of "survival-of-the-fittest 0 --an instrumentalist rationalization for 
competition. Ideas opposing racism, sexism, homophobia, agism, ablism, 
and most other politically-correct but economically-irrational causes of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s require constant reiteration and 
justification; whereas, the non-economic ideas of motherhood and apple 
pie are less subject to challenge and do not acquire motive status. 
Pluralism of opinion and acceptance of divergent beliefs are viewed as 
consistent with instrumental orientations because diversity of ideas 
breeds innovation and effects "self-righting•• market principles. Also, 
relativism--the belief that all truth is relative to the individual and 
to the time or place in which he or she acts--fragments the power of any 
single idea. In an instrumentally-motivated society, non-economic ideas 
tend to make themselves marketable by accommodating or absorbing elements 
of instrumental vocabuaries. 
The primary focus of instrumentalism, the accumulation of wealth, is 
an ongoing displacement and redistribution activity whose vitality is 
dependent upon unequal concentrations of capital. Counter-instrumental 
activity, when deemed necessary to correct for widing economic and social 
inequity, is rationalized by the adoption of non-economic ideas. These 
ideas, such as egalitarianism and minority rights, have manifested a 
stronger impact on the conduct of instrumental activity in the social 
democracies of Western Europe than in the United States. Examples of 
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value-based economic activity include efforts to redistribute income and 
lessen class polarity by instituting negative-taxation policies for lower 
income groups, establishing welfare programs to benefit needy people, and 
subsidizing public transportation. Western and Northern European social 
democracies may be differentiated from communist countries because 
material attainment, not social and material equality, is the primary 
rationalization for public ownership and subsidization of many 
enterprises. 
Adam Smith appears to have been cognizant of the force of morals in 
harnessing the excesses of self-interest. In the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments. which preceded Wealth of Nations by five years, Smith 
acknowledged the essential selfishness of humans, but proposed, 
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently 
some principles in his nature which interest him in the fortune 
of others, and render their happiness necessary to hlm, though 
he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it 
(1771). 
Instrumentally-motivated nations cannot sustain an overarching and 
intrusive belief system, such as Marxist-Leninism or fundamentalist 
Islam, because of the incompatability of pluralism and absolutism. Also 
competition and differential reward are not compatible with overarching 
ideas dependent upon social conformity and centralized enforcement. 
Another form of instrumentalist activity that falls farther from the 
ideal type is pursued in Japan and other newly prosperous nations of the 
Pacific Rim, such as Taiwan and South Korea. Though oriented toward the 
attainment of wealth and material goods, these nations' economic 
activities are not premised on individual self-interest, but rather upon 
coordinated collective interests. The nation is the competitor, not the 
individual entrepreneur or enterprise. This divergence from the ideal 
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instrumental type has resulted in part from the pervasiveness of 
ideational motives enshrined in indigenous religions that place value on 
social cohesion, ethnic and racial solidarity, and central authority. 
The geographical vulnerability of these island nations also diminishes 
the utility of individualism and increases the perception of need for 
centralized authority and concerted action--justified by survival motive 
vocabularies. Emerging as economic powers in the 1980s, a period of 
unprecedented global trade, the coordinated strategies are seen as more 
effective for competing in international markets than competitive 
domestic strategies that promote efficiency and innovation. 
When an instrumentalist nation's security is imminently threatened, 
the primary motive can be rapidly supplanted by survival motives, and if 
the reorientation is sustained over a sufficient period of time, 
instrumental rationales are replaced with values of social cohesion and 
collective loyalty, "big" government, and strong central leadership. 
The Third Premise 
Nations and their press systems, forced to act and respond to 
constantly evolving situations, exist in a state of perpetual flux. 
Technological advances in communication and transportation have greatly 
accelerated international interaction and increased the volatility of 
national situations and the dynamism of motivated action. And motive 
realignments and adjustments, 8 remedial work,u to use Irving Goffman's 
micro-level term, are facilitated within shorter and shorter time spans. 
This motility did not always exist to the extent it does today. The 
acceleration of events is compounded by global interconnectedness, and is 
said by some to signal a revolutionary rescaling of human affairs to new 
concepts of time and space, a t~ansition identified as the post-mode~n 
age by Anthony Giddens (1990) and the lnfo~mation age by Ma~shall 
McLuhan. Mo~e than 25 yea~s ago, McLuhan wrote, 
We have had to shift au~ st~ess of attention f~om action to 
~eaction. We must now know in advance the consequences of any 
policy o~ action, since the ~esults a~e expe~ienced without 
delay. Because of elect~ic speed, we can no lange~ walt and 
see. Geo~ge Washington once ~ema~ked, 11 We haven/t hea~d f~om 
Benj. F~anklln in Pads this yea~. We should w~lte him a 
lette~u (1967: 63). 
Rationalized ~esponse to ~eal and pe~ceived challenges on domestic 
101 
and inte~national f~onts is an ongoing p~ocess, and selection of the most 
efficacious motive to justify situated action is neve~ ce~tain. As Mills 
pointed out, shifts in motive a~e commonplace occu~~ences and should be 
no mo~e suspect than o~iginal motives given to justify the same action, 
since they may st~engthen the act and win new allies fa~ it (1940: 907>. 
Adoption of dlffe~ent p~ima~y motives and ~edefinitions of p~evalling 
ones a~e necessa~y accompaniments to g~adual and ~adical social change. 
The T~iangle of Motives 
To illust~ate these theo~etical p~emlses and thei~ inte~action, a 
visual model is p~oposed. It consists of a t~langle of p~ima~y motives, 
whose th~ee defining points ~ep~esent su~vival, ideational, and 
inst~umental ideal motive types. The la~ge~. yet mo~e desc~lptlve motive 
zones a~e mo~e useful than the ideal-type points in locating and 
desc~ibing obse~ved p~ess behavio~. (See Figu~e 1 below.> 
National st~uctu~es, including the p~ess, may be conceived of as 
moving along and within the pe~imete~ of the t~iangle, usually, though 
not always, in tandem. In unstable nations o~ in unstable times, p~ess, 
gove~nment, and society tend to be out of sync. Although the t~iangle 
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may be useful in conceptualizing political, economic, and social change, 




Flgu~e 1.The Motive T~iangle 
The model is offe~ed with some ~eluctance, because of conce~n that 
it may be applied too mechanistically in p~ess analysis. It is intended 
to se~ve me~ely as a conceptual device and not as a scheme fa~ 
nume~ically app~aising p~ess pe~fo~mance, attitudes, a~ goals. Its 
heu~istlc value, if taken too lite~ally, may be as limited as the 
a~~ow-punctuated dia~ams p~oposed by communication schola~s in the 
1950s, p~evlously cited. Ce~tainly it is no mo~e ~eceptive to 
quantification and exactitude than Hegel's and Ma~x's •dialectic• a~ 
Ko~zybski's •1adde~ of abst~action.• Interpretation is acknowledged to 
be a key component and a majo~ st~ength of phenomenologically-based 
methodology; inte~p~etation is likewise viewed as inherent in all 
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empirical research. 
The motive triangle provides an _analytical framework that takes Into 
account the constant fluidity and frequent ambiguity of press policy and 
behavior. Although press systems are identified in terms of their 
predominant activity, specific national behavior never correlates 
perfectly with ideal types because action is predicated on varying and 
conflicting situation, priorities, and cultural repertoires of responses, 
corresponding to the voluntaristic options exercised in all human 
behavior. The behavioral range of isolated press activity (e.g., U.S. 
coverage of HDesert Storm" in January 1991; anti-drug advertising 
campaigns in Columbia in 1991> might be confined to one or two sides of 
the motive triangle that originate from the point of prevailing motive. 
On the whole, it is expected that the smaller and more specific the unit 
of analysis, whether in terms of time span, subject category, or media 
organization, the smaller the area of press activity would be. Thus a 
motive-triangle summary of NATO countries' press behavior would no doubt 
occupy more area on the motive triangle than a single member country's 
press, for broader analysis encompassing extended periods of time reveal 
that press behavior is tugged in all three directions simultaneously. 
Figure 2, shown on the following page, is offered as illustration of 
how the model may be used to indicate press activity of countries A, B, 
and C, <or media organizaions A, B, and C,> in a comparative study within 
a specified time span. In Figure 3, longitudinal study findings are 
shown, summarizing the characteristics of a single national press system 
over a 40-year time span. The subscript notation system presented 
perhaps facetiously by Wendell Johnson in People in Quandaries <1946>, 




Figure 2. Press Activity of Countries 




Figure 3. Press Activity of Country X 
1945, 1965, and 1985 
While It ls theoretically and geometrically possible to ascertain 
the precise point within the motive triangle where a press system might 
lie by quantifying and weighting observed press characteristics, such 
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pLoceduLes aLe beyond the scope OL intention of this qualitatively-based 
constLuct. FoL the focus of the dynamic theoLy is on disceLning press 
behavioL exhibited by nations in a multiplicity of contexts and 
situations. This heLmeneutical peLspective in no way denies the 
influences of political, economic, and social philosophies posited as 
PLimary determinants in existing world press theoLy, but it reduces the 
relevance of theiL OLigin in a rapidly-changing world of unprecedented 
situational fluidity. Using Japan as illustLation of an 
instrumentally-motivated nation, attempts to understand the Japanese 
media in the 1990s by fixating on Enlightenment ideas of Smith and Locke 
is to enter a time warp, further skewed by Occicentrism. By the same 
token, concentation on the cultural groundings, such as indiginous 
religions, offers only interesting speculation on why the Japanese media 
function as thy do. More relevant are actions triggered and rationalized 
by American occupation following World War II. And even more meaningful 
are actions taken in response to favorable world market conditions 
beginning in the 1970s. The suspicion is that before 1 whyH can be 
answered, if, indeed, it needs to be, uhowu must be addressed first. 
Finally, the lack of logic in classifying Japan as a Western nation for 
the sake of tidy philosophy-based typologies need not be argued. 
The motive triangle is intended to serve as a frame for identifying 
observed press behavior in relation to ideal typical behavior. In the 
next section, ideal-type behavioral characteristics are described and 
briefly illustrated. 
Ideal-Type Characteristics of 
Motivated Press Behavior 
Survival-Motivated Press Characteristics 
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National Motive and the Press. The primary activity of survivalist 
press systems is to encourage and support leaders/ efforts to prevail 
against military and economic threats to the nation. The mass media play 
a central role in identifying and reifying the perceived threat, 
strengthening national identity, unifying public opinion, and integrating 
action of all social sectors. The media provide high, positive visibilty 
for the government and are viewed as partners and agents of authority. 
Dramatic examples of sudden shifts to survival from instrumental 
vocabularies and behaviors in the 1980s are illustrated by U.S. press 
activity in recent short-lived military activities in the Persian Gulf, 
Panama, and Grenada, as well as Britain/s Falkland Island crisis. 
Situations of longer duration, such as the Soviet Union/s battle against 
invading Fascist forces in World War II and England/s ongoing conflict 
with Irish separatists, result in the justification of survivalist press 
strategies that supercedes or compromises ideational and instrumentalist 
rationales for press behavior that might normally prevail. 
News. News is information, either domestic or foreign in origin, 
that does not undermine the survival or strength of the nation. A 
proclivity toward positive presentation of national activities and events 
is characteristic of the survival press; however, news and information 
unrelated to national survival appeals to a broad range of national 
tastes, interests, and needs. Objectivity in the reporting of events 
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associated with national survival issues is irrelevant at best and may be 
counterproductive or even disastrous. Timeliness itself is not a virtue, 
though the timing of news may be manipulated to strengthen the impression 
of government infallability. 
Education and Morality. Media content places disproportionate 
emphasis on educating the public with the goal of strengthening national 
cohesion and development of the surival agenda. 
Advertising. Financing and ownership. The media may be owned by 
the state, individuals, or political parties. The distinction is not 
important because it has little impact on press activity due to the 
ubiquity of the national agenda and the effectiveness of self-censorship 
based on the assumption of cohesive action. When the threat to survival 
is economic, lack of resources severely limits private ownership and 
inhibits press diversity and effectiveness even when media are 
government- or party-owned and have access to public funds. Advertising 
is encouraged, though scarcity of goods and the absence of a 
consumption-oriented middle class limits its financial impact. 
Entertainment and Art. Domestic and foreign entertainment are not 
perceived as threatening, unless the content itself is perceived as 
undermining national security. Though vociferous spokesmen, such as 
Mustafa Masmoudi of Tunesia <1978>, inveigh against the •cultural 
imperialism11 of foreign <predominantly. Western> television programs, 
feature films, and tour companies, imported entertainment is facilitated 
by the state. A 1975 UNESCO study, reported by Jeremy Tunstall in~ 
Media Are American. showed that of the seven African countries surveyed, 
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including Masmoudi's Tunesia, American feature films accounted for 26 
percent of all officially-imported films, and that U.S., Western 
European, and other developed countries' films together comprised 83 
percent of imported films. Similar percentages describe imported 
television programs. The pattern is duplicated to a greater and lesser 
extent throughout Latin America and South Asia CTunstall, 1977: 280-281>. 
As L. John Martin and Angu Chaudhary observe, 0 As Third World nations 
move toward more developed status, their reliance on imports decline. 
The irony here is that the poorer a country is, the more dependent it is 
on foreign imports for entertainmentu C1983: 223>.~ However, 
economic conditions do not dictate reliance on foreign entertainment in 
ideationally-motivated nations, as the next section makes clear. 
Local and Small Media. Survival-motivated nations view their 
primary threat as external and the government encourages internal 
communication in order to unify the country and promote cohesion. Rural 
and local networks are generally encouraged to utilize available 
technologies, such as newspapers, broadcast media, newsletters, public 
address systems, criers, and even more primitive instruments, such as 
drums, to assist in horizontal communication of information and 
education. 
Foreign Journalists and Qutgoing Media Fare. The government exerts 
strict control over entry and access of foreign journalists and is 
empowered to order expulsion, detainment, and imprisonment of personnel 
on the grounds of national security/survival. Strenuous effort is 
expended to manage outgoing news and to shape the reporting of internal 
events for international audiences. These activities are justified on 
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the basis of minimizing national vulne~ability. 
Fo~eign Media Fa~e and the Domestic Audience. Incoming news 
~eceives less ~igo~ous sc~utiny, though fo~eign media that pointedly 
add~ess domestic conce~ns may have pages excised, issues pulled, etc. 
Offensive wi~e copy f~om inte~national news agencies is heavily edited 
fo~ style and content. Neve~theless, financially-st~apped su~vivalist 
nations tu~n to fo~eign news se~vices fo~ inte~national news, even of 
adjoining count~ies. The most common sou~ces a~e usually Weste~n 
se~vices, p~ima~ily the Associated P~ess, Reute~s, Agence F~ance P~esse, 
as well as inte~national b~oadcast se~vices and, inc~easingly, comme~clal 
television netwo~ks and video se~vlces. 
Idea-Motivated P~ess Cha~acte~istics 
National Motive and the P~ess. The p~ess, as messenge~ and 
"t~ansmission belt" of the idea, enjoys a sanctified position among 
social institutions and is highly developed and well financed; fo~ the 
media a~e ent~usted with p~omulgating, inte~p~eting, and maintaining the 
belief system, while simultaneously building unananimity and exposing 
deviation. The p~ess is an integ~al pa~t of the belief system and plays 
a quasi-official ~ole in advancing the idea and its accompanying 
vocabula~y of motives. 
Existing p~ess typologies have identified the Soviet Communist o~ 
Ma~xist p~ess type and many cha~acte~istlcs associated with that 
designation a~e obse~ved in the idea-motivated ideal type. Media 
behavlo~ of the People's Republic of China, Cuba, and No~th Ko~ea in 
ea~ly 1991 a~e p~ima~ily justified by ideational vocabula~ies based on 
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Marxism-Leninism, Stalinism, and Maoism. The fundamentalist state of 
Iran is another example of an idea-dominated nation and its media embody 
that orientation. 
In South Africa, international and domestic challenge to apartheid 
elevated that sociopolitical policy to motive status, necessitating a 
strengthening of the motive vocabulary in the mid-1980s intended to turn 
aside objection at home and abroad. South Africa~s government, between 
1986 and 1989, increasingly pursued lines of action that included extreme 
measures to enlist the mass media, particularly the privately-owned 
press, in service to the idea of segregation of the races and the 
supremacy of the white race. Failure of the print media, South African 
citizens, and the world community to accept the rationales of apartheid 
motive vcabulary led to the defeat of the ldea~s proponents and the 
apparent phasing out of the idea beginning in the early 1990s. 
News. In ideational systems, news is regarded as information that 
explains, interprets, strengthens, and illustrates the correctness of the 
idea. It also includes selective reporting of events that show the 
wrongness and ill-consequences of other beliefs. A marked tendency to 
orient all information to serve ideational ends is observed. The 
practice of highlighting "good" news and underplaying or omitting the 
reporting of Hbad newsu further characterizes the ideational press. 
Assuming that two-sided <or multi-sided> messages subvert the idea, 
ideational presses reJect the notion of obJectivity. Timeliness is not a 
priority and is superceded by an emphasis on interpretive caution and 
accuracy. As a consequence, media reports are delayed while they undergo 
scrutiny by ideational authorities. Interpretation rather than facticity 
characterizes media content. With the exception of spiritual leaders, 
individual achievements and activities receive scant attention, since 
focus on individuals is seen as subverting the idea. 
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Education and Morality. Disproportionate emphasis is placed on 
educating and enlightening the masses. Even information that pertains to 
daily life and appears to be irrelevant to the belief system is presented 
as instruction that offers the audience an opportunity to demonstrate 
compliance and cooperation. 
Advertising. Financing. and Qwnership. Because all other beliefs 
are perceived as endangering and weakening the idea system, the mass 
media are owned or funded, and under total state management. The mission 
of the media is viewed as too important to be subject to the vagaries of 
the market. Display and classified advertising serve an instrumental 
purpose by making the audience aware of how goods and services may be 
obtained, but it is not a significant source of media income. All 
foreign advertising is prohibited, except that which originates in 
countries sharing the value system. Control is centralized and 
multi-layered, but the main force at work is the ingrained 
self-censorship of media professionals. 
Entertainment and Art. All forms of entertainment and art are 
viewed as possible and likely vehicles for purveying heretical ideas. 
Foreign entertainment is prohibited, unless it originates in a nation 
sharing the belief system. Exceptions are selected works that are 
sympathetic to the national idea or that reveal the error of competing 
ideas. The 1975 UNESCO study reported by Tunstall revealed that almost 
50 peLcent of foLeign featuLe films impoLted by seven EasteLn EuLopean 
countLies came fLam etheL communist countLies; U.S. films compLised a 
caLefully-selected 10 peLcent of lmpoLted films; WesteLn EuLopean films 
compLised 25 peLcent. 
112 
Local and Small Media. Local media activity is suspect and is 
caLefully OLchestLated by and patteLned afteL centLal media. Small media 
aLe pLohibited OL closely contLolled. Access to photocopying, fax 
machines, public addLess systems, and even telephones may be licensed and 
otheLwise LeStLlcted. 
FoLeign JouLnalists and Outgoing Media FaLe. StLict contLol is 
exeLcised oveL foLeign jouLnalists and authoLities have the poweL to 
OLdeL expulsion, detainment, and impLisonment of foLeign peLsonnel whose 
LepoLts endangeL OL belittle the idea system. StLenuous effoLt is 
expended to manage and manipulate outgoing news. The ideational pLess is 
centLal in disseminating the idea system and its motive vocabulaLies to 
foLeign audiences via well-financed inteLnational bLoadcasts, wiLe 
seLvices, newspapeLs, and magazines. John MeLLill LepoLts that ILan 
bLoadcasts Leadings fLom the KaLan and etheL Leligious discussions in 13 
languages to EuLope,the Soviet Union, AfLica, Asia, and paLts of the 
United States <MeLLill, 1991: 139>. 
FoLeign Media FaLe and the Domestic Audience. Incoming news fLam 
foLeign souLces is gLeatly suspect and LaLely appeaLs in the domestic 
media. Those foLeign items that aLe made available foL domestic 
consumption aLe selected because they poLtLay etheL beliefs in a negative 
light, indicate instances of foLeign solidaLity with the cause, andloL 
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otherwise lend support to the national idea. Sophisticated and expensive 
technologies are used to jam shortwave signals from international 
broadcasting organizations, such as Voice of America, the British 
Broadcasting Company, Deutsche Welle, Radio Havana, and Radio Peking. 
Iwo Manifestations of Ideational Press Behavior. Two special 
instances of ideational press activity merit additional discussion. 
These are revolutionary presses and advertising/public relations 
activity. 
The revolutionary press concept, identified by Hachten <1987: 
27-30>, represents a counterforce to prevailing national motive. 
However, revolutionary movements do not set as their goal the destruction 
of the nation or the worsening of its economic situation, but rather its 
amelioration and strengthening. Therefore, survival vocabularies 
advanced by incumbents are ineffective in responding to the challenge of 
revolutionary ideas. Domestic opposition, reaching its apex in civil 
war, is combatted using highly affective ideational motives. 
Because of a revolutionary press~s fixation on propagating an 
•tdea, 11 its own behavioral characteristics are those of an ideational 
type. "By its very nature, the Revolutionary concept is a short-term 
affair,• Hachten wri~es ....... Once goals are achieved, the gains must 
be consolidated, and then another concept takes over <1988: 30>. As the 
present author observed in a study of the Soviet weekly newspaper, Moscow 
News. 11 all revolutionary presses ••. are processual, on their way to 
becoming something else 11 <Schillinger, 1991: 147>. Certain parallels can 
be recognized between the Weberian concept of charismatic leadership and 
the revolutionary press, because both represent transitional phases 
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between mo~e endu~lng ideal types. A successful ~evolution b~ings about 
institutionalization <~outinization> of a media system aligned with 
national motives. 
The dynamic theo~y also ~ecognizes mo~e limited ~evolutiona~y ideas 
whose aims challenge p~evailing motive vocabula~les, but fall sho~t of 
~ooting out existing political/economic st~uctu~es and ~eplacing them 
with new ones. Any iconoclastic idea that utilizes the media to 
challenge existing vocabula~ies of motive can be viewed as ~evolutiona~y. 
A ~evolutlona~y p~ess goes unde~~ound, howeve~, only when it meets with 
official p~ohibition and becomes aoutlawed. 1 The fact that it is 
socially o~ cultu~ally ~epugnant may account fo~ its lack of success or 
adaption, but it takes gove~nment intervention to drive a revolutionary 
press underground. 
Government response to a revolutionary press that threatens the 
prevailing national motive is usually swift and accompanied by vigorous 
reiteration of the prevailing motive vocabulary 1 to convince others11 of 
the irrationality of questioning ongoing activity. Risk inherent in 
government-outlawed press behavior increases group cohesion, 
centralization, control, and intolerance for competing ideas. Among 
prime histo~ical examples a~e the p~ess activity of the highly factional 
p~e-Revoluiona~y p~ess in Russia, 1880-1917; the equally impassioned and 
intole~ant anti-To~y political pamphleteering preceding the American 
Revolution; and the underground press in Nazi-occupied France during 
World War II. The samizdat <self-publishing> press in the Soviet Union, 
utilized most effectively by Jewish dissidents in the 1960s and 1970s, 
was targeted largely to an external audience. 
The single-mindedness and cohesion of ~evolutionary media f~equently 
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offset ~est~ictions imposed by limited financial ~esou~ces, namely 
p~imitive technologies. Though ta~g~ted at Hmass• audiences, 
~evolutiona~y media often fall within the pu~view of •small media," 
cha~acte~ized by dependence upon pe~sonal inte~action. up~int 11 media is 
f~equently handw~itten o~ machine-p~oduced in limited quantities to be 
passed f~om hand to hand. In ~ecent decades photocopying, inexpensive 
offset p~inting p~ocesses, and telefax machines have expanded the ~each 
of small p~int media. Audio and video cassettes and mobile b~oadcasting 
equipment have likewise multiplied domestic and t~ansbo~de~ audiences. 
Unde~~ound ~evolutlona~y media activity usually occu~s in nations 
in which idea motives p~edominate. In su~vival and 
inst~umentally-o~de~ed systems, the "~evolutiona~y ideau is pe~ceived by 
autho~ities as th~eatening only when its content specifically ta~gets 
su~vival o~ inst~umental motive vocabula~ies; whe~eas, in idea-o~iented 
nations, any such idea is pe~ceived as a th~eat that must be e~adicated. 
Thus, the ~~~evolutiona~y idean of homosexual ~ights is likely to be 
officially tole~ated in su~vival and inst~umentalist systems; whe~eas it 
is likely to be d~iven unde~g~ound in ideational systems. Whe~eas media 
p~omoting the idea of t~ansnational tdbal loyalty a~e viewed as 
~evolutiona~y and th~eatening to su~vival-motlvated nations, the U.S. 
ethnic p~ess, with financial and cultu~al ties to fo~eign count~ies, 
p~esents no th~eat to inst~umental assumptions in the United States. 
Du~ing Wo~ld Wa~ II, when su~vival motives p~evailed in the United 
States, little tole~ance was extended to ethnic Japanese and Ge~man 
publications. 
The so-called unde~g~ound p~ess that ope~ated in the United States 
in the 1960s was not t~uly unde~g~ound, fa~ it was not actively opposed 
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o~ banned by autho~ity. Opposition to the VietNam Wa~ did not impe~il 
the national instrumental vocabula~y of motives. Likewise, censorship of 
mate~lals that attacked the gove~nment in powe~ and even the political 
structure did not occur, because tentative effo~ts to suspend the 
prevailing motive vocaulary against free expression could not be 
rationalized by the public. In contrast, rebel I ious activity that 
targetted U.S. businesses and p~operty was not tolerated. In Africa and 
Asia, the economic benefits of colonial policies had become sufficiently 
ambiguous to imperial powers in the post-World War II yea~s that British 
autho~ities tole~ated ~evolutionary nationalist, anti-colonial press 
activity to a su~p~ising deg~ee. 
The instrumentalists' tolerance for diverse ideas and actions, 
essential for economic dynamism, tends to make underg~ound activity 
unnecessary. The media provide a fo~um for the ai~ing of ~evolutionary 
ideas that do not seriously imperil instrumentalist tenets. The impact 
of revolutionary media in a pluralistic media envi~onment is diffused, 
and ~evolutiona~y movements a~e more likely to die out because of 
sociocultural disaffection and lack of ~isk-inspired cohesion, rather 
than because of official opposition. Revolutionary ideas that repudiate 
seconda~y and tertiary motives frequently ~un up against public opinion 
and social censure that can rival the force of government prohibition. 
Advertising and public relations activities likewise are 
ideationally motivated, though these activities ultimately and 
collectively promote instrumentalist values, such as competition and 
consumerism. Neither the advertising account executive nor the public 
relations speech writer is advocating pluralistic views, obJectivity, or 
the •self-righting" principle--enshrined in instrumentalist press 
117 
ideology. Rather, the goal of advertising professionals Is to implant 
and support as effectively as possible one idea--the product or service 
of his/her client--to the exclusion of competing products or services. 
Consequently the day-to-day activity and ideology of advertising and 
public relations professionals is at odds with that motivating 
journalists. One memorable example is NBC newsman Tom Brokaw/s refusal 
to sully his reputation for accuracy and objectivity by advertising "dog 
food 11 on the Today Show. 
Yet textbook writers and industry spokesmen feel compelled to fit 
advertising and public relations into a procrustean bed of journalistic 
motives that practitioners disdain and adopt only at their own financial 
peril. The disparity in motives between print and broadcast journalists 
on one hand and advertising and public relations practitioners on the 
other accounts for the rivalry and distrust commonly observed between 
these contradictory yet interdependent professions <Altschull, 1988; 
Gans, 1979; Hiebert et al .• 1979; 0/Mara, 1989; Ryan and Martinson, 
1988). 
Instrumentally-Motivated Press Characteristics 
National Motive and the Press. The press is a competitor in the 
economic market and seeks to maximize profit by appealing to large 
audiences. Like other businesses, the media seek to limit government 
authority. In addition, the press is legally entrusted with the 
responsibility of monitoring government decisions and policy and with 
exposing malfeasance and poor judgment. "The public/s right to know 11 is 
the centerpiece of instrumental press motivation, a rationale that has 
proved to be more efficacious is gaining societal acceptance than "the 
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press's right to sell intormation.u 
News. In instrumentally-dominated press systems, news is any 
timely information, domestic or international in focus that can be 
marketed profitably to the public. Unusual and exceptional events, 
including •badu news, are disproportionately represented in media content 
because of their common appeal and saleability. Primary among newsworthy 
items is information that assists those engaged in market activities 
operate more effectively--even though such persons may comprise a small 
percentage of the audience. News is also any information that tracks the 
activity of government or government leaders. 
Objectivity, multi-sided coverage, and an emphasis on facts over 
interpretation are rationalized as "good, 11 in the utilitarian/pragmatic 
sense, because they are least likely to alienate significant segments of 
the audience. Likewise, timeliness, accuracy, simplicity and clarity of 
style, and attention to graphics and illustrations are stressed because 
these strategies succeed in attracting audiences in a field of media 
competitors. 
Education and Morality. Moralizing and overt instruction are 
avoided, as they are seen as having little audience appeal and violate 
the motive of relativism. Materials that tend to specify correct courses 
of action are confined to signed columns and editorials, and are thus 
identified as 11 0pinion•. Opinion pieces are the primary vehicle for 
reiteration of the instrumental vocabulary motives, but the motive 
vocabulary is also reinforced in the selection of news and in the 
ordering of information in these accounts. Thus the instrumental 
vocabulary of motives infiltrates all media fare, but does not depend on 
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inst~uctive devices fo~ its diffusion. 
Advertising. Financing. and Qwne~shlp. Media a~e owned by p~ivate 
individuals, domestic o~ fo~eign chains, and conglome~ates. Gove~nment 
cont~ols ave~ media monopolies a~e minimal. The vast majo~ity of 
mainst~eam media ~evenues a~e p~ovided by adve~tising. Adve~tising ~ates 
a~e dete~mined by audience size, based on ~atings and ci~culation. Thus 
the content of media fa~e is influenced by the public and by adve~tise~s, 
as well as by media p~ofessionals and owne~s. Gove~nment influence on 
programming is minimal, though self-censo~ship and ent~ep~eneu~ial 
self-interest tend to keep media content is line with audience and 
gove~nment expectation. 
Ente~tainment and A~t. All media fo~ms from domestic and fo~eign 
sou~ces alike are viewed as p~oducts to be sold. Thus selection of 
entertainment by media o~ganizations is based on p~edicted marketability 
and p~ofitability. As such, mainst~eam media tend to ta~get 
ente~tainment at the masses, ~esulting ln an appeal to the lowest common 
denominator, a "cultu~al 11 manifestation of the 11 ty~anny of the majority. 8 
Local and small Media. No attempt is made to cont~ol o~ limit 
local o~ small media activity. The availability of compa~atively 
sophisticated technologies in most of today~s instrumentally-o~iented 
countries encourages a b~oad spectrum of specialized small-media effo~ts, 
pa~ticula~ly in p~int. 
Foreign Journalists and Outgoing Media Fare. In 
instrumentally-oriented nations, foreign jou~nalists and their work do 
not ~eceive any special t~eatment o~ attention. When su~vival motives 
take p~ecedence ave~ inst~umental vocabula~ies, gove~nment immediately 
assumes greate~ autho~ity and visibility and fo~eign jou~nalists may be 
depo~ted, detained, o~ imp~isoned. 
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Fo~eiqn Media Fare and the Domestic Audience. Incoming news and 
info~mation from fo~eign sou~ces does not undergo special scrutiny. The 
media downplay international cove~age when they believe it holds little 
interest for the public and emphasize it when it is pe~ceived to have a 
wide ma~ket and to be p~ofitable. 
Cont~ol of the P~ess 
In examining the characte~istics of survival-, idea-, and 
inst~ument-dominated p~ess systems, no special catego~y was set aside for 
noting the means by which governments exercise control over the 
press--p~ior ~est~aint, censorship, fines, law suits, imprisonment, 
expulsion, etc. Note is taken of the fact that ideational press systems 
a~e more subject to control than su~vivalist systems, and that an 
ideal-typical inst~umental system exe~cises no form of press cont~ol. 
It is the gene~al assumption of the dynamic theory that it is 
national situation that determines national action and the deg~ee of 
gove~nment int~usion into p~ess ope~ation. The assumption is that 
government action is dete~mined primarily by situations. Any gove~nment, 
when fo~ced to act in ~esponse to a given stuation, will invoke the 
approp~iate motive vocabula~y and exe~cise whatever measu~es that 
vocabulary justifies to b~ing press behavio~ into line. When dealing 
with the domestic press, coercion is usually unnecessa~y, since the p~ess 
too is caught in the same situation and aligns itself with the new motive 
vocabulary. It is in seeking to control the foreign press that more 
severe measures must be applied. 
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Thus to speak of free-press nations versus controlled-press nations 
is to confuse nations with situations. To paraphrase Mills, the 
propensity of a government to con~rol the press is not a fixed element in 
the government or the nation; but a rationalized response to a perceived 
situation. The attribution to a nation of qualities of forebearance or 
brutality toward the press is exacerbated and its faulty conclusions 
reified when situations remain largely unchanged for several decades, as 
occurred during the exteqded period of the Cold War. In the case 
summaries that follow, the premises and tenets of the dynamic theory 
illustrate how situated actions, occurring at specific points in time, 
determine government and press behavior. 
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Endnotes 
1. Among other works which have utilized the concept of motive and 
motive vocabularies in efforts to integrate interactionism, social 
organizations and 1 extended temporalityu are: Robert Faulkner~s study of 
the film industry <1983>, Norman Denzin~s portrait of the liquor industry 
<1977>, and Farberman/s analysis of the automobile industry <1975>. For 
further interpretation see Peter M. Hall/s 11 Interactionism and the study 
of social organization (1987> and Randall Stokes and John Hewitt's 
"Aligning Actions11 (1976>. 
2. The Freedom of Information Act, passed by Congress in 1966 and 
subsequently liberalized, broadens access to government information, but 
exempts the president and his immediate advisers, Congress, its 
committees, and agencies under its direct control, such as the Library of 
Congress and the General Accounting Office, and the federal judicial 
system. Seven additional exemptions include among them 11 trade secrets 
and commercial or financial," .. investigatory records compiled for law 
enforcement purposes, .. "geological and geophysical information and data, 
including maps, concerning wellsu <Holsinger, 1991: 351-371>. 
The Supreme Court has supported the government/s right to censor 
books and articles even when no breach of national security is involved. 
Contractual agreements between the CIA, FBI, and some other government 
agencies and employees prohibit publication of agency-related materials, 
even after employees have left the agency. The Supreme Court generally 
has supported the government position on these contracts in opinions 
handed down in United States v. Marchetti, 1972; Alfred A. Knopf v. 
Colby, 1975; and Snepp v. United States, 1980 <Holsinger, 1991: 74-76>. 
3. Altschull/s 11 Seven Laws of Journalism" are: 
1. In all press systems, the news media are agents of those who 
exercise political and economic power. Newspapers, magazines, and 
broadcasting outlets thus are not independent actors, although they 
have the potential to exercise independent power. 
2. The content of the news media always reflects the interests of 
those who finance the press. 
3. All press systems are based on belief in free expression, 
although free expression is defined in different ways. 
4. All press sytems endorse the doctrine of social responsibility, 
proclaim that they serve the needs and interests of the people, and 
state their willingness to provide access to the people. 
5. In each of the three press models [that Altschul] proposes: 
Market, Marxist, and Advancing], the press of the other models is 
perceived to be deviant. 
6. Schools of journalism transmit ideologies and value systems of 
the society in which they exist and inevitably assist those in power 
to maintain their control of the news media. 
7. Press practices always differ from theory. 
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4. The term culture, as employed here, is static and non-problematic, 
corresponding to the notion of non-motivated, unconscious acts. The 
concept is defined by Stokes and Hewitt as follows: aculture thus 
consists of recognized and preferred ways of thinking, feeling and acting 
that can be designated by and acted toward by those who are participants 
in a given culture. Conceived in this way, it must be stressed, culture 
is a set of obJects: ideas, knowledge, beliefs, ways of acting, roles, 
institutions, norms, activities--all may be designated and acted towards 
as objects" <1975: 843>. 
5. The debate over "cultural imperialism," a central theme in the New 
World Information Order controversy, is largely one based on principle 
rather than real concern that Third World peoples are being flooded with 
Western films, videos, and print media. In Ghana, a relatively 
media-rich developing nation, three television sets per 1,000 population 
and 164 radio receivers per 1,000 were reported in 1982. Per capita 
newsprint consumption was 1.5 pounds. <Kurian, Vol. I, 1982: 389>. 
Indonesians had 5.1 television sets and 47 radio receivers per 1,000 and 
newsprint consumption was less than one pound per capita <Kurian, Vol. I, 
1982: 495>. Other sources indicate that motion picture theatres are few 
and far between outside urban areas. By way of extreme comparison, the 
United States was reported to have 988 television sets per 1,000 and 
2,200 radio receivers per 1,000 in 1982 <Kurian, Vol II, 1982: 945). 
CHAPTER V 
CASE SUMMARIES OF INSTRUMENTALLY-ORIENTED 
PRESS SYSTEMS--THE UNITED STATES 
1776-1992 AND BRITAIN 1979-1990 
Introduction 
The instrumentally-oriented press systems of the United States and 
Britain were selected for analysis because their comparison illustrates 
the dynamic theory's capacity to discern significant differences between 
similar systems that more static theoretical approaches do not 
distinguish. By concentrating on situated actions revealed through 
articulated motives rather than on historical bonds and contemporary 
political associations, a certain theoretical detachment can be achieved 
that precludes or, at least, reduces international bias and 
stereotyping. 
The decision to place the instrumental case studies before the 
examples of survival and ideational systems, which follow in Chapters VI 
and VII, was based on the fact that the inherent pluralism of the 
instrumental orientation provides meaningful insights into these ideal 
types as well. Also, it is assumed that American readers will gain 
greater understanding of the dynamic theory if it is first demonstrated 
by examples with which they are likely to have some familiarity. The 
fuller treatment given to the U.S. and British systems is a consequence 
of the theory's grounding in phenomenology and motive theory. Because 
124 
125 
understanding of national press activity is derived primarily from 
motives articulated by working media professionals, audiences, and policy 
makers in the countries under study, ready access to American and British 
accounts enriches and lengthens these analyses. The less detailed 
treatment of the survival-dominated media systems of Singapore and 
Nigeria and the ideationally-motived press behaviors of Iran and the 
former Soviet Union are limited by the scope of these illustrative 
studies, rather than by the capacity of the dynamic theory. 
The United States 
National Situation and Motive 
Jamestown, the first permanent British settlement in North America 
was founded in 1607--just two years before the world's first printed 
newspaper came off the press in Germany and 150 years after Johan 
Gutenberg's invention gave birth to the Modern Age. Though the first 
short-lived newspaper in the American colonies did not appear until 1680, 
the new world would serve as a laboratory for the development and testing 
of French and English Enlightenment ideas, combining them with the 
revolutionary concept of mass communication. 
Throughout most of its national history, the press of the United 
States has subscribed to an instrumental vocabulary of motives and today 
comes closest in its behavior and rationales to the instrumental ideal 
type. While fluctuation and change are observed in the course of 
American press history and for some periods and in some contexts 
ideational and survival characteristics rival and even surpass 
instrumental characteristics, in no other nation has press activity been 
so consistently rationalized by a single prevailing motive type for such 
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an extended period of time. 
Because of its constancy of motive, continually reiterated and 
adjusted, a wide-angle approach has been applied to analysis of the U.S. 
media, beginning with underlying situations, that is with contextual and 
historical conditions that are still relevant to today/s instrumental 
press. To illustrate oscillations and aligning actions, event-specific 
situations are noted and elaborated in more detail. 
The great paradox of the American media is found in the frequent 
conflict between two major Enlightenment concepts--free enterprise and 
free expression. This dichotomy, as well as a motive for balanced and 
objective reporting, is addressed by Benjamin Franklin in a 1731 essay, 
"Apology for Printers,~ appearing in his Pennsylvania Gazette: 
Printers are educated in the Belief, that when Men differ in 
Opinion, both Sides ought equally to have the Advantage of 
being heard by the Publick; and that when Truth and Error have 
fair Play, the former is always an overmatch for the latter: 
Hence they chearfully serve all contending Writers that pay 
them well [emphasis added], without regarding on which side 
they are of the Question in Dispute •••• That hence arises the 
peculiar unhappiness of that Business, which other Callings are 
no way liable to; they who follow Printing being scarce able to 
do any thing in their way of getting Living, which shall not 
probably given offence to some, and perhaps to many ••• <1731>. 
Attempts to make the two concepts consistent if not identical have 
been a preoccupation of media practitioners, publishers, and theorists 
ever since. The identification of the American and other industrial 
nation/s press systems as 11 free presses" rather than "capitalist presses" 
is an indication of the tendency of most analysts to place emphasis on 
Milton/s •self-righting principle• over Smith/s •laissez faire 11 beliefs. 
Instrumental Characteristics 
In contrast, it is the premise of this analysis that the U.S. media 
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since about 1830 have been primarily motivated by an instrumental, 
market-oriented vocabulary, and that the ideational tenet of press 
freedom and the public's right to know have been co-opted to win 
adherents to the instrumental vocabulary. Similarly, democratic press 
values have been aligned to accommodate instrumental actions. According 
to C. Wright Mills, 11 The 'Real Attitude to Motive' [in this case, the 
instrumental orientation] is not something different in kind from the 
verbalization or the 'opinion.' They turn out to be only relatively and 
temporally different• <1940: 908>. More simply, most of the time profit 
motives and free-press ideas are compatible; when the two orientations 
collide, instrumental motives tend to prevail over ideational ones. The 
triumphs of free-press ideas over instrumentalism are discussed along 
with other non-instrumental values in the next section, in which the 
ideational characteristics of the U.S. press are examined. 
The First Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1791 along with 
nine other amendments comprising the Bill of Rights, is viewed as the 
cornerstone of U.S. press activity. Press rights are listed among other 
natural rights in the First Amendment, which reads: 
Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or of the 
right of the public peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances. 1 
The ambiguity of that spare negatively-worded statement has encouraged 
endless scrutiny, and one interpretation suggests that the authors may 
have intended to reserve the privilege of press oversight for state and 
local governments. The Bill of Rights was an addendum to the original 
Constitution, created to win ratification by state legislatures fearful 
that the federal government might usurp state authority. James Madison 
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recorded in his diary that when it was proposed at the original 
Constitutional Convention that the new document might address the issue 
of press freedom, the delegates voted unanimously against it <Koch, 1966: 
630). 
The Constitutional Convention took place behind locked doors and 
great pains were taken to keep the press at bay. Coming across a 
carelessly discarded copy of agenda proposals, George Washington 
reportedly chastised the delegates, saying, ui must entreat gentlemen to 
be more careful, lest our transactions get into the newspapers and 
disturb public repose by premature speculationsu <Clines, 1985). The 
notion of an independent press is likewise absent in the Federalist 
Papers. a series of partisan writings by James Madison, Alexander 
Hamilton, and John Jay, arguing for ratification of the Constitution. 
A strongly ideational press played a decisive role in arousing 
anti-British sentiment during the decades leading up to the American 
Revolution and fueled popular support for the colonial cause during the 
dark days of the war itself. For the first 50 years following 
independence, national press activity was rationalized by both ideational 
and instrumental motives. Altschull argues convincingly that the 
founding fathers anticipated that the press of the fledgling nation would 
serve primarily as a vehicle for their political ideas. 
The ideas expressed in the newspapers [of their day] were, not 
surprisingly, the ideas of the social and cultural elite. if 
the publications were read by the masses, then, it was assumed 
the masses would be influenced by the ideas and political 
principles supported by the press. In this way, the press was 
seen as an instrument of social control, an agency for the 
improvement and benefit of society <Altschull, 1984: 30). 
In the closing years of the 18th century, the Federalist Congress 
found the country/s sovereignty threatened by the refusal of France to 
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~ecognize Ame~ica's ~ight to the seas. The Sedition Act was one of feu~ 
laws passed by Cong~ess and signed into law by P~esident John Adams in 
1797 to ~est~ict the activities of ~esident aliens and quell opposition 
f~om the mino~ity Republican pa~ty. The Sedition Act made seditious 
libel a c~iminal offense and imposed fines and imp~isonment on those 
convicted of 11 W~iting, p~inting, utte~ing, o~ publishing any false, 
scandalous and malicious w~iting o~ w~itings against the Gove~nment of 
the United States, o~ the P~esident of the United States, o~ eithe~ house 
of Cong~ess of the United States •••• • <Folke~ts and Teete~, 1989: 112>. 
Though the law was allowed to expi~e in 1801, p~osecutions continued as 
late as 1803. In that yea~, P~esident Thomas Jeffe~son, to~mented by the 
Fede~alist political p~ess w~ote: 
So abandoned a~e the to~y [Fede~alistl p~ess that ... even the 
least info~med of the people have lea~nt that nothing in a 
newspape~ is to be believed. This is a dange~ous state of 
things, and the p~ess ought to be ~esto~ed to its c~edibility 
if possible. The ~est~aints p~ovided by the laws of the states 
a~e sufficient fo~ this to be applied. And I have the~efo~e 
long thought that a few p~osecutions of the most p~ominent 
offende~s would have a wholesome effect in ~esto~ing the 
integ~ity of the p~esses2 <Altschull, 1984: 28-29>. 
Excised f~om national memo~y and the motive vocabula~y is the 
ambivalence towa~ds an independent p~ess exhibited by the count~y's 
founde~s. Rathe~, emphasis is placed upon the Enlightenment ideas of 
Burne, Locke, Rousseau, Smith, and thei~ Ame~ican disciples, codified fo~ 
the fi~st time in the U.S. Constitution. F~ee of England's autho~ita~ian 
~ule and la~gely unfette~ed by t~adition, social hie~a~chy, economic 
st~ictu~es, and legal const~aints, 3 the count~y set out to test the 
basic tenets of the Mode~n Age. These included glo~ification of the 
individual eve~ the collective, ~ationality eve~ metaphysics, ~elativism 
eve~ absolutism, and p~agmatism eve~ idealism. All of these 
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11 innovations" we~e seen as consistent with and essential to the 
development of Adam Smith/s laissez fai~e capitalism and John Locke/s 
"g~eat chief end" of men, "the p~ese~vation of thei~ p~ope~ty" <Locke, 
1690: 184). 
Anothe~ situation that wo~ked in conce~t with these ideas and 
influenced the activity of the new nation and its p~ess was geo~aphical 
isolation, which allowed Ame~ican institutions to establish themselves 
with minimal fo~eign inte~fe~ence and with inf~equent need fa~ 
cent~alized autho~ity to coo~dinate milita~y effo~ts against fo~eign 
foes. The immense size of the nation, ~apidly expanding to fulfill its 
"manifest destiny," and a constant influx of immig~ants fu~the~ 
diminished dependence upon and ~espect fa~ a st~ong cent~alized 
gove~nment. At the same time, attention was concent~ated upon local 
issues and upon the local p~ess as a means of coo~dinating community 
activity and establishing community identity. Alexis de Tocqueville 
att~ibuted the ~obustness of the local p~ess in Ame~ica to the 
decent~alized natu~e of administ~ative powe~. 
The ext~ao~dina~y subdivision of administ~ative powe~ has much 
mo~e to do with the eno~mous numbe~ of Ame~ican newspape~s than 
the g~eat political f~eedom of the count~y and the absolute 
libe~ty of the p~ess ..•• [Wlithin the ~eat national 
association !esse~ associations have been established by law 
and eve~y village, fa~ the pu~poses of local administration. 
The laws of the country thus compel every American to 
co-ope~ate eve~y day of his life with some of his fellow 
citizens for a common pu~pose, and each one of them ~equi~es a 
newspape~ to info~m him what all the othe~s a~e doing C1835b: 
121>. 
P~og~essive historian Jackson Turne~/s F~ontie~ Thesis, advanced as 
an explanation of the Ame~ican cha~acters, suggests othe~ 
geographically-determined responses. These national 
qualities--inventiveness, efficiency, strength, straight-fo~ardness, 
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p~agmatism, energy, and willingness to take ~isks--a~e elevated to 
virtues in the inst~umental motive vocabula~y CTu~ne~, 1894>. 
The Ame~ican vocabula~y of motives establishes inexo~able ties 
between p~ess p~ofits and p~ess freedom. Advertising notices appea~ed in 
American newspape~s f~om the earliest times and by 1800, 20 of the 24 
dailies bo~e the wo~d Adve~tise~ in thei~ name plates (Folkerts and 
Teete~, 1988: 93>. Howeve~, until the 1830s, Ame~ican newspape~s we~e 
pa~tisan political vehicles, ta~geted at the p~ospe~ous comme~cial elite 
and financed by subsc~iptions and party subsidies. 
The turnabout came with the 11 penny p~ess. 11 It was only the 
eme~gence of a llte~ate and financially solvent u~ban middle class that 
enabled Ben Day's innovative New Yo~k ~sold on streetco~ne~s fo~ a 
penny, to p~ospe~ on the basis of adve~tising ~evenues, ~athe~ than on 
~eade~ subsc~iptions. In the fi~st issue, dated Septembe~ 3, 1833, Day 
announced: 
The object of this pape~ is to lay befo~e the public, at a 
p~ice, within the means of eve~y one, ALL THE NEWS OF THE DAY, 
and at the same time afford an advantageous medium fo~ 
adve~tising. The sheet will be enla~ged as soon as the 
inc~ease of adve~tisements ~equires it--the p~ice remaining the 
same <Day, 1833: 1>. 
The success of Day's expe~iment att~acted sco~es of imitato~s. 
Within a decade, la~ge-ci~culation metropolitan dailies had p~olife~ated 
and we~e competing against each othe~ in majo~ cities. Almost 
immediately the motive vocabula~y was ~est~uctu~ed to accommodate the 
change. Democ~atization of the p~ess became a key concept and 
agg~essiveness and ~epo~to~ial "hustle,u skills al~eady valued in 
comme~ce, acqui~ed heightened status. As financial statements clea~ly 
showed, high ci~culation and high adve~tising ~ates and ~evenues waxed 
1$2 
and waned in tandem. 
By mid-century, publisher Samuel Goodrich could note that books and 
newspapers 11 are now diffused even among the country towns, so as to be in 
the hands of all, young and old •.. 11 (1857, Vol. 2: 284>. Just as an 
unregulated economic market was seen to result in the production of 
high-quality goods and services and the winnowing out of the unfit, so, 
it was reasoned, the desire to maximize profits would result in the most 
satisfactory and consumer-oriented media content. The press fell under 
the jurisdiction of the law of supply and demand. 
Appealing to the ulowest c00111on denominator," as press critics 
charged, newspaper sensationalism reached its apogee in the circulation 
wars between Joseph Pulitzer's New York~ and William Randolph 
Hearst's New York Journal at the end of the 19th century. The function 
of the American mainstream press was not only to inform and persuade, but 
perhaps, above all, to entertain. The excesses of •yellow journalism, .. 
so called because of 0 The Yellow Kid11 comic strip that ran in the World. 
are usually credited with fomenting the Spanish-American War and even 
prompting the assassination of President William McKinley--linked by the 
press and the public to inflammatory words against the president 
appearing in the Journal. Newspaper historian Frank Luther Matt 
characterized "yellow journalismu as the sensationalized coverage of 
crime, scandal, sex, disaster, and sports--featuring lurid headlines, an 
abundance of photographs, stunts, faked stories, Sunday supplements, 
comic strips, and crusades on behalf of the lower classes <Hiebert, 
Ungurait, and Bohn, 1979: 223). While the more controversial 
characteristics of the yellow journalism era were abandoned by the 
mainstream press, others have been adopted and have become standard fare. 
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Supermarket and New York tabloids and, more recently, television news and 
talk-show exposes continue the yellow journalism tradition under the 
updated buzzword "infotainment.u 
In a 1961 speech to television broadcasters, Newton Minow, then 
chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, referred to 
television's mass-oriented content as a "vast wasteland," in which one 
might see 
a procession of game shows, violence, audience-participation 
shows, formula comedies about totally unbelievable families, 
blood and thunder, mayhem, violence, sadism, murder, western 
badmen, western good men, private eyes, gangsters, more 
violence and cartoons •••. And most of all boredom11 <Whelton, 
1982: 465). 
A similar conclusion is drawn by Bill McKibben in a tongue-in-cheek 
review of one 24-hour period in 1990 of nearly 2,000 hours of programming 
taped from Fairfax, Virginia's, cable system. 11 We believe that we live 
in 'the age of information,'" McKibben writes. However, he continues, 
While in a certain sense this is the case, in many important 
ways just the opposite is true. We also live at a moment of 
deep ignorance, when vital knowledge that human beings have 
always possessed about who we are and where we live seems 
beyond our reach; we live in an age of missing information 
(1992: 41). 
The intellectual accessibility and mass appeal of American 
television and film entertainment, determined by the U.S. market, 
transcends national culture and borders. Exports comprise more than 50 
percent of the total annual revenue for most American motion pictures 
<Hiebert et al .• 1979: 273>. The attraction and affordability of taped 
and satellite-transmitted television programs have prompted the 
establishment of quotas limiting American media fare by the European 
Economic Community, Canada, and other countries. 
The U.S. press labels its penchant for disasters, problems, 
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political upheavals, and negative news in gene~al Hthe jou~nalism of 
exception,u o~ •c~isis news.a The social benefit is ~ationalized in the 
inst~umental vocabula~y as info~ming the public of situations in need of 
co~~ection, that is 0 the public's ~ight to know.•• The motive was 
a~ticulated by Senate~ Daniel Pat~ick Moynihan, who obse~ved, "It is the 
ma~k of a democ~acy that its p~ess is filled with bad news. When one 
comes to a count~y whe~e the p~ess is filled with good news, one can be 
p~etty sure that the jails are filled with good men" (1971). 
As transpo~tation and mass p~oduction c~eated national ma~kets fo~ 
goods, the media responded by ~est~uctu~ing thei~ content to appeal to a 
potential national ~eade~ship. The magazine indust~y, in particula~, 
felt compelled to expand its target audience and thus expanded itself, 
beginning in the late 19th centu~y. Likewise, with the advent of ~adio 
and television, national b~and sponso~s enouraged nationwide netwo~king 
and diminished the p~ofitability of independent local stations. Only 
newspape~s have remained la~gely local in focus, though the high cost of 
mode~n p~int technology has ~educed competition and choice ln that a~ena 
too. With the exception of the Wallst~eet Journal. which targets the 
economic elite, the United States was without a national newspaper until 
1982, when Gannett founded USA Today. now the nation's second 
la~gest-circulation paper. 
The growth of national audiences and the accompanying increase in 
diversity of views exacerabated the dilemma identified by F~anklin in his 
11 Apology,"--that is how to 0 buy and sell with jews, Turks, Hereticks and 
Infidels of all sorts, and get Money by eve~y one of them, without giving 
Offense to the most orthodox, •.. or suffering the least Censure or Ill 
will ••.• (1731). While the solution proposed by Franklin, drawn from 
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Milton, was the balanced presentation of opposing views, a more 
contemporary and more distinctly American approach was the objective 
presentation of news. The stress was to be on facts, not on opinion--the 
assumption being that facts are facts, objective, and undebatable, 
whereas opinion is merely one man's interpretation. 
The supposed amoral nature of facts is in keeping with the 
instrumental endorsement of the dissemination of information as a 
legitimate activity and its rejection of education as subversive and 
manipulative. The motive thus justifies media concentration on 
information, a saleable commodity, as opposed to education, which has 
more limited market appeal. It should be noted that the distinction is 
indiscernable to those who do not share the instrumental orientation. 
Editorials and opinion columns, which do contain opinion and a 
certain amount of lecturing or preaching, are spatially separated or 
otherwise set off from objective facts as an alert to the audience to be 
on guard. The American Society of Newspaper Editors declares in its 
Statement of Purpose that 11 [slound practice ••• demands a clear 
distinction for the reader between news reports and opinion. Articles 
that contain opinion or personal interpretation should be clearly 
identifiedu <1973>. "Commentary and analysis should be clearly 
identified as such," the National Association of Broadcasters states in 
its Television Code <1978>. 
American media's obsession with facts is rationalized and grounded 
in the ideas of skeptics Hume and Voltaire, who believed that truth lies 
in the search for clear, empirical evidence, rather than in the 
interpretations of persons involved. Max Weber, in a comparative study 
of French, English, German, and American newspapers, attributed the 
American obsession with facticity to the belief in democracy, noting, 
For the American ••• wants nothing but facts from his paper. 
Whatever opinions are published in the press about these facts 
he regards as not worth reading; as a democrat he is convinced 
that, in principle, he can interpret as well as the newspaper 
writer, perhaps even better <1904: 439). 
However, in his well-known social study of the American newsroom, 
Warren Breed traces the emphasis on news and facts to more pragmatic 
inducements: 
[Newsmen] are not rewarded for analyzing the social structure, 
but for getting news. It would seem that this instrumental 
orientation diminishes their moral potential <1955: 328). 
Inseparable from the notion of facts is the persistent idea that 
facts represent objective reality. University of Missouri journalism 
Professor Theodore Glasser bemoans "the journalist/a naively empirical 
view of the world, a belief in the separation of facts and values, a 
belief in the existence of s reality--the reality of empirical facts 
136 
their belief that news is 'out there '" <1984: 16>. In its "Code of 
Ethics" adopted in 1973, the Society of Professional Journalists includes 
the following among its declarations of standards: "Objectivity in 
reporting the news is another goal, which serves as the mark of an 
experienced professional. It is a standard of performance toward which 
we strive. We honor those who achieve it" <Society of Professional 
Journalists, 1973>. 
In 1977 a federal appellate court for the first time explicity 
recognized objective reporting--"neutral reportage"--as a standard of 
journalism meriting First Amendment protection. Handing down its opinion 
in favor of the New York Times/ right to report erroneous and libelous 
statements made by officers of the National Audubon Society, the court 
ruled, 
[Wlhen a responsible, prominent organization like the National 
Audubon Society makes serious charges against a public figure, 
the First Amendment protects the accurate and disinterested 
reporting of those charges, regardless of the reporter/s 
private views regarding their validity CEdwards v. National 
Audubon Society, 1977>. 
Despite the fact that since the 1950s the morality as well as the 
possibility of objectivity and objective facticity have been subject to 
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growing challenge, uvalue-free 11 reporting remains an important ingredient 
in the newswriting formula, along with the Hinverted pyramid" structure 
and the who-what-where-when-why-how lead. 
Historically, the very concept of American formulaic newswriting 
came about as an accommodation to the cost of telegraphy and the 
competing wire-services/ emphasis on speed and efficiency. Objective 
facts can be formulated and transmitted more rapidly than subjective 
analyses and opinion. Glasser argues that objectively-reported news is 
11 biased in favor of the status quo; it is inherently conservative to the 
extent that it encourages reporters to rely on what sociologist Alvin 
Gouldner so appropriately describes as the /managers of the status 
quo/--the prominent and ellte/ 11 C1984: 14>. Glasser concludes, 
[Qlbjectivity is largely a matter of efficiency--efficiency 
that serves, as far as I can tell, only the needs and interests 
of the owners of the press, not the needs and interests of 
talented writers and certainly not the needs and interests of 
the larger society C1984: 16>. 
The social role of advertising--ignoring that of creating 
profits--has been enunciated and adopted into the instrumental 
vocabulary. An article appearing in Advertising Age in the 1970s listed 
six social contributions of advertising: selling the consumer, creating 
new markets, lowering costs to consumers, spurring product Improvement, 
forcing competition, and encouraging scientific research (Hiebert, 
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Unguiait, and Bohn, 1979: 418-419>. 
The emeigence of chain owneiship began in the last decade of the 
19th centuiy and hit its stiide in the eaily 1920s. The numbei of daily 
newspapeis peaked in 1909, with 2,600 newspapeis and declined theieaftei, 
as the less competitive died Oi were bought up by chains and 
conglomerates <Folkerts and Teetei, 1988: 340>. Competition from news 
magazines, iadio, and television also contributed to the shiinking numbei 
of dailies, which numbeied 1,611 in 1990 <Editoi & Publishei, 1991>. 
Weekly newspapers showed a similar decline. In 1900, 13 chains owned 62 
dailies; by 1930, 55 chains owned 311 dailies, comprising almost 43 
peicent of all daily circulation. Today, 167 chains own 1,047 daily 
newspapers, accounting for 71 peicent of circulation <World Almanac, 
1991: 312-313). 
The paiadox of a commeicialized piess viewing itself as independent 
of commercial influence has not gone unchallenged--oi undefended. When a 
ieader in 1836 piotested the qualities of a Dr. Biandeth's tonic, 
advertised in James Gordon Bennett's New York Herald. the feisty editor 
responded, 
Send us more advertisements than Dr. Biandeth does--give us 
higher prices--we'll cut Dr. Biandeth dead--or at least curtail 
his space. Business is business--money is money •.• we peimlt 
no blockhead to interfeie with cui business <Altschull, 1984: 
63). 
Another eailY advocate of adveitising support for the media, the New York 
Morning Courier. expressed the view that ..... commeicial patronage is 
best, safest and most unstraying of any, and less affected by prejudice, 
whim, or petulance than any others 11 <Altschull, 1984: 62>. 
With the exception of investigative magazine ieports exposing the 
greed and exploitation of big business duiing the short-lived Muckraking 
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Age, 1900-1915, the ~elationship between business and the p~ess can be 
viewed as a fai~ly cozy one, though business does not always sha~e this 
pe~ception <D~eie~, 1983; Hoge, 1984; Smith, 1985>. Altschul! maintains 
that 11 those voices being hea~d in the business corrmunlty about a bias in 
the p~ess against business a~e off the ma~k. The bias is against 
anything that is neithe~ conflictual no~ hea~t-wa~ming 11 <Altschull, 1972: 
5). 
Though the public pe~iodically indicates conce~n about the 
comme~cial bent of the media, the seve~est c~itics have been jou~nalists 
themselves, most notably Will !~win, A.J. Liebling, Ha~old Ickes, Lincoln 
Steffans, and Geo~ge Seldes. The latte~ claimed in 1980 that g~eat p~ess 
lo~ds we~e 11 in bed with business in almost all ~espects and a~e using 
thei~ pape~s mainly to advance the comme~cial and political inte~ests of 
themselves and thei~ c~onies" <Dennis and Be~t~and, 1980). Pe~haps the 
ha~shest judge was Upton Sinclai~, who compa~ed the p~ess to a p~ostitute 
se~ving big business in his book, The B~ass Check. a muck~aking attack 
on the media which he had intended to subtitle, "A Study of the Who~e of 
Jou~nallsm" <1920>. 
Just as gove~nment inte~vention is viewed as a th~eat to f~ee 
ente~p~ise in the United States, it is also viewed as the majo~ th~eat to 
Ame~ican media independence. The adve~sa~y o~ watchdog ~ole of the media 
is one which successfully encompasses the Enlightenment democ~atic idea 
of the p~ess as the ubulwa~ku of f~eedom against opp~essive gove~nment 
and at the same time justifies su~veillance and limitation of cent~alized 
autho~ity on the domestic f~ont. 
The coining of the te~m 11 fou~th estate" gene~ally is c~edited to the 
English philosophe~ and statesman, Edmund Bu~ke. Of him Thomas Ca~lyle 
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wrote, "Bu~ke said the~e we~e Th~ee Estates in Pa~liament; but, in the 
Repo~te~s/ Galle~y yonde~, the~e sat a Fou~th Estate mo~e impo~tant by 
fa~ than they a11° <1841: 164>. The concept of a tab-keeping p~ess is 
a~ticulated most fo~cefully in the w~itings of Locke, Jeffe~son, Madison, 
and Mill. In 1974 U.S. Sup~eme Cou~t Justice Patte~ Stewa~t went so fa~ 
as to a~gue that a p~ima~y pu~pose of the Fi~st Amendment was to "c~eate 
a fou~th institution outside the gove~nment as an additional check on the 
th~ee official b~anches" <Altschull, 1990: 121>. 
The intensity of p~ess vigilance tends to be cyclical, tempe~ed by 
public opinion seemingly as sensitive to the excesses of media powe~ as 
to the excesses of political powe~. Neve~theless, since the beginning 
of the twentieth centu~y, the U.S. p~ess inc~easingly has taken upon 
itself the task of fe~~eting out co~~uption in gove~nment and malfeasance 
in office. These effo~ts ~eached thei~ zenith in ~ecent decades with the 
Washington Post/s un~aveling of the Wate~gate myste~ies and the 
consequent ~esignation of P~esident Richa~d Nixon. The p~olife~ation of 
ethics codes in the 1970s was an attempt by media o~ganizations to check 
imp~op~ieties a~ the appea~ance of imp~op~ieties and assuage public 
conce~n ave~ unb~idled p~ess powe~. 
Othe~ significant instances of p~ess ove~sight of gove~nment we~e 
the New Yo~k Sun/s "tu~n the ~ascals out" campaign against the 
administ~ation of P~esident Ulysses G~ant; the New Yo~k Times/ ~ole in 
exposing the Tweed ~ing that bilked New Yo~k City out of some $30 million 
in the 1870s; Edwa~d R. Mu~~ow/s famous ~ebuke of Senate~ Joseph McCa~thy 
on CBS-TV/s "See It Now," in the sp~ing of 1954; and f~eelance jou~nalist 
Seymou~ He~sh/s ~evelation of the My Lai massac~e by the U.S. mllita~y 
du~ing the Vietnam Wa~. 
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The instrumental motive vocabulary reinforces the separation of 
press and state. In the •conflict of Interest" section of the Washington 
Post/s wstandards and Ethics,• reporters and editors are pledged to 
avoid active involvement in causes of any kind--politics, 
community affairs, social action, demonstrations--that could 
compromise, or seem to compromise, our ability to report and 
edit with fairness (Washington~ 1977>. 
Perhaps no American journalist can surpass Washington~ executive 
editor Len Downie/s commitment to the code of detached observer. Downie 
is not registered to vote and does not take part in any election on any 
governmental level--fearing that partisanship would jeopardize his 
objectivity on public issues CDownie, 1989). 
Sociologist Daniel Bell has linked the "bad news syndrome .. of the 
U.S. media to the adversarial relationship between press and government 
and journalists/ proclivity to brood on 11 themes of despair, anomie, and 
alienation" (1976: 40-41). Vice President Spiro Agnew/s memorable 1969 
characterization of newsmen as 11 nattering nabobs of negativism11 found 
unexpected resonance among the public, to the consternation of media 
practitioners. 
A more positive spin has been placed on investigative journalism by 
the press Itself. 11 Informed skepticism11 is the byword and as Max Frankel 
of the New York Times explained in 1971, "We practice this skepticism not 
in the spirit of persecution or prosecution, but from a sense of wishing 
to serve our readers with reports of what is really going on 11 --again, by 
reporting the facts (1971: 18>. Informed skepticism is expressed in the 
Washington Post/s professed belief that "(tlhe claim of national interest 
by a federal official does not automatically equate with the national 
interest. The claim of community interest by a local offcial does not 
142 
automatically equate with the community inte~est (Washington Post. 1977: 
299). 
While a g~owing numbe~ of media c~itics and schola~s question the 
sepa~ation of p~ess and gove~nment and, in fact, see complicity in thei~ 
actions <Altschull, 1984: 193-201; Bethell, 1977; Moynihan, 1971>, 
public ~esentment against the media seemingly focuses on p~ess a~~ogance 
and on excessive antagonism against gove~nment. Michael Novak in his 
a~ticle, "Why the Wo~kingman Hates the Media," w~ites, 
What people ~esent is the new economic powe~ of the media, the 
myth-making which e~ects g~eat new ~ealities. They also ~esent 
the a~~ogance that tells people eve~y day: "We'~e sma~te~. 
bette~-info~med, mo~e c~itical, mo~e skeptical than you" <1975: 
110>. 
The inst~umental vocabula~y of motives constantly ~eite~ates the 
"bulwa~k-of-libe~ty 11 defense to quiet its challenge~s. Because schola~ly 
obse~vations on the chummy ~elations between gove~nment and the media a~e 
not pe~ceived o~ sha~ed by the public, little effo~t has been expended to 
const~uct a ~ationale to explain the close pe~sonal and social 
~elationships that commonly exist between jou~nalists and public 
officials. 
T~aditionally, Ame~ican media have abdicated a substantial po~tion 
of thei~ fou~th-estate p~ivilege and ~esponsibility in the inte~national 
sphe~e--that is the ove~sight of the fede~al gove~nment's conduct of 
fo~eign policy, inte~national ~elations, and wa~s against fo~eign 
enemies. One ~eason fa~ this is the economic bu~den of p~oviding 
on-the-g~ound cove~age ove~seas. Until ~ecent technological developments 
in communication and t~anspo~tation lowe~ed the cost of inte~natlonal 
~epo~ting, a skeletal national p~ess co~ps actually kept tabs on 
gove~nment activity ab~oad. In many pa~ts of the developing wo~ld, U.S. 
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State Depa~tment emlssa~ies continue to be the p~ima~y sou~ce of news and 
info~mation fo~ the Ame~ican media. Lleblin, in one of his ~egula~ 
columns on the uwaywa~d P~ess," a c~ltical se~ies that ~an in the New 
Yo~ke~ magazine between 1944 and 1963, noted the i~~econcilabiity of 
inte~national news gathe~ing and p~ofitable media ope~ations: 
The function of the p~ess in society is to info~m, but its ~ole 
is to make money. The monopoly publishe~;s ~eactions, on being 
told that he ought to spend money on ~epo~ting distant events, 
is the~efo~e exactly that of the p~op~ieto~ of a la~ge, fat 
cow, who is told that he ought to ente~ he~ in a ho~se ~ace 
(1961: 7>. 
Pe~haps an even mo~e impo~tant dete~minant of pe~fo~mance ab~oad is 
the idea that the cause of Ame~ica and democ~acy must not be jeopa~dized 
by ove~-zealous ~epo~ting o~ ove~ly c~itical commenta~y. The 
inst~umental motive cannot be extended to include the ab~ogation of the 
watchdog ~ole in the inte~national a~ena. In the next two sections, 
analysis focuses on the impact of ideational and su~vival motive 
vocabula~ies as they a~e employed to justify international news coverage 
and othe~ activities of the American media which cannot be accounted fo~ 
by the instrumental motive vocabulary. 
Ideational Characteristics 
The idea of a f~ee and democratic press, rooted in Enlightenment 
political and social philosophy, is emotionally embraced by the American 
media and thel~ p~actitioners. The ••info~med skepticism .. that info~ms 
journalistic efforts in othe~ arenas ~a~ely su~faces in the examination 
of the cent~al mission of the press. The heartfelt attachment to the 
tradition of press freedom la~gely precludes the detachment so highly 
valued in the t~eatment of other subjects. Few American journalists 
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would take issue with the opinion handed down by U.S. District Judge 
Murray Gurfein upholding the New York Time's right to publish the 
"Pentagon Papers:u 
A cantankerous press, an obstinate press, a ubiquitous press 
must be suffered by those in authority in order to preserve the 
even greater values of freedom of expression and the right of 
the people to know (Shapiro, 1972: 9?>. 
As previously noted, most of the ideas associated with Enlightenment 
thinking are consistent with the instrumental orientation and have been 
coopted to strengthen the latter. When disparity occurs, instrumental 
action is likely to supercede the canons of democracy, including the 
public's right to know. This "right" is a widely-held but only sketchily 
documented concept that occasionally justifies deviation from 
instrumentally-oriented action. An example is the practice of network 
television to interrupt sponsored programming to offer extended pro bono 
coverage of unscheduled national events of social or political 
importance, such as the Challenger disaster or the Clarence Thomas 
confirmation hearings. 
The public's right to know is cited by journalists to justify almost 
all of their doings, whether lt be revealing the sexual indiscretions of 
presidential candidates, shielding a source involved in criminal 
activity, providing instructions for the construction of a hydrogen bomb, 
revealing the financial indiscretions of Congressmen, or appealing to the 
public's appetite for sexually-provocative photographs. The American 
public, however, has not bought into this centerpiece of free-press value 
with the same gusto as the media themselves. Many object to what they 
see as press manipulation of the electoral process by excessive coverage 
of candidates' personal lives and premature release and interpretation of 
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election returns. Others were offended by the media/s gavel-to-gavel 
coverage of the seamy Senate Judiciary committee hearings involving Judge 
Clarence Thomas and Professor Anita Hill, closely followed by the Florida 
rape trial of a young Kennedy cousin a few weeks later. 
Altschull cites several newsmen and media analysts who scoff at the 
notion of the public 1 s right to know as 
something invented by journalists in the hope that they could 
badger the courts and the legislatures into guaranteeing the 
press access to confidential information <1990: 251>. 
Among the detractors is Kurt Luedtke, who told his journalistic colleages 
in 1982: 
The public knows what you choose to tell it, no more, no less. 
If the public did have a right to know, it would then have 
something to say about what it is you choose to call news 
(1982). 
Inasmuch as the American public, the government, and many in the business 
sector are more concerned about 11 the public 1 S right to not-know-too-much, .. 
the idea of the public 1 s right to know is one that most media 
professionals constantly defend and rationalize. The passage of the 
Freedom of Information Act in 1964, its subsequent liberalization, and 
numerous court decisions clarifying the right of journalists to pursue <as 
well as report news> have buttressed the idea from a legal standpoint, but 
have done little to remove ongoing public skepticism. 
The First Amendment/s guarantees of press freedom are of monumental 
historical significance and have been duly noted; however, less attention 
has been directed at what the First Amendment did not specify. It did not 
charge the press to be fair, unprejudiced, or balanced in its coverage; 
nor did it constrain the media to be truthful, accurate, thorough, or 
vigilant. Whether the Founding Fathers considered such standards to be 
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desirable or achievable is largely a matter of conjecture; however, the 
only mechanism for effecting press responsibility and ethical behavior was 
the 0 invisible hand" of a non-regulated profit-driven economic system. 
Thousands of laws, regulations, and court decisions have been 
required to curb the excesses and malfunctioning of free enterprise--most 
notably, the tendency toward the unequal concentration of wealth and the 
ever-widening gap between the upper and lower economic classes. So too 
has a voluminous body of legislation been created to correct for the 
imperfections of democracy--most notably the tyranny of the majority and 
the alienation of large sectors of society from the body politic. 
Clearly, American society holds some moral values too dearly to trust them 
to the vagaries of the "invisible hand." 
The doctrine of "social responsibility" is the primary value system 
through which the press has sought to correct for the malfunctions and 
imperfections of an instrumentally-motivated press. Though certainly 
notions of press ethics, morality, and social obligation were well in 
place long before the 1947 publication of the report of the Commission on 
Freedom of the Press, <Commission on Freedom of the Press, 1947>, that 
slim document brought into sharp focus and, indeed, redefined the division 
between ideationally and instrumentally-motivated press activity. 
The problem, as the Commission saw it, was that the freedom of the 
press was in danger, 
in part the consequence of the economic structure of the press, 
in part the consequence of the industrial organization of 
modern society, and in part the result of the failure of the 
directors of the press to recognize the press needs of a modern 
nation and to estimate and accept the responsibilites which 
those needs impose upon them (1947: 2>. 
Headed by Robert M. Hutchins, the commissioners argued that popular 
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access to the media forum was decreasing at the same time the importance 
of the media was increasing; that press and the "few" who controlled it 
were not adequately serving the needs of society; and that many press 
practices were offensive to society. The Commission predicted that the 
public would find a way to regulate or control the media if these 
activities were to continue <1947: 1). 
The Commission was the brainchild of Henry R. Luce, of Time, Inc., 
which provided the major portion of the funding for the three-year 
project. Robert M. Hutchins, then chancellor of the University of 
Chicago, and twelve other luminaries from various academic disciplines 
were selected because Luce believed 11 adequate criticism of an activity 
cannot come from within that activity 11 <Adams, 1947). 
The Hutchins Commission challenged the press to offer the public 
five basic services: 1> a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent 
account of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning; 2) a 
forum for the exchange of comment and criticism; 3> the projection of a 
representative picture of the constituent groups in society; 4> the 
presentation and clarification of the goals and values of society; and 5> 
full access to the day's intelligence <1947: 20-29>. The media's 
response to the findings was lukewarm at best, in part because the heart 
of the report focused on press shortcomings, rather than on the 
Democratic administration's curtailment of press freedom during the New 
Deal and World War II. 
Writers for Time. The Nation. the Chicago Tribune. the Washington 
Star. the Detroit Free Press. and even venerated columnist Walter 
Li_ppmann took issue with the Commission's conclusions CLyons, 1947). In 
an editorial, Luce's Fortune magazine labeled the report "an important, 
balanced meaty difficult document." It continued. 
The commissioners are philosophers and obviously not 
journalists, and achieved brevity at great cost to clarity. 
Statement after statement invites argument or challenge that 
might have been unnecessary had there been more elaboration 
( 11 Dangers to Press Freedom," 1947>. 
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The challenge that Luce and his colleagues issued to the Hutchins 
Commission was in fact a counter-challenge, for at the heart of the new 
doctrine was the espousal of an ideational motive vocabulary that was in 
conflict with the prevailing instrumental orientation. David Rubin, chair 
of the Journalism Department at Columbia University, perceived the notion 
of press obligation as incompatible with press freedom, as he stated in a 
roundtable discussion in 1983: 
Very rarely wi 11 you hear a publisher or an editor say, 11 We 
have a right in our publication to say whatever we want, even 
if it/s wrong, even if it/s basically opinionated; each of us 
has a right to print what we want 11 ••• [Rather,] they say, uwe 
have a right to noninterference by the government, .. but at the 
same time they also say, "We mean to be fair with you, to give 
a reaonable heaLing to all major sides of the controversy... By 
saying both things at the same time, they water down that First 
Amendment freedom •... <Reed, 1983>. 
Altschull finds little value in the doctrine of social responsibility and 
argues that it operates as a mechanism of social control. He proposes 
that one of its primary values may be that 11 it enables the journalist to 
ignore the eonomi c rea 1 it i es of his or her trade. 11 Another, he adds, is 
that 11 it heads off the threat of government intervention, a threat of 
primary concern to the Hutchins Commission .. (1984: 303>. 
Though the impact of the report itself appears to have been minimal, 
it proved prescient in its depiction of the direction the media would take 
in order to preserve their existing autonomy. The "requirements" or 
"ideal demandsu that the public makes upon the press, as specified in the 
Commission report, suggest a framework for examining ideally-motivated 
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press activity in the United States. 
"It is no 1 anger enough to report the fact truthfu 11 y," the 
Commissioners wrote. "It is now necessary to report the truth about the 
fact" <1947: 22>. The idea of providing context along with the facts was 
not a new one, though it had been stoutly opposed and continues to be 
resisted by those who link context to interpretation and indoctrination. 
The growing successes of the American public relations industry 
since its inception in the early years of the century and the successful 
propaganda efforts of the Fascist war machine created rising doubts about 
the neutrality of facts and the achievability of objectivity. Senator 
Joseph McCarthy/s rapid rise to prominence was subsequently attributed in 
part to the press/s straightforward reporting of his unsubstantiated 
charges against people and agencies he claimed were controlled by Soviet 
Communists. An early master of press deadlines and time pressures, he 
released sensational charges shortly before wire-service deadlines. 
Refutations appeared in later issues if at all. 
Though newspaper editorials railed against McCarthy/s vendetta by a 
ratio of 10 to 1, it was the headlines and front-page "facts" that 
propelled the junior senator from Wisconsin into national prominence. 
And it took four years, six weeks of Senate hearings, and CBS/s Edward R. 
Murrow to bring him down. Devoting his entire weekly "See It Now 11 
program of March 9, 1954, to unmasking McCarthy, Murrow dealt a mortal 
wound to the aspirations of the Senator and breathed life into the idea 
of interpretive journalism. 
McCarthy <questioning author/professor Reed Harris>: You know 
the Civil Liberties Union has been listed as a front for the 
Communist Party? 
Murrow: The Attorney General's List (visible in McCarthy's 
hand> does not and never has linked the A.C.L.U. as subversive. 
Nor does the F.B.I. or any other federal government agency. 
As Folkerts and Teeter note, 11 Murrow here stepped far beyond the 
featureless objectivity that McCarthy had fed upon <1989: 492). 
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The Commission argued that 11 the great agencies of mass communication 
should regard themselves as common carriers of public discussion 11 <1947: 
23>. Issues of access, right of reply, and the provision of a forum for 
debate of current issues would appear to obtain equally to print and 
broadcast media; however, the print media have claimed First Amendment 
immunity against the imposition of such constraints and the courts have 
supported this interpretation. It is the broadcast media, and 
particularly television, which have been held responsible for offering a 
viable arena for the discussion of controversial issues. 
Regulations and enforcement of broadcasting's responsibility to the 
public have been the charge of the Federal Communications Commission, made 
up of presidential appointees drawn from the media industry. Created in 
the early 1930s, the establishment of the F.C.C. was justified by the 
"scarcity principle, .. the idea that since broadcasting bands were finite, 
it was incumbent upon the federal government to see that the public 
interest was served by fairly allocating these bands through the granting 
and rescinding of licenses. Though the advent of cable television has 
made the scarcity principle obsolete, the F.C.C. remains, its authority 
rising and falling with successive administrations and changing regulatory 
climates. Broadcasters have long chafed under the clear implication that 
the First Amendment afforded them less protection from government meddling 
than afforded their colleagues in print. This resentment is voiced by 
Ithaca de Sola Pool in his book Technologies of Freedom. •The first 
principle is that the First Amendment applies fully to all media,• he 
wrote. nit applies to the function of communication, not just to the 
media that existed in the 18th century (1983: 246>. 
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Ideational motives were used by Congress to justify the imposition of 
the Fairness Doctrine from 1979 to 1988 "to operate in the public interest 
and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting 
views of issues of public importance,u as stated in Article 315[al of the 
Communications Act. Under threat of losing their licenses, broadcasters 
were required to provide coverage of controversial community issues and to 
offer reasonable opportunity for contrasting views. The rescinding of the 
Fairness Doctrine occured during the general deregulation of the Reagan 
years and was based partially on the growth of cable channels. Earlier 
the F.C.C. had ruled that broadcast license holders could not even 
broadcast their own views on public issues, for fear of unduly influencing 
the public. In a similar but narrower vein, since 1927 radio and 
television networks and local stations have been required to extend equal 
opportunities and "reasonable time" on the airwaves to competing political 
candidates. Cable companies are also subject to must-carry programming 
regulations to serve the public interest. 
In addition to the public/s right to know and the provision of forums 
for discussion, the nurturing and protection of children provide 
ideational justification for prescribing broadcasting behavior, including 
grants to develop programming and limits on the airing of obscene 
materials and sexually oriented programming during prime-time hours. 
The 1967 Carnegie Commission on Public Broadcasting envisioned public 
television as a noncommercial forum, which would be, in the words of 
essayist E.B. White, "our Lyceum, our Chautauqua, our Minsky/s, and our 
Camelot. It should ~estate and cla~ify the social dilemma and the 
political pickle• <Aufde~heide, 1991: 61>. 
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The twelve white male commissione~s we~e among the fi~st 
quasi-official bodies to ~ecognize and censu~e the pe~petuation of ~adical 
and ethnic ste~eotypes in the media. Slu~s against Neg~oes and Asians had 
appea~ed ~egula~ly in the mainst~eam p~ess and ente~tainment media. The 
ty~anny of an insensitive and unsympathetic white majo~ity not only 
~esulted in ~adically-p~ejudiced content, also dictated media fa~e that 
had little to offe~ non-whites. Oswald Villa~d, who was edito~ of the 
magazine Tbe Nation between the wo~ld wa~s, said the newspape~ •was 
unsu~passed [asl a teache~ of ~ace hat~ed [that leftl no stone untu~ned to 
make clea~ its belief that the~e a~e two kinds of Ame~ican citizens--the 
p~ivileged and the disadvantaged--the whites and the blacks 11 <1923: 
11-12>. 
While Af~ican-Ame~ican and othe~ ethnic newspape~s and a handful of 
magazines and ~adio stations t~ied to se~ve the info~mation needs of 
mino~ity audiences, the mainst~eam media found little incentive to b~oaden 
o~ libe~alize thei~ content. The Civil Rights movement of the 1960s and 
1970s, accele~ated by television cove~age of black/white conf~ontations in 
the South, and the Women's Libe~ation movement, ~evitalized the ideas of 
equality and •equality of oppo~tunity" fo~ all Ame~icans. Heightened 
identity among mino~ities and awakened consciousness among whites also 
~esulted in financial incentives to b~oaden media content, pa~ticula~ly 
fo~ magazine, u~ban-based newspape~, and motion pictu~es. 
the 1968 ~epo~t of the national Adviso~y Commission on Civil 
Diso~de~s, appointed by P~esident Lyndon Johnson and headed by fo~me~ 
Illinois gove~no~ Otto Ke~ne~, cha~ged the media with failu~e •to ~epo~t 
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adequately on the causes and consequences of civil disorders and the 
underlying problems of race relations" <National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders, 1968: 101). The Kerner Commission also recognized an 
underlying distrust of the white-controlled media by blacks and noted that 
only a dozen blacks were employed in television production positions and 
only one above the production level. 
Starting in 1978, the F.C.C. gave priority to license applicants who 
were black, Asian, native American, Hispanic, or female. A law to the 
effect, subsequently passed by the Congress, was upheld by the Supreme 
Court in 1990 <Holsinger, 1991: 430-31>. Despite legal reversals in the 
past decade, the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 
resulted in several class action suits by women in the media and by 1982 
almost a third of the journalistic work force was female, although blacks 
and hispanics made few gains. Nevertheless, the idea of equality 
significantly changed the content and policy of the mass media, reinforced 
by recognition of new markets comprised of previously overlooked 
minorities--particularly in the entertainment media. 
Another "constituent group" that had lost out to the majority was the 
intellectual and cultural elite. 11 Highbrowa art, drama, and music did not 
attract a large enough audience to snare sponsors. In 1965 Congress 
created the National Endowment for the Arts, providing "aspects of the 
good life not taken care of by market forces' <Mattick, 1990: 348>. In 
1967 a law was passed authorizing the creation of the Corporation for 
Public Broadcasting. Under its aegis National Public Radio was formed and 
the Public Broadcasting Service was established to link television 
stations nationwide. Federal, state, and local taxpayers contribute about 
40 percent of PBS's billion-dollar-plus annual budget, and viewers and 
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corporations cover the remainder <Aufderheide, 1991>. The federal subsidy 
in 1992 is a quarter of a billion dollars and proposed increases would 
bring the subsidy to $1.1 billion for 1994-96 <Will, 1992>. 
A growing number of instrumentalist voices are challenging continued 
government funding of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. Columnist 
George Will refers to public television as "an upper-middle-class 
entitlement" and claims that the government is unfairly subsidizing 
competition against private print and broadcasting enterprises. Will;s 
primary objections center on the bottom line, that is the return on 
government;s financial investment: 
The original rationale for public television ••• was that 
government had to subsidize such programming precisely because 
so few people wanted it ••.. [PBSl stations claim 5.2 million 
voluntary donors. If each would give another $70 a year ••• , 
they would raise the $1.1 billion without requiring taxpayers to 
subsidize their entertainment <1992>. 
Laurence Jarvik of the Heritage Foundation can see no justification for 
government-subsidized media and dismisses public television as 11 a solution 
in search of a problem,u arguing that it should be sold to private 
investors <Will, 1992). 
A slightly different challenge is issued by David Horowitz, 
chairman of the Committee on Media Integrity, who charges that PBS has 
become politicized, coopted by liberal factions in the Democratic Congress 
and by leftist filmmakers, producers, and commentators. "In creating the 
new system in the late 60;s, its architects attempted to square the circle 
of a government-funded institution that could be independent of political 
influence," he writes (1991: 26>. Calling for objective reporting and 
balanced programming, Horowitz predicts a rocky future 
so long as public television fails to live up to its statutory 
mandate by presenting a fair balance of views reflecting the 
b~oad inte~ests of the population that is being taxed to help 
suppo~t it <1991: 32). 
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Simila~ cha~ges of politicizatlon have been made against the National 
Endowment fo~ the A~ts, a p~o~am o~iginally ~ationalized in political 
terms. Arthu~ Schlesinge~. Jr., advise~ to P~esident John Kennedy, spoke 
in favo~ of a gove~nment a~ts policy in the ea~ly 1960s, a~guing, awe will 
win wo~ld unde~standing of ou~ policy and pu~poses not th~ough the fo~ces 
of our a~ms o~ the a~my of ou~ wealth but th~ough the splendo~ of ou~ 
ideals .. <Mattick, 1990: 350). In ~ecent yea~s. debated has focused on the 
NEA's domestic impact, pa~ticula~ly subidies on a~t depicting 
cont~ove~sial homosexual, sadomasochistic and sac~ilegious acts. F~om the 
intsrumentalist pe~spective, unconventional a~t that cannot ga~ne~ popula~ 
suppo~t in the ma~ket should not be a~tificially suppo~ted with gove~nment 
funds. The ideational ~esponse is that c~itics a~e seeking to cont~ol and 
limit the a~ts and, by extension, public taste. "The idea that the~e 
exists an aesthetic sphe~e untouched by social and political meaning is an 
ideological fiction ••• , 11 Paul Mattick w~ote in a 1990 a~ticle appea~ing 
in The Nation . 
The p~oblem is not that a~t has been politicized; the existence 
of state funding shows that the gene~ally hidden political side 
of the a~ts has existed all along. The st~uggle eve~ the N.E.A. 
is a st~uggle fo~ cont~ol of this political side <Mattick, 1990: 
357). 
Society needed a g~eate~ amount of cu~~ent info~mation than ~equi~ed 
in ea~lie~ times, the Commissione~s a~gued, in o~de~ to insu~e the 
preservation of government by consent. Cable-TV, fi~st viewed as a way to 
enhance netwo~k signals in ~emote a~eas, mush~oomed in the 70s and 80s and 
now ~eaches mo~e than 53 million subsc~ibe~s. nea~ly 58 pe~cent of 
households with TV sets. The netwo~k's audience he~e comp~ises about 
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two-thirds of viewers at any one time <Broadcasting, 1990>. Cable 
technology virtually insures community monopolies and heavy FCC and local 
government regulation is thus justified. 
Some form of "must-carryn regulations that require cable companies to 
air "significantly viewed 11 local stations and Cable Satellite Public 
Affairs Network <C-Span> have been in force during most of cable TV;s 
existence, justified on the basis of serving the public interest. Cable 
systems are required to provide free public access channels in about 1,500 
communities, encouraging innovative and unorthodox entertainment and 
opinion options. On the whole, regulations against sexually-oriented 
programming are less stringent for cable than for the national networks. 
Fuller and more diverse coverage and interpretation of events is' 
also provided by a number of newspapers, journals, and magazines targeted 
at small, specialized audiences. Although made more affordable by 
inexpensive computer and printing technologies, these publications are not 
intended to make a profit, but rather to promulgate ideas and opinions 
unlikely to receive prominence in the mainstream media. Like the American 
press of the 18th and early 19th centuries, these advocative publications, 
such as The Nation. The National Review. The Oklahoma Observer. and 
others of a more parochial or radical persuasion receive little or no 
advertising revenue ad base their viability upon subscriptions and gifts 
from a core of committed supporters. 
Although the Hutchins Commission report is largely a moribund 
document, better known today to media scholars than media practitioners, 
its reasoning informs an ideational motive vocabulary that justifies media 
behavior justified by social, ethical, and moral values which run contrary 
to the economic interests of media organizations. Detractors point out 
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that the imposition of theese values, cherished as they may be, imposes 
constraints on the practice of a 11 free press;" whereas, advocates believe 
that adherence to ideas empowers a "free press11 by liberating it from the 
influence of commercial sponsors and corporate owners. Juxtaposing the 
two motive vocabularies underscores the ambiguity of the concept of press 
freedom and suggests why its definition differs so radically from nation 
to nation, situation to situation, and from age to age. 
Survival Characteristics 
In the United States, instrumental and ideational motives coexist 
under the shared rationale of the 11 public's right to know11 ; however, 
press behavior justified by the survival motive contradicts the basic 
tenet of the other vocabularies. As a consequence, it is subject to 
constant challenge from the media themselves and from aggrieved parties 
who lodge their complaints in the courts. Survival tactics include prior 
restraint on publishing and broadcasting, censorship and post-publication 
fines and prosecutions, news management by public officials and the 
military, the dissemination of false and misleading information, and the 
general cooptation of the media as organs of government. 
The key concept of the survival motive is the emphasis given to 
11 national security 11 over the 11 publlc's right to know. 11 In the landmark 
case, Schenck v. United States <1919>, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
argued that First Amendment rights should be curtailed in situations in 
which unrestrained expression might constitute a "clear and present 
danger 11 to the nation or society. Writing for a unanimous court, Holmes 
compared Socialist ·Charles Schenck's distribution of leaflets urging 
resistance to the World War I draft to the hypothetical instance of 
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"falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." Though 
subsequent interpretations have cited the Schenck decision as a precedent 
for establishing a high level of threat to justify state interference 
<Abrams v. United States, 1919; Gitlow v. People of the State of New 
York, 1925; Dennis v. United States; Yates v. United States, 1957>, the 
ruling against Schenck underscored the preferred position of the 
government,.s obligation to ••provide for the coiTillon defense" over the 
individual,.s right of free expression. 
Those who challenge survival motives are most skeptical of the 
tendency of public officials at all governmental levels to link their own 
political survival to that of the areas under their jurisdiction. With 
the exception of the Civil War, the media and the courts have tended to 
reject survival reasoning when the perceived threat was domestic, rather 
than foreign in origin. 4 Perhaps best known is the Supreme Court's 
speedy decision to lift Attorney General John Mitchell's restraint on 
publication of the 7,000-page top-secret 11 Pentagon Papers," materials 
chronicling years of administration handling and mishandling of the 
Vietnam War. In the Court's view, the government failed to show that the 
nation would be imperiled by the publica.tion of these aging documents, 
though certain public officials might be embarrassed by them <New York 
Times Co. v. United States, 1971>. 
The emphasis upon foreign threat effectively eliminates survival 
orientation from press news and commentary of state and local government 
activity. In 1969 the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a Ku Klux Klansman 
charged with sedition for making televised threats against state 
officials who advocated racial integration. The decision had the effect 
of making all state sedition laws unconstitutional <Brandenberg v. Ohio, 
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1969). The Cable Communications Policy Act, which authorizes public 
access channels, forbids censorship except for the prevention of obscene 
programming. The American Nazi party and the Klan are among a number of 
fringe groups that produce programs shown on public access channels in 
many U.S. communities, despite complaints from mainstream viewers 
<Holsinger, 1991: 487>. 
The danger posed by socialism and communism was grounded in 
identification with foreign ideology and was used by President Franklin 
Roosevelt in the 1930s as justification for managing information and 
suppressing press opposition to New Deal programs. Much of the federal 
legislation authorizing limitations on press activity was enacted during 
Roosevelt's third term, when domestic economic and political unrest was 
perceived by the three branches of government as a "clear and present 
danger" to national security. Among these are the Smith Act of 1940 and 
the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, both of which remain "on the 
books.•• 
It was the Smith Act which legitimized McCarthy's efforts to uncover 
communist agents in the early 1950s and which, after a lapse of 30 years, 
authorized unsuccessful prosecutions against Puerto Rican nationalists 
<Bishop, 1988>, white supremacists ("Jury Acquits 9," 1988>, and American 
Marxists <"Judge Declares Mistrial," 1989> under the Reagan 
administration. In the 1980s, provisions of the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act were cited by the Department of Justice to authorize 
requests that three Canadian documentaries be labeled "political 
propaganda" before distribution in the United States. The films fell 
into the category of "films of warning" and spoke out against nuclear 
proliferation and U.S. industrial practices that resulted in acid rain in 
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Canada--views seen as attacks on Reagan policies. Media scholar Maureen 
J. Nemecek links administration reaction to its entrenched Cold War 
opposition to any weakening of a strong defense posture <Nemecek, 1991: 
5-8>. It is noteworthy that the views expressed in the three Canadian 
"progaganda" films have been regularly and forcefully presented in U.S. 
documentaries. 
In general, U.S. restrictions against foreign journalists in the 
United States are minimal. From time to time, foreign journalists are 
denied entry or expelled from the country when their presence is 
associated with espionage or subverting the political process. Also 
non-U.S. citizens are prevented from holding controlling interests in 
American media--a restriction circumvented by Australian publisher Rupert 
Murdoch, who acquired U.S. citizenship in 1985 order to legalize his 
purchase of seven television stations from Metromedia, Inc. 
The survival motive is most clearly applicable and least likely to 
elicit challenge when it is employed to justify constraints on press 
activity in the context of reporting and commenting on wars and 
war-related events.~ Because the Cold War dominated United States 
international policy for almost 50 years, preceded by World Wars I and 
II, it can be argued that the survival orientation inhibited and 
influenced media coverage of almost all international events for a 
substantial portion of the century. 
Perhaps the survival orientation was summarized most eloquently by 
Winston Churchill who, in the course of planning the Normandy invasion, 
uttered the famous aphorism, "In wartime, truth is so precious that she 
should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies11 <Brown, 1975: 10>. 
Prior restraint and post-publication penalties are intended to prevent 
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media accounts and commentaries that could compromise military efforts by 
giving succor to the enemy, weaken the resolve of the armed forces, or 
dampen support and morale on the homefront. In addition, since World War 
I, the U.S. government has employed an army of propaganda agencies, often 
overseen by appointed media professionals, to deliberately portray 
military efforts and the American cause in a positive light. Frank 
Capra's 11 Why We Fight 11 film series, used in World War II in an attempt to 
bolster military morale and commitment, is a well-known example of the 
latter. 
Margaret Blanchard identifies control of media coverage of the 1991 
Persian Gulf War with 11 a long and disturbing lineage for managing 
free expression, especially when the nation is caught up in armed 
conflict .. C1992: 5>. Citing wars and political administrations from the 
Revolution and the War of 1812 and continuing through the Mexican War and 
the Civil War, Blanchard argues that press censorship, deliberate 
misinformation, and manipulation of public opinion were tactics utilized 
in the 18th and 19th centuries that have been extended and amplified in 
the current era. 
Self censorship, always the most effective form of press restraint, 
was billed as a voluntary mechanism during WW II; however, its 
enforcement was insured by a vast network of government agencies. FBI 
director J. Edgar Hoover focused special attention during the war years 
on the African-American media, whose commitment to the national agenda in 
both world wars was seen as less than wholehearted. The extent of 
government control of all American media in the 1940s was, in fact, so 
comprehensive that it even pervaded the wage scale of press employees. A 
regional War Labor Board in 1943 imposed a four-tiered structure 
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specifying merit-raises for New York Times reporters based upon the 
degree to which individual journalists might be trusted not to reveal 
sensitive military information6 <"Fourth Estate: Times ABC's," 1944>. 
President John F. Kennedy's manipulation of the press, especially 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, underscored the pressure on the media to 
act as accomplices in effecting administration policy <LeoGrande, 1987). 
As Daniel C. Hallin observed in his study of the U.S. media and the 
Vietnam War, "American news media are both highly autonomous from direct 
political control and, through the routines of the news-gathering 
process, deeply intertwined in the actual operations of government 11 
<Hallin, 1989: 8). 
Although the press always has objected to imposed wartime 
restrictions, the Vietnam War, because of its unpopularity and its 
duration, provided an arena for proponents of instrumental press motives 
to challenge the survival orientation of the administration. Whereas the 
government, the military, and the majority of the American people link 
the United States' defeat in the Vietnam War to irresponsible press 
performance, media and media analysts believe that 
government unwillingness to act as if the nation was really at 
war .•• including being honest with the people about the status 
of events in Vietnam--was the cause of the American problems 
there rather than press coverage <Blanchard, 1992: 171; also 
Hammond, 1988; Hallin, 1989; Turner, 1985.) 
Government perception of the media as a threat to national security 
in Vietnam has been used to rationalize even stronger measures in 
subsequent military ventures--measures that have outraged many 
journalists, but have met with the overwhelming approval of the public, 
according to opinion polls. The Reagan administration's unprecedented 
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press blackout during the invasion of Grenada in 1983 kept the closest 
reporters 160 miles away on the island of Barbados for two days and no 
combat video or on-site newspaper dispatches were relayed for three days 
<"Keeping the Press from the Action," 1983>. 
In the wake of Grenada, a "National Press Pool" was created by the 
Defense Department, consisting of 11 preselected reporters--designated to 
enter a combat zone "on a moment's notice" in time of military emergency. 
A quota system assigned six to the television networks, one to radio, two 
to the wire services, and one to the weekly new magazines. Said Albert 
Hunt of the Wall Street Journal. "I have never heard of a pool 
arrangement that excludes newspapers. It would appear that they are not 
anxious to give any opportunity for in depth reportingn <"War Zone Media 
Pool Designated," 1985: 773>. 
A somewhat larger pool of reporters arrived in Panama four hours 
after the short-lived conflict began. Proponents of the "public's right 
to know" argue that press constraint allowed U.S. government claims of 
low Panamanian fatalities to go uninvestigated, despite reports to the 
contrary< Garneau, 1990; Rangel, 1990; Teeter, 1992>. 
Media coverage of the Persian Gulf War by pool arrangements was 
orche.strated by the U.S. mi I itary and generally acquiesced to by the 
press. Malcolm Browne of the New York Times attributed the near 
bloodless portrayal of that war to the fact that"(flor the first time 
since World War II, correspondents must submit to near-total military 
supervision" <Browne, 1991: A8>. The mainstream establishment media 
chose not to participate in an unsuccessful legal challenge against the 
Department of Defense calling for an injunction against 
military-controlled reports <Nation Magazine v. U.S. Department of 
Defense: 1991) Summing up the past decade of American warfare, 
academician Dwight Teeter concluded, 
Military censorship of U.S. actions in Grenada (1983>, Panama 
<1989> and in the Persian gulf (1991> also showed situations in 
which the U.S. government used a monopoly of force and 
assertions of national security to be, to borrow a fine British 
phrase, economical with the truth (1992: 21). 
One less obvious use of the survival motive to justify press 
activity at the local level is the "booster press 11 of the American 
frontier. The primary purpose of the frontier newspaper, according to 
historian Daniel Boorsteln, was to advertise nonexistent towns by 
recruiting sorely-needed settlers (1965: 127>. These euphoric 
publications championing the opportunities and progress of their 
struggling communities can be seen as analogous to the media in much of 
the developing nations of the world. As settlement occurred in the 
American West and levels of economic prosperity climbed, the booster 
press allied with the local business community and gradually assumed an 
instrumental orientation--but only after it reached a point of economic 
and strategic stability that enabled it to indulge in this luxury. 
The U.S. Press and the Motive Triangle 
The challenge of summarizing the motivations of American media 
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behavior is best met by analyzing and identifying discrete time periods, 
media forms, and situations. On the following page, Figures 4A, 4B, 4C, 
4D, and 4E summarize U.S. press activity over five periods of its history 
selected by the author. Other analysts might choose different periods or 
to narrow their focus to individual media organizations or coverage of 
specified issues, but these indicate one approach. Comparative 
assessment of U.S. press behavior illustrates that since the advent of 
SUIVIVAL SUIVIVAL 
A. 1776-1800 B. 1800-1830 
SUIVIVAL SUIVIVAL 
c. 1830-1914 D. 1914-1960 
SUIVIVAL 
E. 1960-1992 
Figure 4. U.S. Press Activity 1776-1992 
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the penny p~ess in the 1830s, inst~umental motives have p~evailed over 
inc~easingly significant ideational influences associated with heightened 
social consciousness and press responsibility. The fact that some press 
activity is su~vival-motivated is indicated by the fact that the U.S. 
press cannot be represented by a single point falling on the line between 
the instrumental and ideational type; however, the fact that su~vivalist 
behavior generally is ~est~icted to wartime activity ~esults in 
~elatively small impact on press activity. 
B~itain under Thatcher--1979-1990 
National Situation and Motive 
Because Ame~ican political tradition traces its roots to the Magna 
Carta and B~itish common law and because the f~ame~s of the U.S. 
Constitution were inspi~ed by British thinke~s, there is a tendency to 
overidentify similarities between the two nations' 
inst~umentally-oriented p~ess systems. In fact, throughout its history, 
Britain and the B~itish people have had difficulty ~econciling a strong, 
independent p~ess with the national interest. B~itain has never emb~aced 
with anything approaching American enthusiasm the watchdog role of the 
press, "the pub! ic's ~ight to know," jou~nal istic p~ivi lege in the 
courts, shield laws, st~ictures against "p~ior restraint," or, with a few 
highly-visible exceptions, the notion that mass taste is a c~edlble gauge 
of appropriate media content. 
American newspaper columnist Anthony Lewis observed in a lecture 
before a British audience in the late 1980s that in B~itain the public 
right of free speech is not a prime value: 
Judges often speak of it as a t~easu~ed ~ight, but the ~esults 
of case after case are to the contra~y. Freedom to argue the 
facts of public policy loses out to the claims of 
confidentiality, fo~eign policy, legal o~der, and so on. Even 
the most di~ect assault on p~ess freedom seems to evoke little 
outrage <Nell, 1988: 24). 
It is the p~emise of this analysis that ideational motives account 
for these differences--which a~e concent~ated prima~ily in the 
~elatlonship between press and gove~nment. Though the content of the 
B~itish ideational vocabula~y and the p~ess actvity it justifies a~e 
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elabo~ated in a late~ section, it is necessa~y to note at the outset that 
the t~aditional B~itish value system is often at odds with weak 
gove~nment/st~ong p~ess ~ationales. As a consequence, British press 
behavior falls somewhat farther from the ideal instrumental type 
associated with American press behavior, and more closely ~esembles that 
of its European neighbors and Japan. 
The prevailing instrumental vocabulary came under pa~ticula~ly 
strong ve~bal and legal challenge du~ing the 1980s, when Marga~et 
Thatcher headed the Conse~vative government--the years on which this case 
summary focuses. While the clash may have been exacerbated by the 
moralistic th~ust of Thatcher politics, conflict between ideational and 
inst~umental press activity is ongoing, fueled by powe~ful and somewhat 
incong~uous institutions--the monarchy, the House of Lo~ds, and the 
vestiges of a landed aristocracy, on one hand, and an elected House of 
Commons on the other. Both fo~ces exert significant influence not only 
on the press policies of the British government and the mammoth 
bureauc~acy that serves it, but on the attitudes and actions of 
p~actitioners and the public as well. 
In the 1980s, a small but vocal body of British journalists and 
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libe~ta~ians rose to challenge new policies advocated by the Thatche~ 
administ~ation to tighten cont~ol ave~ the media. In 1988~ •cha~te~ 88," 
a two-page manifesto signed by mo~e than 250 w~ite~s and intellectuals~ 
attacked the ••unt~anune 1 ed mandate of Ma~ga~et Thatche~" to cu~tai 1 p~ess 
independence and decla~ed that 11 [tJhe time has come to demand political~ 
civi 1 and human ~ights in the United Kingdom." Though Cha~te~ 
signato~ies we~e dismissed by To~y columnists as the 11 Chatte~ing 
classes," out~aged jou~nalists, lite~ati, and libe~ta~ians of eve~y 
political st~ipe took to the media and the cou~ts in the late 1980s to 
lodge thei~ complaints <Atlas, 1989>. And~ew Neil, edito~ of The London 
Sunday Times. summa~ized the issue in a 1989 lecture, entitled "Britain/s 
Free P~ess: Does It have One? 11 (1989>. His p~edecessor at the Sunday 
Times. Ha~old Evans, had asked a simila~ question and concluded that 
B~itain had a "half-freeu press <Walker, 1983: 16; Neil, 1989: 36). 
Anothe~ answe~ might well be found in Mill/s 19th centu~y obse~vation, 
"The~e is, in fact, no recognized principle by which the p~op~iety a~ 
impropriety of Government inte~ference is customa~i ly tested" <1859: 67>. 
British writer Piers Brendan, author of The Life and Death of the 
P~ess Ba~ons. attributes what he sees as the embattled status of the 
press to the fact that its social and political value has no legal 
unde~pinnings, since there is no B~itish Constitution and no codified 
jou~nalistic license analogous to the United States/ Fi~st Amendment 
<1991). P~ess advocates frequently desc~ibe the British form of 
government as an "elective dictato~ship, 11 a refe~ence to a cha~ge 
Conservatives leveled against the Labor government in the 1970s 
<B~endeon, 1991; Neil, 1989; Walke~, 1985). 
Article 10 of the Eu~opean Convention of Human Rights comes closest 
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to providing a legal guarantee of British press rights, critics contend. 
Article 10 declares that freedom of expression should not be limited 
unless strictly necessary to preserve an overriding public interest 
<Brenden, 1991: 70). A British reporter is currently appealing a 
decision handed down in 1991 by the law lords of the House of Lords, 
Britain's highest court. Bill Goodwin was held in contempt of court and 
fined 5,000 pounds for shielding a source who revealed plans for 
refinancing a privately-owned computer company. The information has been 
suppressed by a court injunction gagging its publication nationwide 
<Brenden, 1991: 70). Commenting on the controversy, Martin Walker 
observed, 
It is a matter of some national embarrassment when British 
citizens must seek protection of their rights in European 
statutes and European courts, rather than in those of her 
Majesty's government--England being the Mother of Parliaments 
and all that <1992). 
In the 1960s, a famous legal battle pitted pharmaceutical companies 
against media wishing to publicize study findings that showed the 
deforming effects of the tranquilizer thalidomide on human fetuses. 
After years in the British courts, court-imposed injunctions were lifted 
by a ruling from the European court seated in Strasbourg <Neil, 1988: 
23). 
Though a series of events, proposals, and legislative actions in the 
Thatcher years catalyzed protests and charges from 11 qual i ty 11 media 
practitioners that threatened to overload the courts, the disputed 
measures were generally the result of vigorous enforcement of policies 
already in place. Lord Rees-Mogg, chairman of the Broadcasting Standards 
Council, said he did not find "the political climate [of the Thatcher 
years] so 'very sinister. I can't remember when it wasn't so'" <Atlas, 
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1990: 97). 
The 1989 Official Secrets Act, while not as all-encompassing in its 
definition of government secrets as its 1911 predecessor, nevertheless 
extends to the attorney general broad discretionary powers while 
disallowing the public-interest defense, commonly used in U.S. courts. 
The new act, not yet tested in the courts, is directed not only against 
those who obtain and reveal privileged information, but against any media 
organization that reports it <Neil, 1988; Walker, 1992>. Because the 
Official Secrets Act specifies jury trial, during the 1980s the 
government frequently turned to the hundreds of confidentiality laws that 
require only a judge;s ruling to censor information if the "balance of 
convenience" supports the plaintiff--that is, if a plaintiff convincingly 
claims the information is confidential in nature. A declaration of 
confidentiality is enforced by the serving of injunctions to prevent 
publication or broadcast of the information in question. Those convicted 
of violating the confidentiality laws or the Official Secrets Act can be 
fined and imprisoned. 7 The 1981 Contempt of Court Act also 
facilitates gag orders, giving judges the power to quash reporting of 
evidence and threatening journalists with imprisonment if they approach 
jurors after a trial. 
The thalidomide injunction was upheld in British courts in the 19?0s 
because judges ruled that pharmaceutical interests had a right to keep 
findings from scientific studies confidential. In the 1980s, the 
government was plaintiff in two of the most controversial applications of 
confidentiality laws. The first focused on official action the London 
Sunday Times from publishing excerpts from Spycatcher. a candid memoir by 
former British intelligence officer Peter Wright 6 • Serialization of 
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the banned book was prohibited in Britain--though it was published in 
Australia and in the United States, where editor Andrew Neil purchased 
serialization rights <Atlas, 1989; Campbell, 1987; Neil, 1988>. The 
second controversy was over the banning of a six-part BBC documentary on 
the planned launching of "Zircon," a British spy-satellite, and a 
subsequent 28-hour police raid on BBC offices in Glasgow, during which 30 
boxes of film, videotape, and documents were confiscated (Blowup Over 
the BBC," 1987; Brendan, 1991; Campbe 11, 1987; Laver, 1987). 
Other debates raged over ultimately unsuccessful attempts to pass 
legislation authorizing the 11 right of reply," for persons who felt they 
had been unfairly treated by the media; and a privacy bill, aimed at 
inhibiting the tabloids. Such proposals received rather widespread 
public support because of objection to the sensationalism of popular 
tabloids, which are somewhat akin to those of American "supermarket 
tabloids. 11 11 lt is sometimes difficult, when one sees the shenanigans of 
the British tabloids, to feel quite as strongly about press freedom as 
you do in the United States," 9 London Sunday Times editor Andrew Neil 
explained to a group of American media professionals in 1988. He 
continued, 
The libel laws in Britain are tougher [than in the United 
States.) I would like them to stay tougher because they are 
one way of making sure that the tabloids have some limits to 
what they can write, and they must stick with some semblance of 
the truth <Neil, 1988: 25). 
Existing law in Britain places the burden of proving the truth of 
potentially libelous material on defendants, rather than on 
plaintiffs--the reverse of American procedure. Whereas, Neil says that 
tough libel laws 11 pose no problems to trying to root out government 
wrongdoing" (1988: 25>, Brendan argues that the threat of libel suits and 
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high damage awards cause the press to 0 pussyfoot about politicians (1991: 
70>. Cecil King, member of a prominent British newspaper family, claims 
that libel laws are an uabsolute nightmaren for journalists and that, 
because of the threat of costly libel suits, ••inefficient hospitals are 
not named, doubtful share flotations pass without comment, and some 
fraudulent individuals go unexposed ... 11 <Brenden, 1991: 70). 
Instrumental Characteristics 
Despite these controversies and challenges, most day-to-day British 
press activity is motivated by instrumental vocabulary. Indeed, British 
commentators argue that the print media are even more competitive and 
market-driven than their U.S. counterparts. Neil claims that it is, 
ironically, the rivalry among the media that makes it possible for the 
government to retain the upper hand. 
The highly competitive nature of British newspapers means that 
it is very difficult for the press ever to take a common front, 
and editors are more prone to score points rather than stand 
firm in defence of their basic freedoms <1989: 24>. 
A. case in point was the charge of 11 treason 11 leveled against the BBC by 
Murdoch 1 s ~ for questioning the government 1 s version of the Falkland 
War sea battles. 
The prevalence of the instrumental orientation is acknowledged 
somewhat bleakly by parliamentary correspondent Chris Moncrief£, who said 
of himself and his journalistic colleagues, 11 I think we are part of the 
entertainment industry at the downmarket end. We do it for the money. 
A.nd if that serves the public at the end of the day--well that 1 s a bonus 11 
<Brendan. 1991: 70>. 
In justifying the extraordinary means he went to in order to 
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circumvent the government and acquire serialization rights to Spycatcher. 
Neil relied on instrumental motives, linking them with the idea of 
serving 11 the public"s right to known: 
Large sums are spent to secure these serial rights because they 
can be important circulation-builders and because of the 
interest to readers of the quality press. So I was not 
surprised to discover that many others were also in the running 
for Spycatcher (1988: 8). 
The very fact that the media provide the main forum for unrestrained 
debate on press policy weakens the credibility of charges decrying 
censorship and control. As Tory columnists noted, dissenting journalists 
and writers were making lots of money and wrote whatever they pleased 
<Atlas, 1989: 97>. Even the tabloid press appears to shrug off most 
attempts to rein it in. 
Under Thatcher, deregulation and the weakening of labor unions 
provided an environment in which market mechanisms flourished, ushering 
in a decade of unprecedented media profits; widespread, if belated, 
adoption of new technologies and innovations; movement away from the 
legendary Fleet Street hub; and new entries into print and broadcasting 
industries. Martin Walker, though an opponent of recent government press 
policies, acknowledges that the prosperity of the 1980s resulted in two 
revolutions that invigorated the print media and widened the media 
voice--the success of the popular tabloids and the doubling in readership 
of quality newspapers <1992>. 
Beginning with the Falklands War in 1982, the British Broadcasting 
Corporation saw its highly-valued independence increasingly compromised 
by government meddling in programming decisions. Thatcher endeavored to 
bring an end to the company"s near-monopoly by calling for the sale of 
more commercial television franchises and proposed a plan for financial 
restructuring based on subsidy-free "pay-your-own-wayu principles. 
Thatcher said her proposals were intended to increase competition and 
private enterprise in order to improve television quality. 
Survival Characteristics 
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The survival vocabulary of motives was employed by the British 
government to rationalize censorship, official dissembling, and delay of 
press reports filed during the Falklands War of 1982. Thatcher took to 
task certain BBC reporters critical of government handling of the war for 
failing to acknowledge it was "their duty to stand up for our boys" 
<Atlas, 1989: 38). BBC correspondent Brian Hanrahan testified at a 
parliamentary inquiry that an agreement was struck with commander Admiral 
John Woodward, "where he was entitled to stop us reporting things, but we 
were not prepared to report things that were incorrect" <Downie, 1982: 
269). Similar rationales were used to explain the managing of coverage 
in the Persian Gulf War. 
American editor James Atlas attributes the media crackdown during 
the Thatcher years to the ongoing battle between England and Irish 
secessionists. He writes, "Indeed, it's the doings of the [Irish 
Republican Army], I suspect, that have impelled the Prime Minister to 
strengthen her hand." He pointed to the fact that an I.R.A. bombing in 
1984 at a Tory conference killed several government officials and almost 
killed Thatcher. "England, to her way of thinking, is under seige," 
Atlas concluded (1989: 38>. 
Indeed a controversial ban on broadcasting interviews with Sinn Fein 
speakers was imposed after a Thames Television documentary, "Death on a 
Rock," aired conversations with three Irish activists gunned down by the 
Special Ai~ Se~vices in Gib~alta~ in 1988. Thatche~ fought to have the 
p~ogram supp~essed and th~eatened to suspend the network;s license, 
denouncing the p~oduction as "t~ial by television .. <Atlas, 1988: 37; 
Brenden, 1991: 71>. 
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Though clea~ly su~vival motives account for some characte~istics of 
the British press, the broad net of gove~nment secrecy and control 
encompasses areas that media p~actitione~s do not accept as essential to 
national security. nsecrecy, as a tool of gove~nment, has very little to 
do with foreign affai~s, and even less to do with national security, .. 
Martin Walker has written. 11 Secrecy is a system of self-protection that 
governments and bu~eaucracies wear like a skin 11 <1985: 22>. 
Ideational Characteristics 
The idea system that rivals the instrumental orientation and tends 
to elide with survival rationales is de~ived from the remnants of a class 
system rooted in the feudal period. Similar cultural memories and 
manners inform ideational motives and continue to rationalize press 
behaviors in Europe and much of Asia as well. Among the values emerging 
from entrenched class divisions are paternalism on the part of the social 
and political elite; a sense of loyalty verging on fealty that permeates 
the aspi~ing middle and lowe~ classes <from whose ranks most journalists 
are recruited); and a sense of propriety and etiquette that adds a unique 
dimension to British press ethics. These values rely upon communal, 
rather than individualistic, orientation. 
One manifestation of pate~nalism is the presumption that the content 
of the media is best overseen by "the great and the good," a pool of the 
intellectual and social elite that Walker compares to the Soviet 
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"nomenklatura" <1992>. An interesting illustration of belief in this 
idea was broadcasters' concern that Thatcher's plans to further privatize 
the television industry would produce "an era of game shows and soap 
operas." Stuart Prebble of the Campaign for Quality Television called 
the Prime Minister's proposal "a detailed epitaph for the television 
which has been the envy of the world" <Atlas: 1989: 38>. 
Oversight of media content extends beyond entertainment and is most 
pervasive in the disclosure of government activity. The long-established 
"D"-notice system routinely alerts the media to news items judged by the 
Defense Ministry as threatening to national security. The practice 
results in "censorship by wink and nod from the Ministry of Defence," 
according to British author Geoffrey Robertson <Brendan, 1991: 71>. 
Writing in 1956, American sociologist Edward Shils observed that 
[TJhe acceptance of hierarchy in British society permits the 
government to retain its secrets, with little challenge or 
resentment ...• The deferential attitude of the working and 
middle classes is matched by the uncommunicativeness of the 
upper middle classes and of those who govern ••.. No ruling 
class discloses as little of its confidential proceedings as 
the British <Brendan, 1991: 68-69). 
Shils noted the general acceptance in the mid-20th century of a 
rationale articulated 400 years before by Sir Roger L'Estrange, Charles 
II's press censor, who opposed the newspapers because they make 11 the 
multitude too familiar with the actions and counsels of their superiors" 
<Brendan, 1991: 68>. 
Brendan argues that among the panoply of government measures 
restricting the modern media--taxation, licensing, legislation, and court 
injunctions--the most efficacious has been that which the elite exert 
11 through their superior social positions." Reporters belonging to an 
exclusive club known as the 11 lobby" are privileged to attend regular 
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u off-the-record'' briefings from members of the government and their 
information officers--briefings that set the agenda for the presentation 
of information without holding newsmakers accountable. According to 
Walker, 
When they are called together for their regular meetings with 
the Prime Minister/s spokesman, they write down what is said, 
but the code of the lobby does not permit them to let their 
readers know who said it. Hence the absurd fictions of 
11 Cabinet sources" and 11 Senior Ministers believe ... " and so on 
( 1983: 22). 
"Court correspondents fancy themselves as royal retainers, the 
gentlemen-in-waiting of the press," Brenden writes. 11 Editors behave as 
though they are part of the governing mandarinate, accepting knighthoods 
as orders of merit instead of badges of shame, rewards for having 
prostituted their organs to this or that party" <Brenden, 1991: 69>. 
Neil, who engineered the publication of one installment of the Spycatcher 
memoir in the London Sunday Times before it was quashed, notes that a 
number of people were 11 ennobled" for services to suppressing publication 
of the memoir--adding, 11 We call them /Spycatcher peers!/" He himself was 
awarded the 11 Buckingham Palace Award11 by Fleet Street colleagues, 
presented to the editor judged least likely to ever receive a knighthood. 
11 This is a badge I wear with pride, 11 Neil said (1988: 9>. 
The willingness of the media to conform to official expectations is 
acknowledged in an anonymous poem recollected by Walker: 
You can/t hope to bribe or twist 
The honest British journalist. 
But seeing what the men will do 
Unbribed, there is no reason to C1992>. 
The ideational motive vocabulary extends the upperclass social value 
of genteel discretion across all levels of elite activity in both public 
and private spheres. Brenden relates the rationale to the "inhibition 
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about talking freely in front of servants, social inferiors, and <in the 
empire> /natives/ <1991: 69). Neil draws a similar conclusion, noting, 
In Britain, no information is made available unless the ruling 
elite decides that it should be, and they get very angry when 
newspapers like [The London Sunday Timesl and others attempt to 
get information out that they do not want distributed. It is 
very much a paternalistic, "not in front of the children" 
attitude <1988: 26>. 
While dozens of statutes authorizing stiff fines and imprisonment 
reinforce this aristocratic idea on civil servants and the press, it has 
been absorbed into the national belief system at all social levels. 
Investigative reporting carries with it a tinge of vulgarity and 
aggressiveness, frequently identified with U.S. press performance. A 
Thatcher spokesman was proven right when he predicted that "Charter 88" 
would be met with "massive public indifference and ridicule to the whole 
thing." He continued, 
The press simply doesn/t have the power in England that it does 
in the United States; it doesn/t go about its business with the 
same investigative zeal. The practice of leaking information 
from Government sources is virtually unknown .••• [Tlhe press 
has become a courier between the Government and the public 
<Atlas, 1988: 97). 
Though the articulation of instrumental, ideational, and survival 
motives cited in this analysis of the British press justify different 
press behaviors and indicate different views on how the press should have 
acted in the 1980s, together they construct a consistent triangulated 
picture of how the press, in fact did act. The dynamic theory is not 
intended to determine the correctness or incorrectness of press activity 
or, even less, to provide a measure of the support for conflicting 
viewpoints. The instrumentalist arguments cited here were made by 
opposition voices from the "quality" media, railing against the actions 
of the government, the "popular" media, and the public. They were 
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minority voices, raised in response to what was perceived as significant 
challenge; in turn, they elicited ideational and survival motives to 
justify the actions under attack in the 1980s. A three-dimensional view 
of the British press in the 1980s is a by-product of this interaction. 
Britain and the Motive Triangle 
British media activity is shown to be less focused In its motivation 
than the U.S. press, in part because the institution of the press was 
appended to a society already shaped by historical priorities and values, 
and in part because any close-up view, in this case a decade, reveals 





Figure 5. British Press Activity 
triangle summarizing British press behavior at the beginning of Margaret 
Thatcher's administration, shown in Figure 5A on the preceding page, 
instrumental motives are shown to be less diluted by survival activity 
than at the end of her term, when protest against British press policies 
reacbed its height, shown in Figure 5B. The increasing impact of 
survival considerations, occasioned by two foreign wars and ongoing 
threat from Irish separatists, is revealed through analysis and visually 




1. In the o~iginal d~aft of the Bill of Rights, p~ess f~eedom was 
add~essed in the fou~th amendment. Madison w~ote, 0 The people shall not 
be dep~ived o~ ab~idged of thei~ ~ight to speak, to w~ite of to publish 
thei~ sentiments; and the f~eeedom of the p~ess, as one of the bulwa~ks of 
libe~ty, shall be inviolable 11 <Altschul!, 1984: 26). 
2. Ame~icans a~e mo~e familia~ with the wo~ds Jeffe~son w~ote to his 
f~iend, Colonel Edwa~d Ca~~ington in 1787, •• ••• we~e it left to me to 
decide whethe~ we should have a gove~nment without newspape~s. o~ 
newspape~s without a gove~nment, I should not hesitate a moment to p~efe~ 
the I at te~. u 
3. The 18th centu~y B~itish doct~ine against p~io~ ~est~aint, as opposed 
to post-publication penalty, has been inco~po~ated into Ame~ican common 
law and info~ms many cou~t decisions, among them, Nea~ v. Minnesota 
<1931>, Bantam Books v. Sullivan <1963>, and New To~k Times Co. v. United 
States <1971>--the latte~ common known as the Pentagon Pape~s case. The 
doct~ine, a~ticulated by Si~ William Blackstone in his Commenta~ies, ~eads 
in pa~t, "The libe~ty of the p~ess ... consists in laying no p~evious 
~est~aint upon publications, but not in f~eedom f~om censu~e fa~ c~iminal 
matte~ when published11 <Blackstone, 1976-1769: 151>. 
4. Gove~nment attempts to p~osecute Ame~ican citizens on cha~ges of 
sedition and seditious libel ~a~ely succeed--whethe~ those det~acto~s a~e 
membe~s of the Communist pa~ty, Vietnam wa~ p~otesto~s. o~ a Texas woman 
who, upon hea~ing of the assassination attempt against P~esident Ronald 
Reagan, exp~essed the wish that 11 If they go afte~ him again, I hope they 
get him 11 <Rankin v. McPhe~son, 1987>. 
5. In cont~ast, the va~ious pseudo-"wa~su against pove~ty, d~ugs, 
pollution, etc., which a~e actually domestic social campaigns, do not 
elicit su~vival behavio~ f~om the p~ess. On the cont~a~y. the substance 
and implementations of these policies a~e subject to ~igo~ous media 
sc~utiny and c~iticism. 
6. Fou~ white fixtu~es in the Times men/s ~oom we~e myste~iously labeled 
A, B, C, and D by a cynical wag, Newsweek ~epo~ted. Also, the following 
bit of dogge~el appea~ed on an employees' bulletin boa~d: 
In this g~eat ~epo~to~ial waste 
The~e a~e classes of skill and of taste; 
If you'~e not libel-f~ee 
You a~e g~aded Class D 
And the chances a~e you a~e not chaste 
<Fou~th Estate: Times ABC's, 1944>. 
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7. In 1983, Sarah Tisdall, a government clerk, leaked to the Manchester 
Guardian a memorandum from the Ministry of Defense that U.S. cruise 
missiles were about to be installed in England. Without publishing or 
confirming the information, a Guardi"an editor passed her communication on 
to authorities and she subsequently was sentenced to six months in jail 
<At 1 as, 1989: 38; Jackman, 1992). 
8. U.S. federal employees with access to classified information must 
agree to not disclose information acquired in the course of their 
employment, and former employees must submit for security clearance any 
books, articles, or speeches they write based on their previous work. The 
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of these 11 Contracts 11 in 
Snepp v. United States (1980>. The decision required former CIA agent 
Frank W. Snepp to turn over to the government all earnings from a book he 
wrote about U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, which was published without 
government clearance in 1977. Lower court ruling detail procedures for 
appealing decisions on disputed materials and place the burden on the 
author to prove that national security would not be threatened by 
publication. 
9. Martin Walker attributes the success of the 11 trash tabloids 11 to the 
fact that they are openly targeted at working people. Irreverent, 
gossipy, sexually explicit, and highly entertaining, they are at the same 
time unabashedly partisan and patriotic, regularly combining news and 
views in the European tradition. These publications fill a market vacuum 
seized upon by foreign-born entrepreneurs Rupert Murdoch and Robert 
Maxwell that had been ignored by 11 quality 11 print and broadcasting 
organizations, Walker says (1992>. 
CHAPTER VI 
CASE SUMMARIES OF SURVIVAL-ORIENTED 
PRESS SYSTEMS--SINGAPORE AND 
NIGERIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 
Introduction 
In the introduction of Powers of the Press. Martin Walker considers 
the "privileged" role of the Anglo-American press, and asks 11 is it not 
the atypical outcome of two nations lucky enough to have known wealth 
without revolution and war without invasion for the last few centuries?" 
He then wonders, 11 Why is it so much of the world is following another 
model? 11 <1983: 16). 
The press behavior most nations exhibit most of the time is 
rationalized by survival motive vocabularies. The characteristics 
associated with this ideal type of press activity most closely resemble 
those assigned to the authoritarian type, defined in Four Theories of the 
Press. <Siebert et al .• 1956) and the developmental concepts identified 
by Schramm <1964), Lerner and Schramm <1967), and Hachten <1987), among 
others. As has been pointed out in analyses of the U.S. and British 
press systems, however, a nation need be neither authoritarian in its 
political structure nor "developing" in its economic potential to find 
survival strategies efficacious. 
The distinction in nomenclature is significant in view of the 
essential purpose of motives, which is to influence others to accept a 
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problematic action strategy. 
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As C. Wright Mills notes, Min many social 
actions, others must agree, tacitly or explicitly. Thus, acts often will 
be abandoned if no reason can be found that others wi 11 accept 11 <1940: 
907). While motives espousing the individual's duty to obey authority 
may have been credited in the medieval period when the "divine right of 
kings 11 was accepted as rote, no nation today that is sufficiently 
11 modern 11 to support a mass media system can effectively employ 
authoritarian rationales to justify elite secular control of the press. 
Survival or national security, however, retains currency in all national 
situations where the public or the masses can be convinced that imminent 
threat looms. 
Likewise, the notion that 11 developing11 countries adhere to a 
distinctive set of press behaviors reserved for 11 have-not 0 nations is 
dispelled by the periodic observation of survivalist press activity in 
the most industrially and technologically advanced nations. To 
illustrate the point, this chapter presents a case summary of the 
survival-dominated press of the prosperous island-nation of Singapore, 
focusing on its press behavior since it ceased being a British colony in 
1963. A second study over roughly the same period summarizes the press 
behavior of Nigeria, a survival-oriented nation whose media system is 
more representative of former European colonies and Third-World Systems 
in general. Though not examined here, the highly-centralized Israeli 
press also has been dominated by survivalist rationales since the 
nation's founding after World War II. 
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Singapore--1963-1992 
National Situation and Motive 
Singapore is a city-nation occupying an island roughly 14 miles 
across and 26 miles up and down, an area slightly more than half as large 
as Oklahoma City. It is located at the tip of the Malay Peninsula in the 
Straits connecting the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Seventy 
five percent of its 2.5 million people are of Chinese descent, 15 percent 
are Malays, and 7 percent Indians. Established as a British trading and 
commercial center in 1819, it became a crown colony in 1867. In 
preparation for independence almost a century later, Singaporeans elected 
their first legislative assembly in 1959, dominated by the nationalistic 
People/s Action Party <P.A.P.> and its leader Lee Kuan Yew. After 
separating from Britain in 1963, Prime Minister Lee maneuvered Singapore 
into a federation with Malaya and North Borneo that lasted only two 
years. The Republic of Singapore emerged as an independent republic in 
1965. 
Under Lee/s strict stewardship, Singapore has emerged as a major 
Asian economic power, an upwardly mobile 11 First-World" phenomenon that 
can boast of virtually no poverty, no homelessness, no begging, little 
crime, no unemployment, negligible inflation, and no pollution. Its 
annual per capita income of $12,000 is exceeded in Asia only by Japan, 
while more abundant residential space makes the standard of living 
actually higher. It was not always so. When Lee came to power, he 
recalled in a recent interview, 11 there was no sanitation and no running 
water, hot or cold, for many not even electricity 11 CSesser, 1992: 37>. 
With characteristic pragmatism and lack of sentimentality, Lee has 
directed the tearing down and bulldozing of its teeming ethnic 
neighborhoods and replaced thousands of two-story 11 shophouses 11 with 
sparkling office towers and high-rise apartment buildings. William 
Hachten writes that, since the early 1970s, Singapore has become 11 an 
efficient, corruption-free country where telephones work, streets are 
safe, air is clean and water is pure" <1989: 822). 
The island is hailed as a bastion of capitalism, despite the fact 
that a not-so-invisible governmental hand beckons and smoothes the way 
for transnational corporations, international banks, and high-tech 
manufacturing for foreign contractors--which comprise the base of the 
surging economy. More than 80 percent of the country's capital comes 
from foreigners and foreign-exchange reserves now total $27 billion. 
Whereas other former colonies have shunned TNCs, Singapore has seized 
upon them, creating a world market for "made-in-Singapore .. goods. By 
catering to the entrepreneurs of the industrial core, the island nation 
has become the world's second-largest port, third-largest oil refiner, 
the manufacturer of half of the world's computer disk drives, and ••a 
major center of shipbuilding, telecommunications equipment, electronic 
components, pharmaceuticals, and medical equipment .. <Sesser, 1992: 50>. 
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The great paradox of Singapore is the coupling of its capitalist 
economy with an authoritarian political system that pays scant 
lip-service to Western ideals of participatory democracy and countenances 
only token political opposition. The synthesis has been achieved by a 
dedicated commitment to social order, a perhaps uniquely tit-for-tat 
interpretation of the social contract in which growing economic success 
and social tranquility correlate with increasing social control. The 
enforced order pervades private as well as public spheres, producing a 
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placid yet efficient commercial environment that appeals to foreign 
investors and that Lee says is consistent with widely-held Asian values. 
The corporate structure that Singapore suggests has earned it the 
soubriquet 11 Singapore, Inc., 11 with Lee its undisputed and omnipresent 
C.E.O. 
When political tensions arose in Singapore in the 1980s, Barbara 
Crossette reports, the Confucian scholar Wu Teh Yao told an interviewer 
that .. individualism may not rank high in this social system, but that 
this did not mean an acceptance of authoritarianism, especially amid 
prosperity.n Wu said, 
In all human societies, once the tummy is full, the mind begins 
to think. So whoever is going to rule, even in Japan or China, 
will have to pay attention to the people's needs and wishes .. 
<Crossette, 1992>. 
Yet Western observer Stan Sesser reports little expression of needs 
or wishes by Singapore's expanding middle class. 
The government tells Singaporeans what books and magazines they 
can read, what movies they can see, and what television 
programs they can watch, and the result is a cultural desert in 
a nation so wealthy that it could easily be a showcase for the 
arts. Residents of Singapore pursue but one activity with 
passion--a passion so great that it sometimes seems to 
constitute recreation as well as vocation. This is the making 
of money <1992: 37>. 
In this environment, it is not surprising that the media are 
expected to contribute to the maintenance of an orderly society, to 
assist in the task of nation building, and to serve as the government's 
vehicle for social campaigns that range from appeals to citizens to say 
11 please 11 and 11 thank-you, 11 to reminders to flush public toilets, to 
exhortations to 11 Speak Mandarin, .. avoid obesity; and, in the case of 
university-educated couples, to have larger families. Though the press's 
role is a subservient one, it is an ever-present servant and Singaporeans 
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enjoy a ~ich media envi~onment of local and inte~national fa~e. Fo~ the 
gove~nment ~ecognizes that a st~ong communication inf~ast~uctu~e is 
essential fo~ the efficient conduct of inte~national business, as well as 
the pleasu~e and convenience of inte~national businessmen. As Hachten 
notes in a 1989 a~ticle, "Singapo~e is a ~a~e success sto~y in media 
development, one that has been achieved without p~ess f~eedom" (1989: 
822). Thus while mass communication has flou~ished, a p~ess that 
functions independently of gove~nment--commonly associated with 
inst~umental activity--has ~eg~essed in ~ecent decades. 
Cent~al to all sphe~es of Singapo~ean life and all its institutions 
is 68-yea~-old'Lee Kuan Yew, known by his count~ymen as P.M., fo~ the 
position he held fo~ th~ee decades befo~e stepping down in 1990. 
Following a succession plan he had d~afted yea~s befo~e. Lee has ~etained 
the post of senio~ ministe~ and continued to se~ve as sec~eta~y-gene~al 
of the dominate P.A.P. Lee's mic~omanagement is un~emitting and in no 
way const~ained o~ cont~adicted by his successo~. fo~me~ deputy P~ime 
Ministe~ Goh Chok Tong. Lee explains, 
Multinational co~po~ations and banks expect things to wo~k 
p~ope~ly. That is only possible with continuity. So my 
colleagues and I phased ou~selves out in a g~aduated, 
cont~olled way to avoid any lu~ching ••.. I hope the t~ansition 
will pass impe~ceptibly. If you can feel a lurch, that's 
contrary to my intentions <Sesse~, 1992: 45>. 
Despite Lee's attempt to institutionalize his government's 
succession process, Singaporean law, in fact, ope~ates at Lee's 
discretion. Most commonly, the ~ule of law is maintained by rewriting 
the British-inspired codes to align with Lee's interpretation of cu~~ent 
situations. For example, jury trials were eliminated in 1969 and most 
judges are closely tied to government leade~s who appoint them <New York 
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City Bar Association, 1990>. Under The Essential Control of Publications 
and Safeguarding of Information Regulation, the government prohibited 
print discussion of the abolition of juries. It is Lee's intolerance for 
graft and corruption that makes the 11 Soft authoritarlanism111 of 
Singapore more palatable to its citizens and foreign investors than 
similarly structured charismatic regimes in Thailand, the Philippines, 
and Burma. Chinese by birth, educated at Cambridge University in 
England, and fluent in Mandarin Chinese and two Chinese dialects as well 
as his native English, Lee mirrors the conflict between Western and 
Eastern values that characterizes the schizophrenia experienced by many 
former colonial countries. 
It is in response to Western challenge to the way the Singaporean 
press operates, particularly as it affects Western publications and 
Western journalists, that Lee has constructed a motive vocabulary that 
reiterates the presence of multiple threats to his country's survival. 
That this vulnerability is not appreciated or comprehended by Western or 
even other Asian observers does not diminish its reality in the eyes of 
Singapore's leadership or its citizenry. As Asian-based writer and 
author Ian Buruma observes, 11 Big Brother in Singapore is less a tyrant 
than an authoritarian father worried that his family will one day 
disappear" 2 (1988: 25). He then quotes from a national address Lee 
made in 1982: 
My deepest concern is how to make the young more conscious of 
security. By security I mean defense against threats to our 
survival, whether the threats are external or internal .... 
Civilization is fragile. It is especially so for an island 
city-state <Buruma, 1988: 25). 
In the analysis below, the survival motive vocabulary is explored 
and illustrated as explanation for Singaporean media activity. The 
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lesser impact of the instrumental orientation is then examined, followed 
by the minimal influence of ideas and moral values on press behavior. 
Survival Characteristics 
Threats to Survival. The notion of fear is central to virtually 
all analyses of Singaporean society. The epithet 11 City of fear 11 is so 
widely employed it needs no citation; frequently "paranoid11 is attached 
to the label by Westerners. For purposes of analysis, the threats to 
Singaporean survival articulated by Singaporean leaders, media, and 
citizens may be divided into the following categories, though all, in 
fact, overlap and are perceived as part of an all-encompassing 
precariousness. These are: the thre~t of domestic political subversion 
from the left; military threat posed by China and other envious neighbors 
in the region; cultural subversion from the West; geographical isolation 
and the encroachment of the surrounding jungle; demographic tensions 
produced by conflicting races and religions; and economic vulnerability. 
In 1987 twenty-two young social activists, several of them Catholic 
lay workers, were arrested and detained without trial under the Internal 
Security Act, a remnant of British colonial law. They were charged with 
being part of a 11 Marxist conspiracy to subvert the existing social and 
political system in Singapore through Communist united-front tactics to 
establish a Communist Staten <Sesser, 1992: 57>, though they claimed to 
be merely 11 do gooders, 11 fighting for greater democracy CBuruma, 1988: 
118). Most were released late in 1987, after confessing their crimes on 
Singapore television. When nine later released a public statement 
claiming they were mistreated in prison, they were promptly rearrested. 
By June of 1990 all were said to have been rehabilitated and were 
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released, except for their lawyer, who after being charged with several 
crimes, including being in "close contact .. with an American Embassy 
diplomat, opted for self-imposed exile in the United States <Buruma, 
1989; Sesser, 1992). 
Lee dismisses Western press interpretations that the crackdown was 
directed against opposition forces that threatened P.A.P.'s parliamentary 
majority. Rather, Lee said, the young people were trying to create 
social unrest that would lead to bombings and assassinations. The threat 
as Lee perceives it was not to his own political base, but to the 
stability of the country. In a 1991 interview with Sasser, Lee recalled 
his instructions to his cabinet at the time of the crisis. 11 I told the 
younger ministers,n he said, 
11 Look, as I see it, this takes about five years before it gets 
going. You can wait for it to mature and you might find out 
the ramifications. But you/11 run the risk of many more 
innocent people being drawn in 11 (Sesser, 1992: 60>. 
The need for government supervision of content, staffing, and 
licensing of domestic media is rationalized on the basis of the threat of 
leftist insurgents, all of which fall under the label of 11 communists 11 in 
Lee's vocabulary. Lee allied himself with any and all nationalistic 
political groups in the 1950s, when his primary goal was ending British 
rule, professing, 11 I would vote for Communism if I had to choose only 
between Communism and colonialism,n (Sesser, 1992: 46); however, he now 
opposes communism with the Cold-War vehemence and tenacity exhibited in 
the United States in the early 1950s. As he sought to consolidate power 
as prime minister, all dissent and all dissenters, including his former 
allies, became suspect and 11 Communists. 11 His Internal Security 
Department, whose job it is to ferret out dissent, is described by Sesser 
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as "ruthlessly efficient and intrusive 11 (1992: 40>. 
During the unrest of the early 1960s, many of Singapore's poor 
Malays and its intellectual Chinese elite were inspired by the idealism 
of Mao's cultural revolution. While Western press accounts make 
repeated reference to the fact that Singapore is without enemies since 
the fall of communism in the Soviet Union, Lee and political supporters 
appear to be nervously aware of China's well-armed presence at the 
opposite shore of the South China Sea. 
A look at the map lends substantial credibility to this fear and 
perhaps offers an explanation for the pains Lee takes to not direct his 
assaults on the 11 Sleeping giant 11 itself. As Sesser reports, in a 1990 
address to international journalists in Hong Kong 11 [Leel blamed 
television for the deaths in Tiananmen Square, saying that it was 
television coverage of demonstrations in the Philippines and South Korea, 
rather than a desire for freedom which had spurred the Chinese students 
to protest•• <1992: 64). The proximity of China may also account for the 
fact that Singapore maintains one of the largest armies in the world 
proportionate to population and that all young men are required to devote 
two years to military service. 
In 1990 Russell Heng noted in a Rockefeller Foundation study: 
Two years ago, a Cabinet Minister urged academics and 
professionals to speak up. But when two reporters tried to get 
the reaction of eighteen of them to the Minister's 
encouragement, six preferred to keep their views to themselves. 
Of the remaining twelve, six spoke only on condition of 
anonymity CHeng, 1990>. 
Though the economy and Singapore's standard of living are dependent 
upon its ties to the large, highly developed nations, the threat of 
11 cultural imperialism, .. of fragmentation of its own culture by the influx 
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of Western values and products suggests the country/s lingering 
attachment to Third World identity crises. The construction of a motive 
vocabulary to justify this contradictory position is discussed in the 
section on ideational characteristics. 
Buruma attributes the fear that pervades Singaporean society to 
geographic and demographic factors. He writes, 
It has to do with being a prosperous little island, a minute 
modern enclave surrounded by millions of Malays, whose relative 
backwardness could so easily--so the [Singaporean) Chinese 
fear--turn to hostility (1988: 23) 
Indeed, government censors take extraordinary precautions to make 
sure that media material is not offensive to Singapore/s Muslim Malays or 
the largely Muslim populations of neighboring Indonesia and Malaysia. In 
1965 Lee remarked, "[The Indonesians) live in a tenement area and they 
want to come into my little suburban house with its fruit trees .. (Sesser, 
1992: 63>. The murder of thousands of Chinese minorities in Indonesia in 
1965 and racial tensions at home during that time have left indelible 
impressions on Lee and many other Chinese Singaporeans. Government 
officials fear that the lower economic status and less pervasive work 
ethic of Singapore/s Malays could lead to a permanent underclass, ripe 
for revolt. To counter this, until recently, Malay college students were 
provided full tuition scholarships. 
The surrounding jungle itself, Buruma believes, constitutes a 
perceived peril for Singapore. He writes of "a deep, Conradian fear of 
being swallowed up by the jungle, a fate that can only be avoided by 
being ever more perfect, ever more disciplined, always the best 11 (1988: 
23-24>. A similar fate is alluded to by B.G. Lee, who contemplating the 
effects of eroding confidence in his father and his P.A.P. government, 
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predicts, "Far from cheerfully muddling through, we would vanish without 
trace, submerged into the mud of historyn CBuruma, 1988: 25>. 
Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, for many years foreign minster of Singapore 
and numbered among the republic/s founding fathers, thinks it crucial to 
establish a national identity in this nation of immigrants, but thinks an 
unfettered press and conflicting interpretations would "make it go 
bonkers. 11 11 [AJ11 of this can break up and disappear totally. All might 
be totally lost," he told Buruma in an interview. 11 Raja 11 continued, "How 
many Singaporeans really want free speech, anyway? They want 
orderliness, a decent living. 11 Likening society to an organism and the 
airing of sensitive issues of race, religion, and language to a 
tuberculosis virus, he argues, "We must keep them under control. If your 
constitution is weak, TB will take over and kill you" <Buruma, 1988: 25, 
54). 
Perhaps most tangible to Singaporeans is the threat of economic 
collapse, of sliding back into the post-colonial category of backward 
nations from which it propelled itself not three decades ago. To 
Westerners, and particularly American political analysts, 30 years 
represents a substantial chunk of national history; 30 years of economic 
stability carries with it the American assumption that it is time to put 
the more basic issue of economic survival on a back burner. 3 The 
Singaporean concept of time seemingly embraces a more traditional Asian 
view. For it was only in 1960 that Asia Scene. a travel magazine wrote: 
"The Chinese, who constitute the main current of [Singapore,] the city, 
live in utter filth and poverty. Their poverty is phenomenal. One must 
see with his own eyes to believe lt 11 <Sesser, 1992: 44>. 
Vincent Cheng, the leader of the twenty-two social activists 
arrested for dissent in 1987 and 1988, won his release by confessing on 
national television to economic, not political, wrong-thinking: 
My leftist thinking always left me biased against 
multinationals. What I didn't understand was whether Singapore 
can exist without multinationals' contributing to our economy 
.... During my detention, I was given the opportunity to 
understand Singapore better .... I realized it is very 
important I take into account the reality of 
Singapore--Singapore's vulnerability for example <Sesser, 1992: 
58). 
Press Characteristics. Today Singaporeans may choose from seven 
daily newspapers, three of which are in English, three in Mandarin 
Chinese, and one small-circulation newspaper in the Indian language 
dialect, Tamil. All six of the English and Chinese-language newspapers 
are published by Singapore Press Holdings, a conglomerate through which 
the government exercises near absolute control, down to the hiring and 
firing of editors and staff <Hachten, 1989; Sesser, 1992>. Its current 
chairman is also chairman of the Port of Singapore Authority, a 
government agency. Those who wish to own more than 3 per cent of 
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Holdings stock must seek approval from the Minister of Communications and 
the Arts, who also wields veto power over the choice of directors. Among 
the largest stockholders are government-owned companies and agencies 
<Sesser, 1992: 63>. 
The leading English-language paper is the Straits Times. with a 
circulation of more than 269,000 and an estimated daily readership of 
600,000. The major Chinese-language dailies are Lianhe Zaobao and 
Wanbao. with a combined circulation of 264,000 and an estimated 
readership of 980,000, according to Survey Research of Singapore 
<Hachten, 1989: 824>. 
Sesser, after examining the Straits Times. questions why such an 
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extensive network of state control is necessary since self censorship 
seemingly precludes the need for direct pressure from government 
officials. "One day during my stay, for instance, .. Sesser writes, a 
• 
five-column headline over the lead story read "PM: LET;S MAKE THIS THE 
FINEST NATION 11 (1992: 63-64>. A 1984 headline in the newspaper, 
enthusiastically backing one of the government;s crusades, warned 
readers: 11 DON;T SPIT IN PUBLIC--AFTER THE CAMPAIGN, CULPRITS WILL BE 
FINED. The article that followed corrected a well-meaning tailor who had 
promised henceforward to confine his spitting to drains. "But experts 
say that wherever it is done, spitting is unhygienic," the account read. 
"It spreads a lot of germs that cause illnesses like tuberculosis, cough 
and cold, influenza .... " <Sesser, 1992: 44>. 
Since 1969, literacy has climbed at the rate of 1 percent per year 
and is now more than 86 percent. Although Malay is still the official 
language, emphasis is placed on Mandarin Chinese and English, both of 
which are taught in the schools. Many Singaporeans read publications in 
both languages. Forty-seven percent of all adults read Chinese 
newspapers, and 43 percent read English newspapers. In all, 84 percent 
read a daily newspaper, compared to 78 percent who watch television on a 
daily basis, Hachten reports <1989: 823>. 
Since Lee came to power, the number of national newspapers has 
declined from 12 dailies to its current level, largely through 
consolidation and forced closure. Despite this, circulation has remained 
approximately constant at about 269 issues per 1,000 population, compared 
to about 195 per 1,000 in the United States <Parker, 1982: 785). In May 
1971, Lee closed two English language dailies, The Eastern Sun and the 
Singapore Herald. and detained four senior executives of a Chinese 
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language newspaper, Nyang Siang. All three newspapers were targeted for 
voicing criticism of his policies. In another crackdown in 1982 several 
editors were punished for giving disproportionate coverage to the 
political opposition, represented by only one member in the 81-seat 
parliament. 4 At this point, Lee put his former director of national 
intelligence to oversee the offending Straits Time and forced the sale of 
its afternoon paper, New Nation. to a rival publisher <Hachten, 1989: 
823). 
The Newspaper and Print Presses Act of 1974 requires that all 
newspapers apply for an annual license, which may be withdrawn by the 
government if content is shown to be not in accord with the law. Those 
printing, selling, distributing, or possessing an unlicensed paper are 
subject to fines and/or imprisonment <Parker, 1982: 788>. In effect, 
licensing poses fewer constraints on domestic publishing than the 
self-censorship that results from the frequent firing of journalists and 
the constant threat of libel. Lee himself has initiated 13 libel suits 
in 30 years and won everyone of them--either in court or through 
out-of-court settlement. A Singaporean journalist revealed to Sesser, "I 
never ask questions at a press conference, because if you do they take 
note of you. A number of journalists have lost their jobs" <1992: 57>. 
Since 1980 radio and television have been under the aegis of the 
Singapore Broadcasting Corporation <SBC>, a quasi-official board, 
subsidized by the government and subject to the pressures of Lee and the 
P.A.P. Radio broadcasts in English, Mandarin, Malay, and Tamil total 
over 500 hours a week. SBC television broadcasts 140 hours per week on 
three channels and 40 percent of these programs are domestically 
produced. Hachten reports that, according to SBC/s public relations 
director, U.S. shows sometimes attract audiences of 300,000 to 400,000, 
but locally-produced dramas in Chinese draw twice that number <1989: 
824>. In 1986, almost a half million home television licenses were 
issued, indicating that television reaches nearly every household. 
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Although similarly high domestic media penetration was reported in 
the formerly Socialist countries of the Eastern Bloc, important 
differences distinguishes the media content of survivalist countries from 
that of idea-motivated countries. In Singapore over 3,700 publications 
are imported, as well as hundreds of video tapes, music, and film. And 
while some censorship occurs, as discussed below, the overriding concern 
of the Singapore government and other survival-oriented governments is 
strategic information about the country "going out" rather than 
contaminating ideas and foreign entertainment "coming in." Also, even 
though government controlled and subsidized, media rely on foreign as 
well as domestic advertising for their major operating revenues. 
The government/s Board of Film Censors must clear all videotapes 
that enter Singapore legally. A film distributor operating on 
Singapore/s pricey Orchard Road reports that all of his deliveries go 
first to the Censor Board. All excerpted materials are described on 
sheets taped to the inside of each cassette so that customers can 
identify what is missing. Books, magazines, and music are also subject 
to censorship, though most entertainment excisions appear to be more 
cultural, if not quirky, rather than political. Yet Singaporeans 
experience little difficulty in purchasing uncensored books, magazines, 
and videotapes from thriving shops and stalls located across the causeway 
from Singapore in the Malaysian city of Johore Bahru <Sesser, 1992: 63). 
Furthermore, the government's broadcasting monopoly has been breached by 
the extraordinary increase in video cassette players which by 1987 
reached 75 percent of Singaporean homes--the h.ighest average in Asia, 
surpassing even Tokyo and Sydney <Survey Research Group, 1988: 12> 
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A heavier hand is evident in censors' treatment of foreign political 
material--particularly that perceived as interfering with domestic 
political activity and reflecting poorly on the country in the 
international community. Information, rather than entertainment, clearly 
resonates more strongly with the survival orientation. 
In the past five years, Western media and media scholars have 
focused their attention on the impact of a 1986 amendment to the 
Newspaper and Print Presses Act, empowering the Minister of Communication 
to cut the Singaporean circulation of foreign publications 11 engaging in 
domestic politics ... Under the revised law, Time magazine's circulation 
was halved from 18,000 to 9,000 and later to 2,000 for an article 
reporting government action against P.A.C. opposition leaders <Hachten, 
1989: 825>. In 1987, The Asian Wall Street Journal. the Hong Kong-based 
Far Eastern Economic Review. and Asia Week had their Singapore 
circulations cut by more than 90 percent based on various specific 
charges alleging distorted reporting on Singaporean affairs. In 1987 a 
Malaysian New Straits Times journalist was among several people arrested 
for allegedly participating in a Marxist conspiracy and detained without 
charge for a month. Nigel Holloway of the Far Eastern Economic Review 
was expelled for no stated reason <Committee to Project Journalists, 
1988: 38). 
In 1989 foreign accounts of successful Singaporean court battles 
against these publications and their local printers resulted in a flurry 
of further legal reprisals against the foreign media, including charges 
of contempt of court and the curtailing of visa privileges and work 
permits <Committee to Protect Journalists, 1990: 106-107>. 
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In 1990 the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists reported 
the imposition of new restrictions requiring all but 14 foreign 
publications which 11 report on the politics and current affairs of 
Singapore and other Souheast Asian countries" to post a bond and obtain a 
permit to circulate. Both the Chinese and Enlish-language versions of 
Asiaweek were included in the ban. Those exempted escaped restriction 
because 11 they do not report regularly on Singapore and have not 
interfered in Singapore/s domestic affairs" <Committee to Protect 
Journalists, 1991: 104-105). The Committee also noted that the Singapore 
government prohibited Asian Wall Street Journal and Far Eastern Economic 
Review correspondents from attending the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation conference in July 1990. 
As an additional sidelight on its attitudes toward media fare, it 
should be noted that the Singaporean government brooks little opposition 
to the importation of American television and film dramas, such as 
"Da 11 asn or "LA Law," that appear on SBC; but it has effective 1 y banned 
the live transmission of Cable News Network broadcasts, except at the 
discretion of the SBC. Regional businessmen complain that CNN can be 
viewed in communist Beijing, but not in capitalist Singapore. This ban 
has been accomplished by prohibiting satellite-reception dishes and may 
not be targeted specifically at the U.S. news channel, but at all live 
foreign television. 
While Singapore/s curb on foreign media coverage cannot be 
dismissed, it also should not be exaggerated. For it is the conclusion 
of this analysis that though the multiple threats to the country/s 
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survival are perceived and articulated by the governing elite, their 
impact on foreign press activity is narrowly focused on strategic issues. 
Intervention patterns indicate that fear of increasing the country's 
vulnerability to outsiders outweighs its concern with the impact on the 
domestic audiences, given the lopsided circulation lead of domestic 
political fare over imported content. Furthermore, cognizance must be 
taken of the actual scope of foreign and domestic media 
censorship--keeping in mind the prevalence of self censorship among 
Singapore's media professionals. In 1979, the last date for which 
inclusive figures could be obtained, 76,346 publications were submitted 
for examination and 391 were subsequently banned on moral grounds; 1,300 
films were reviewed and 4.5 percent banned. Approximately one-third 
required cuts or editing "on moral, violent, political, or ethnic 
grounds 11 <Parker, 1982: 788-789>. Subsequent information indicates less 
restrictive censorship policies. 
Although Hachten suggests that many measures curtailing foreign 
media activity in Singapore may bring about negative financial 
consequences for islanders, there is little to suggest that the cutbacks 
of a few thousand issues will have much impact on the printing and 
publishing industry in Singapore, which grossed $327 million in 1982 and 
employed 13,000 <Hachten, 1989: 827>. In 1990 Lee reportedly told 
international pressmen in Hong Kong that 11 Come 1997 [when Hong Kong 
reverts to Chinese rulel, his country would offer the most congenial 
perch from which Western correspondents could cover Asia," according to a 
column in the Far Eastern Econgmic Review <Sesser, 1992: 64). 
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Instrumental Characteristics 
The instrumental orientation of money-minded Singapore is never 
disputed, though some dissenters question the morality of instrumental 
action and charge that materialistic values undermine traditional Asian 
beliefs. The minimal challenge to the instrumental motive vocabulary 
elicits little justification for government and press behavior. One of 
the more telling interpretations of Singaporean instrumentalism is found 
in Singaporean journalist Mary Lee's observation: 
Underneath everything is the housing policy. An ordinary 
office worker can own his own apartment--a situation that would 
be the envy of anyone in the United States. The government 
decided that the way to keep the population quiet was to give 
everyone a stake <Sesser, 1992: 53>. 
Clearly, the Singaporean concept of instrumental activity excludes many 
of the ideological tenets attached to the American instrumental 
vocabulary. Lee defends his country's closely monitored press by showing 
American-style press freedom to be only one option available to those 
nations committed to bettering the material lives of their citizens. 
Democracy countered communism by sponsoring what has been 
advanced as the axiomatic truths of free society, which 
includes freedom of the press and human rights. But are they 
universal values? Can you prove their universality? If they 
are in fact of universal relevance, will they not win just by a 
process of Darwinian evolution?u <Sesser, 1992: 60). 
As Prime Minister Goh observed, in noting why university demonstrations 
are banned, 
[Ilf you have several such demonstrations, right away the 
impression is created that government is not in control of the 
situation--that the place may become unstable. That will have 
an impact on foreign investors <Sesser, 1992: 57>. 
Clearly, the Japanese government's interventionist economic policies 
align more closely with Singaporean priorities than America's more 
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ideal-typical model. In some ways, the Singaporeans may be said to have 
out-maneuvered and out-pragmatized the Western nations at their own game. 
Buruma reports that admiration for the Japanese is widely voiced in the 
city, despite the fact that the majority of Chinese were especially 
targeted by the Japanese during the war. He noted a conversation with a 
Singaporean businessman of Chinese descent, who claimed, in Buruma/s 
words, 
The Japanese, now they have spirit. They are strong, they work 
hard, they sacrifice, they are No. 1 in the world. Their cars, 
their machines, their technology, all No. 1 CBuruma, 1988: 23>. 
As many Singaporeans and most other observers are quick to note, the 
islanders are obsessed with success, not with alien ideas of freedom--or 
at least not yet. An independent press is one Western import Lee and his 
supporters believe they cannot afford. Goh foresees a time when a less 
intrusive government might be possible, but acknowledges, 
The rules would be there, but they would not be intruding into 
your consciousness every day. That means a newer generation 
must be put through schools, to be socially educated that this 
is the norm of behavior. I think it would require twenty or 
twenty-five years before we can move to that situation CSesser, 
1992: 68). 
Ideational Characteristics 
The ideational motive vocabulary plays a minor role in rationalizing 
Singaporean government and press activity. It is vested in two main 
value currents that merge. The first, a carryover from its colonial and 
anti-colonial past, is Singapore/s recurring resentment against Western 
values and culture, that flies in the face of 34 McDonald restaurants, 
jukeboxes fitted with Western CDs, all-night discos, and European home 
decor. In the media, anti-Westernism is exhibited in the banning of 
Playboy and Cosmopolitan and in the censorship of Western videos to rid 
them of decadence and violence. 
Video distributor Albert Odell explains, 
The censors have a yardstick to go by: certain words are one 
hundred per cent taboo. They allow "fuck" but never 
Hmotherfucker. 11 If "motheru is involved it goes. Any frontal 
bare breast is out, but a side view is O.K. All references to 
Allah go. In "Young Guns," a guy might be shot twelve times, 
and they'll say, "Reduce it so he's shot only five times" 
<Sesser, 1992: 62>. 
British and US recordings that refer to drugs are prohibited, including 
"Yellow Submarine" and other songs by the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, 
Eric Clapton, and Elton John. 
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Most importantly, anti-Western motives justify the country's tightly 
controlled infnrmation media. A Singaporean sociologist of Chinese 
descent was questioned by Buruma about the government's agenda. Suddenly 
she lashed out, °Foreigners are always hostile to Singapore, always 
judging us by Western standards. Why? Just because we are modern, 
should we be an open society, why?" CBuruma, 1988: 58). 
Lee and his countrymen appear to take particular pleasure in besting 
their powerful Western partners and former mentors. The P.M. boasts, "I 
speak to Harold Macmillan and Duncan Sandys as equals. At Cambridge I 
got two firsts and a star for distinction. Harold Macmillan did not" 
CBuruma, 1988: 58). Lee's occasional skirmishes with the U.S. State 
Department arouse pride at home, despite the fact that Americans are the 
largest importers of Singaporean goods. 
The second value system Lee and his ministers are seeking to 
construct is a revival and repackaging of Confucianism, in order to 
strengthen efforts to establish a solid Singaporean identity in this 
heterogenous nation of immigrants ~ to make Singaporean society more 
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like the Japanese. These pervasive Asian values are being injected along 
with exhortations to speak Mandarin in the social campaigns and in the 
schools, using simplified, less abstract language and glossier, more 
colorful pictures than traditional texts. Dr. Lau Wai Hart directs the 
five-year-old HConfucian Ethics <Conthics> Project Team.• She explained, 
"English is for getting on in life, for practical use. But for moral 
behavior we must learn Chinese, our own languageH <Buruma, 1988: 58>. 
Producing a flashy Confucian ethics book, she added, ur am Western 
educated, so I know all the modern techniques •••• We have slides, we 
have TV, we have cassette tapes, we have video <Buruma, 1988: 118>. 
Critics of the Conthlcs Project claim "There is more continuity 
between the Renaissance, the Reformation and modern Europe than between 
Confucianism and modern Singapore• <Buruma, 1988: 118>. Buruma likewise 
dismisses the possibility of imposing the ancient Chinese value system on 
money-driven Singapore. 0 Pragmatism, the twisted logic of Cambridge and 
Confucianism, are not really ideas at all; they are tactics to maintain 
order and achieve prosperity. They are not part of any moral universe 
(1988: 118). 
Yet despite these opinions, the emergence of a Singaporean identity 
is detectable--particularly among young people. One of 22 students 
detained as a dissident in 1987 and later released, observed, 
The Government achieved the opposite effect to what they 
intended. Through educational and national service, we felt 
more Singaporean than our parents. Which is why we wanted more 
than money--more participation, more responsibility <Buruma, 
1988: 118). 
206 
Singapore and the Motive Triangle 
Though same fluctuation has occurred in the use of motives in 
response to changing domestic and international situations, the activity 
of Singapore's press system has never strayed far from the survivalist 
orientation. Its position falls in the survival-instrumental motive 
zone, pulled away from the perimeter by minimal idea-motivated activity, 
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Portuguese merchant explorers were first drawn to the West African 
region that now comprises Nigeria in the mid-16th century by the prospect 
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of lucrative slave trading. British rule began in 1861 with the 
annexation of the slave depot at Lagos and expanded over the next 50 
years to include the entire 374,000 square-mile area. Over the course of 
a century, British missionaries and entrepreneurs planted the germ of a 
national press system that would become the colony's first and most 
persistent voice for independence. As early as 1881, the Lagos Times and 
Gold Coast Advertiser advised in an editorial, 
We are not clambering [sic] for immediate independence, but it 
should always be borne in mind that the present order of things 
will not last forever. A time will came when the colonies on 
the west coast will be left to regulate their own internal and 
external affairs <Nwankwo and Kurian, 1982: 687>. 
Africa's first vernacular newspaper and modern print journalism were 
introduced in Nigeria in 1859 by the Rev. Henry Townsend in Abeokuta, in 
Ogun State. Here the printer priest established the bi-weekly Iwe Irohin 
Fun Awon Ara Egba Ati Yoruba. <Newspaper in Yoruba for the Egba and 
Yoruba People>. <Omu, 1978>. 
At the ceremony launching the maiden issue, Townsend declared: [Mly 
object is to get the people to read ••. that is to beget the habit of 
seeking information by reading .•. I have set on foot a Yoruba Newspaper 
<Coker, 1970>. Townsend is credited not only with being the Mfather of 
Nigerian journalism• but also a pioneer in the conversion of spoken 
vernaculars into written languages. Heavily subsidized by the Church of 
England, his eight-page paper sold for less than a penny <120 cowries> 
and its early paternalistic emphasis on health, hygiene, morals, 
education, and local news is carried forward in today's survivalist press 
<Akinfeleye, 1984>. Among the subjects Townsend stressed was attention 
to proper attire, as shown by the following paragraph from a 1864 issue: 
To wear a shirt without trousers and Jacket looks odd; to wear 
a jacket or coat without a shirt looks still more singular and 
out of place. It does not look well to see a soldier's helmet 
or any other head dress worn with country clothes or a 
soldier's red Jacket with naked legs and feet <Okigbo, 1987: 
630). 
Under British statutes colonial administrators were given broad 
authority to control African press enterprises and to punish those that 
voiced opposition to imperial rule. In 1909, a colonial officer said 
that the purpose of the new Seditious Offense Bill was to provide the 
state with "power to punish publications ••• designed to influence an 
excitable and ignorant populace 11 < Omu , 1968: 293 > • Niger ian 
journalist O.S. Coker wrote, 
It was a strong-handed administration, with a 
you-cannot-do-anything-that-the government-does-not-approve-of 
philosophy. Within the law of the country, the newspaper is 
allowed to say so much and at the same time of colonial rule, 
that much was very little (1968: 43). 
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A survey of the African press during British rule suggests, however, 
that these policies further inflamed discontent among the educated elite. 
The tradition of a highly-partisan and highly-interpretive press emerged 
in the opposition press, which reached the heights of contentiousness 
during the colonial era. In 1917 Governor Lord Lugard attempted to 
impose censorship on "the mendacious native press, 11 which Nwankwo and 
Kurian describe as the "equivalent of the African drum, a unique means of 
communication, a sounding board for African ideas and opinions'' <1982: 
687-688>. They attribute the virility of the early native Nigerian press 
to growing literacy and the ambivalence of colonial authorities, torn 
between encouraging a British-style institution and putting down a 
vehicle of insurrection. 
In 1937 Nnamdi "Zik 11 Azikiwe, a dynamic and committed nationalist, 
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launched the daily newspaper, the West African Pilot. proclaiming 
"Independence in All Things and Neutral in Nothing Affecting the Destiny 
of Africa.• By the 1940s, circulation exceeded 24,000 daily copies with 
a readership estimated at between 10 and 20 per copy <Nwankwo and Kurian, 
1982: 688>. The Pilot became the flagship for Africa's first chain, the 
Zik Group, comprised of six daily papers. Zik's newspapers were 
frequently targeted by the colonial government, periodically shut down 
and denied lucrative government advertising. One British bureaucrat 
complained in an official memorandum to the home office: •[The Zik 
newspapers] are like a plague. They are afflicting the whole country" 
<Nwankwo and Kurian, 1982: 688). In the pre-independence years, the Zik 
newspapers and other native-owned and operated papers were, in fact, 
idea-motivated and revolutionary in nature. Azikiwe, like other 
nationalist African newspapermen, became the first president of his 
country after independence.$ 
Between 1947 and 1974 Cecil King and Lord Roy Thomson, among other 
Britishers, introduced modern technology to Nigerian printing and also 
provided training for some of the country's finest journalists. King 
purchased the Lagos Daily Times and its two magazines and Thomson formed 
the Amalgamated Press of Nigeria and ran the Daily Express of Lagos with 
his financial partner, Chief Obafemi Awolowo. In 1974, the last British 
presence in the Nigerian press was removed with passage of the Nigerian 
Enterprise Promotion Decree, requiring that all stock in domestic 
companies be owned by Nigerians. 
Most international media scholars would not take issue with Ralph 
Akinfeleye's assessment that by African standards, •the Nigerian Press is 
by far the oldest and richest in media uses, traditions, developments and 
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diversities~ CAkinfeleye, 1984: 26; Hachten, 1971; Martin, 1991; Nwankwo 
and Kurian, 1982>. As Akinfeleye notes, a 1979 study of African 
communication infrastructure rated Nigeria's press first in all 
categories. The tribal rivalries and religious divisions in this 
Christian-Muslim federation, comprised of disparate states that now 
number 30, 6 have resulted in a pluralistic press that is at the same 
time united by a restive nationalism, a phenomenon that Sylvanus A. 
Ekwelie describes charitably as •the channeling of ethnicity into higher 
patriotism <1986: 149>. Lateef Jakande, publisher of the Nigerian 
Tribune attributes the comparative vigor of Nigeria's news media to 
"three things: the tradition of press freedom instilled by Zik and 
others, the courage and professional spirit of Nigerian editors and 
publishers and the good sense of some of those in authoritya <Nwankwo and 
Kurian, 1982: 689). While Ekwelle credits the 1979 Constitution with 
establishing a framework in which a strong press might operate, he notes 
that 11 Nigeria's ethnic cleavages, political pluralism and occasional 
Judicial activism appear to provide a stronger bulwark against press 
harassment than .•. statutory guarantees" <1986: 98). 
Despite these indications of vitality, further examination reveals 
that the activities of the Nigerian press are dominated by survival 
motives that have prevailed to varying degrees since independence and the 
achievement of the long-sought revolutionary goal. Since acquiring 
sovereignty in 1960, the Federal Republic of Nigeria has experienced a 
succession of civilian and military governments, and for the past seven 
years the country has been ruled by the 29-member Armed Forces Ruling 
Council, headed by President <and Air Force General> Ibrahaim Babangida. 
This federal mandate is scheduled to pass to an elected civilian 
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government in 1992. 
Since 1980 Nigeria's population has increased by 56 percent and is 
now estimated to total 118.7 million <Hunter, 1992: 943).? With 
petroleum accounting for 95 percent of its exports, the nation has been 
struggling to stabilize its currency, control double-digit inflation, and 
reschedule its $34 billion foreign debt, all measures designed to prepare 
the country for the return to civilian rule. Confronted with frequent 
government turnovers, overnight about-faces in press policies, and until 
late 1991, a panoply of economically- and ethnically-based political 
parties, journalists have clung to the one standard that remains constant 
in the stormy seas of its colonial legacy--the government-prescribed role 
of the media as partners in nationbuilding. As private media ownership 
has dwindled in the declining economic situation, the utility of 
instrumental action strategies has decreased and all but disappeared--as 
is the case in almost all sub~Saharan Africa.s And while ideational 
motives account for considerable pointedly political behavior, the 
survivalist image of the press as 11 the anchor for the protection of 
Nigeria's national unityu <Momoh, 1987: 54> is supported in the analysis 
that follows. 
Survival Characteristics 
In The World News Prism. Hachten reports the following exchange 
between the international press corps in Lagos and a government official, 
an account attributed to a 1978 report by Sean Kelly: 
The Nigerian press spokesman smiled at the roomful of 
reporters, paused dramatically, and said: "Gentlemen, I've got 
good news for you today. We are lifting press censorship ... In 
the commotion that followed, one newsman was heard to shout: 
"Can we report that?u "Unfortunately not," replied the 
spokesman. NYou see, we never really said publicly that we 
were imposing press censorship. Therefore, we can hardly 
announce today that we are lifting it• <Hachten, 1987: 108; 
Kelly, 1978>. 
The event is revealing because it underscores the chasm that 
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separates Third and First World logic concerning objective and subjective 
reality. From the Nigerian government/s point of view, the 
precariousness of the country/s new-found sovereignty outweighs any other 
considerations and, typical of survival-motivated nations in general and 
former colonial states in particular, living up to the expectations of 
First Worlders assumes priority only when doing so can result in the 
achievement of strategic goals. 
In a 1987 article, Prince Tony Momoh, then Nigeria/s Minister of 
Information and Culture, 9 argues that Nthe interest of the nation 
overrides any other interest... He continues, 
[Tlhe press has a duty to win, maintain, and perpetuate support 
for the nation as the apex of the collective vested interest of 
the operators within the pyramid ••• at the apex of the 
pyramid, countries mobilize the media to the well-being of the 
nation with an approach that may be capitalist, communist, or 
even hybrid <1987: 54-55). 
Like spokesmen from other underdeveloped nations, Momoh alludes to 
the irrelevance of the East-West political conflict to the southern 
hemisphere and voices the resentment of those who believe the prolonged 
Cold War deflected attention from the more pressing economic divisions 
separating North and South. Distinctions between free and planned 
economic philosophies hold little interest for countries, such as 
Nigeria, which must focus their problem-solving resources on more 
imminent threats. According to Momoh, problems that must be addressed 
include: 
the need to strengthen national unity, the need to express our 
faith in the su~vival of this count~y as an indivisible, viable 
entity both politically and economically, and the need to 
~evamp the nation/s economy. Othe~s a~e the needs to inc~ease 
the national lite~acy level, update health ca~e delive~y, and 
eliminate the c~ime synd~ome in ou~ society. The national 
goals and p~io~ities inva~iably include the achievement of 
national unity, economic self-~eliance, a just and stable 
society, minimization of indiscipline and co~~uption, and the 
adoption of a leade~ship ~ole in Af~ica C1987: 56>. 
As Momoh obse~ves, the aims and objectives a~e so all consuming •they 
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even define ou~ fo~eign policy, that is, ou~ vested inte~est as a nationM 
(1987: 55). 
Du~ing the pe~iod of the unpopula~ civilian ~egime headed by 
P~esident Shehu Shaga~i (1979-1983>, Momoh, then edito~ of the~ 
Times. gained some national noto~iety fo~ ~efusing to ~eveal an 
info~mation sou~ce in ~esponse to a Senate summons--action that was 
upheld in cou~t, but ultimately led to his demotion to manpowe~ t~aining 
manage~ CEkwelie, 1986: 99>. Despite these independent leanings, Mamoh 
st~esses that the ~ights of the p~ess ca~~Y little weight on thei~ own. 
Rathe~ he desc~ibes the media as one of "many links in a chain, each link 
as st~ong as the othe~, each in dedicated se~vice to the chaln 11 (1987: 
55>. The ~ole of the p~ess is dete~mined by its position •in a division 
of labo~ situation," he w~ote. 
The Nige~ian Constitution of 1979 gua~antees f~eedom of exp~ession 
unde~ Section 36, while adjacent sections p~otect pe~sonal libe~ty, 
p~ivacy, and f~eedom of conscience CEkwelie: 98>. Howeve~, Chapte~ 2 of 
the document, 11 Fundamental Objectives and Di~ective P~inciples of State 
Policy" nullifies many of these ~ights, by spelling out the incumbent 
duties that accompany them. Specifically, Chapte~ 2 p~oclaims that 
the p~ess must uphold the aims and objectives of Nige~ia as a 
nation; that the p~ess must ensu~e that all o~gans of 
gove~nment (legislative executive, and judicia~y> uphold these 
aims and objectives and perfo~ the duties imposed in 
furtherance of nationbuilding; that the press must also hold 
the government accountable to the people in performance of 
these duties <Momoh, 1987: 55>. 
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In practice, these articulated responsibilities have served to legitimize 
government intervention in press activity, on the grounds of dereliction 
of duty. 
Overall, media content is directed at internal events to a far 
greater degree than is evident in instrumentally-motivated nations. 
International news receives little attention and even news of nearby 
countries is considered a waste of limited media resources. The te~ 
"Afghanistanism" is used pejoratively to refer to Ha misapplication of 
proximity as a news value. 8 As Ekwelie explains, 11 lt implies reporting 
on items that can go unreported without an appreciable loss to home 
readers" (1984: 25>. Though Ekwelie concedes that sports, entertainment 
features, and advertising appeal to readers, he justifies a classic 
survival press strategy when he advises, 
But it is a civic responsibility that a publication give the 
readers what they are capable of wanting. If we depend on what 
children want, we may feed them little more than varied 
confectionery around the age of three. In spite of all 
protestations to the contrary, human beings love sensational 
and light-mood news items. If a publisher wants his paper to 
sell as hot as akara balls in a school premises, he should go 
hot and heavy into juicy stories. The question must be: Can a 
developing nation afford the luxury of too much entertainment 
and titillation in its newspapers and periodicals? <1984: 17>. 
In 1989 Nigeria published 18 daily newspapers and 30 weeklies, as 
well as some 40 magazines and journals. The aggregate circulation of 
newspapers totals about 1 million, or approximately eight copies per 
thousand population, though in fact, shared readership multiplies the 
audience to as much as 160 per thousand. The phenomenon of print matter 
changing hands many times has prompted Ekwelie, a mass communications 
professor at the University of Nigeria, to suggest the replacement of 
cheap newsprint with costlier but more durable paper. He explains, 
But in much of Africa, and for obvious reasons, a newspaper 
copy would make the rounds until it is torn and beyond 
handling. Even by the time it gets into the hands of groundnut 
and fish sellers, it is still a source of useful information. 
Magazines are treated as consumer durables and are kept first 
on the occasional table but later stored away on the shelf or 
in the cupboards <1984: 16>. 
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The Lagos Daily Times accounts for about 400,000 of the total daily 
circulation of newspapers. Other dailies with circulations exceeding 
25,000 are the New Nigerian. Nigerian Chronicle. Evening Times. the 
evening edition of the Daily Times. the Nigerian Tribune. The 
Renaissance. the Daily Sketch. and the West African Pilot <Hunter, 1992: 
947; Nwankwo and Kurian, 1982: 688>. All but one of the dailies are 
written in English, the lingua Franca and official language of the 
polyglot country. Five of the 18 are published in Lagos; the others are 
divided among three state capitals. In general the print media is 
geographically dispersed and Momoh notes with pride, "Even before UNESCO 
started creating awareness of the need for rural coverage, the Nigerian 
press had started to penetrate the hinterland• <Momah, 1987: 56>. The 
promotion of a regionally- and locally-based media presence, though to a 
degree a natural outgrowth of Nigeria's geographical size and federal 
structure, also illustrates a survivalist tolerance for diversity which 
ideationally-motivated systems do not share. 
However, in a nation in which literacy hovers at about 25 percent 
and is much lower in rural areas, radio is the most pervasive medium. 
Statesman's Yearbook reports a total of 15.7 million radio receivers 
<Hunter, 1992: 947> for a population of 118.7 million in 1985, roughly 
one set for every nine persons. Loudspeakers are frequently mounted in 
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village centers to increase access to radio broadcasts. Television 
remains an elite medium with only a half million sets, a growth of only 
50,000 since 1977 <Nwnkwo and Kurian, 1982: 687; Hunter, 1992: 943). 
Ekwelie takes cognizance of television's potential, concluding, "If we 
believe pop-psychologists, we will regard the African as a visualist. If 
he is, he should see more pictorial communication than boring verbiage 11 
(1984: 17). 
The issue of state versus private ownership is largely a moot 
question in Nigeria. Between 1960, the year in which independence from 
Britain was won, and 1975, private ownership declined by 70 percent. 
Only three dailies remained in private hands by 1975, the year 60 percent 
of the stock of the largest circulation paper, the Daily Times. was 
obtained by the federal government <Nwankwo and Kurian, 1982: 690>. 
Further consolidation and nationalization of the print media have 
occurred since these figures were published; however, as Akinfeleye 
notes, 11 the dismal lack of information [about the medial is so evident in 
almost every aspect of human endeavor in Africa" <1984: 27>. All 
newspapers are required to be registered with the government and signed 
copies of each issue must be provided to authorities at the time of 
publication. 
Government ownership includes not only federal holdings, but state 
and regional ones as well. For instance, the New Nigerian. published in 
Kaduna and Lagos, was owned by six Northern State governments in 1975 
<Sobowale, 1984: 96>. Many government-owned papers actually function as 
tax-supported party organs. 
Likewise, public broadcasting is financed by federal and state 
governments and overseen by agencies at both levels. Radio, television, 
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and mobile film theatres are widely used in the educational system. 
Although radio and television are heavily subsidized by the government, 
revenues are also derived from advertising and license fees. The country 
is served by seven radio stations and nine television stations. 
Ekwelie, though mindful of Western wariness of government-owned 
media, regards a privately-owned press as "wasteful and a luxury a 
developing nation can ill-affordM (1984: 15>. Rather, he advocates a 
combination of government and private investment, a partnership following 
British colonial patterns in which that government seed monies Mkeep [the 
press] afloat during the inchoate stages and nurse it to a solvency 
stagen (1984: 20>. Citing a UNESCO publication that reported 14 African 
nations without a single daily newspaper, he argues that Mit will take 
more than just patriotism for a businessman to invest in so risky a 
busiess as newspapering (1984: 19>. In a memorable metaphor, Ekwelie 
acknowledges, 
[llt is a practice civil libertarians may deplore because it 
would necessarily stand between the press and its role as a 
watch-dog. But where the dog is physically absent, not much 
watching can be done (1984: 20>. 
A 1975 content analysis comparing newspaper coverage by privately-owned 
and government-owned newspapers of two potentially embarrassing national 
events showed no significant difference in the thoroughness of coverage. 
However, researcher Idowu Sobowale concluded, government papers were less 
likely to report information unfavorable to the image of the government 
(1984). 
It is telling that Nigerian commentaries on government censorship 
and post-publication reprisals--at least those available in the 
West--invariably focus on events occurring under previous regimes and 
218 
administrations. Likewise, charges of journalists' extracting bribes and 
otherwise behaving in •unprofessionally" are usually reported in the past 
tense. Yet, summaries of more current press activity, compiled by 
Western human rights organizations, such as the Committee to Protect 
Journalists, indicate that government press advisories are frequently 
violated and that rather pointed media attacks on government policies 
continue. The inference may be made that government crackdowns are 
sufficiently sporadic and arbitrary to not deter those journalists 
committed to monitoring official activity, though certainly government 
measures encourage self-censorship. In any event, Nigerian analyses of 
government-press interaction that appear in international publications 
shed little light on current government-press relationships. 
In his 1986 interpretation of his country's press under civilian 
rule <1979-1983>, Ekwelie cited examples of the Shagari administration's 
efforts to control the mass media, including firings, demotions, 
transfers, detention, and even ucaning0 of journalists. In addition, he 
documented the practice of required insertion of officially-sponsored 
articles, the purposeful distribution of newsprint and other raw 
materials to favored newspapers, and the frequent harsh application of 
sedition, libel, and official secrets laws. When the armed forces moved 
in and deposed the civilian government in 1984, suspending parts of the 
Constitution, Ekwelie notes that the transition brought na sigh of relief 
to the beleaguered newsmen and women, who in their editorials, gave the 
intervention a chorus of approvalu <1986: 105). 
As information minister on President Babangida's cabinet, Momoh 
concluded his analysis of the mid-1980s Nigerian press by noting that the 
achievements of the press were less the result of journalists themselves 
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than the •outcome of the open and humane natu~e of P~esident Ib~ahlm 
Babangida's administ~atlon, which has consistently ~ega~ded the p~ess as 
a t~ue partner in p~ogress 1 <1987: 57>. 
To locate examples of gove~nment inte~vention and mo~e detailed 
~epo~ts of press activity du~ing incumbent administrations, it is 
necessa~y for Westerners without access to the Nige~ian media themselves, 
to tu~n to other sources. Du~lng 1989 and 1990, the Committee fo~ the 
P~otection of Jou~nalists reported the closing of seven newspape~s (fo~ 
up to two months); the detention of 46 p~int jou~nalists, publishe~s, 
b~oadcaste~s, or technical engineers; and the firing of th~ee radio 
newscasters. In January 1989 a new law was passed giving the 
self-~egulatory Nigerian P~ess Council the powe~ to ~egister 
journalists--a move greeted with ala~m in newspape~ columns. In 1990, 
official ~et~ibution against the p~ess was di~ected p~ima~ily against 
ove~-zealous repo~ting of an Ap~il 22 coup-attempt, in pa~ticula~ the 
b~oadcast and printing of speeches by coup plotte~s <Committee to P~otect 
Journalists, 1990: 88-90; 1991, 88-90.> 
In compa~ison with its neighbors, Nige~ia's attitude towa~d fo~elgn 
jou~nalists is ~athe~ benign. Under the cur~ent milita~y administration, 
a journalist fo~ Agence F~ance-P~esse was threatened with expulsion fo~ 
objectionable ~epo~ting of domestic affairs and a Newsweek staff write~ 
was expelled as a •p~ohibited immigrant• in 1987 <Committee to P~otect 
Jou~nalists, 1988: 25>. The following yea~ a New Yo~k Times 
co~respondent was a~~ested and detained for seve~al hou~s fo~ 
investigating a sto~y on toxic waste dumping in West Af~ica; his film and 
notes we~e confiscated <Committee to P~otect Jou~nallsts, 1989: 68>. 
Since 1979, immigration autho~ities a~e no longe~ autho~ized to ban 
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foreign correspondents, though embassies and consulates frequently 
exercise slow caution in granting visas. While some monitoring of 
foreign reports going out of the country occurs, little attention is 
given to incoming materials. The major international news agencies 
operate in Nigeria and foreign broadcasts are not interfered with. 
International publications, such as Time. The Times of London. and the 
New York Times. are available, as well as foreign films and 
videos--though limited viewing facilities limit their exposure and impact 
<Nwankwo and Kurian, 1982>. In view of the country's shifting domestic 
situation, it appears that authorities are kept too busy diffusing the 
political and cultural conflicts of Nigeria's own diverse population to 
worry about the impact of less germane notions from abroad. 
Ideational Characteristics 
Current efforts by the Babangida government to ease political and 
social tensions in preparation for resumption of civilian rule at the end 
of 1992 are focused on aligning administrative jurisdictions with 
traditional tribal territories. In August 1991, nine new states were 
created, bringing the total to 30, plus a Federal Capital Territory. 
Other initiatives reduced the number of political parties that have 
served as political mouthpieces for ethnic and religious beliefs. The 
choice of parties, which totaled at least five in 1986, was legally 
limited to two in 1991 state elections. The National Republican 
Convention, favoring free-market economics, garners support in the 
Islamic northern states; whereas the left-leaning Social Democratic Party 
is more popular in the Christian southern states. Another indication of 
official attempts to reduce tribal feuding was the omission of questions 
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concerning ethnicity and religion in the recent census. 
The strongly politicized Nigerian press mirrors the divisiveness 
that threatens to tear the country apart. More than 200 different ethnic 
groups comprise the country's population, each speaking a different 
language or dialect. The Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo tribes are the largest 
and their languages are spoken by more than 50 percent of the population. 
Indigenous enmities contribute substantially to the ideational activity 
of the press. Added to this are decades of vociferous opposition to 
British colonial rule that inculcated a tradition of intemperate, highly 
inflammatory media rhetoric and a predilection for social change. That 
British influence would result in a views-centered press rather than an 
American-style news-centered press is not surprising. Though the 
activity of Nigeria's press today is somewhat reminiscent of the United 
States' early ideational press, for example, the elitist composition of 
the audience and high subscription rates,--this is more likely the 
consequence of a shared linkage to British imperial policies and residual 
revolutionary zeal rather than an indication that Nigeria is proceeding 
along some predetermined modernization path. 
As Ekwelie emphasizes, .. Interpretative journalism is something the 
present generations of Africans cannot have too much of• (1984: 21>. But 
even this observation is colored by the notion that the alien idea of 
national sovereignty must be diffused among the provincial masses in 
order to better the chances for Nigeria's survival. Journalistic 
interpretation is especially necessary, he writes, in handling wire 
stories from international news agencies. Not only must terms like 
uautamatic telephone exchange, 11 satellite communication,n and 8 electrical 
fuse .. be explained in terms the audience can understand, but foreign 
ph~ases that have no meaning fo~ Nige~ians must be edited. He 
illust~ates the latte~ point with a ~athe~ convincing example of a 
cultu~al non-sequitu~, 
A 1 Winte~ of discontent• conju~es up a pictu~e of double mise~y 
to an inhabitant of the tempe~ate ~egion. A "ha~mattan of 
discontentu may be the nea~est thing to this seasonal mise~y 
fo~ a Sahelian Af~ican CEkwelie, 1984: 22>. 
Ideational t~ibal identification st~engthens opposition to 
gove~nment effo~ts to build national cohesion. I~onically the same 
idea-based t~adition that helped bring about Nigeria's statehood today 
threatens its stability. 
Instrumental Cha~acte~istics 
Though economic stability and a highe~ standa~d of living are 
important goals of the Nigerian government, instrumental activity and 
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economic progress are frustrated by the need to first establish economic 
and social stability. At the p~esent time, inst~umental press activity 
is most evident in the publicly-condemned but widely-p~acticed 
jou~nalistic expedient of extracting bribes from those wishing to 
publicize o~ conceal info~mation. Public officials who cont~ol newsp~int 
allocations and other sou~ces of press funding engage in similar forms of 
profit taking <Mamoh, 1987>. 
Nigeria and the Motive Triangle 
On the motive triangle shown in Figure 7 below, the position of 
Nigeria's press system diffe~s from those of other nations examined here 




Figure 7. Nigerian Press Activity 
Since Independence 1960-1991 
Preoccupied by survival, the nation necessarily finds itself engaged in 
some ideational activity intrinsic to its struggle. The potentially 
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splintering effects of an instrumentally-motivated press are perceived as 
yet another threat, an optional risk that cannot be justified in 
Nigeria's current situation. 
224 
Endnotes 
1. Chinese academicans refer to Lee's formula of quelling discontent by 
freeing its economy, but not its political system, as 
0 neo-authoritarianism." Russell Heng believes that nee-authoritarianism 
could emerge as the primary challenge to democratic capitalism in Asia 
<Heng, 1990; Sesser, 1992: 60>. 
2. Ian Buruma is also the author of God's Dust: A Modern Asian Journey. 
<1989) in which many observations taken from his New York Times Magazine 
article <1988> first appeared. 
3. Particularly striking evidence of the Western proclivity to project 
long-term eventualities from short-term patterns can be found in American 
Francis Fukuyama's proclamation of the triumph of Western political ideas 
and capitalist economics based on international events since the 1970s, 
and most strikingly, since Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms starting in 1985. 
Fukuyama labels this perceived climax to the historical dialectic "the 
end of history" <Fukuyama, 1992>. 
4. Gerrymandering of electoral districts distorts the level of the 
political opposition to the P.A.P. In August 1991, opposition parties 
garnered almost 40 percent of the popular vote, but won only four seats 
in Parliament--nevertheless the largest number held by Lee's opponents 
since the early 1960s. Persecution of opposition leaders and elected 
members and occasional prosecution further discourages support for rival 
parties <New York Bar Association, 1990; Sesser, 1992.) 
5. Dr. Francis Kwame Nkrumah, a journalist, became Ghana's first prime 
minister in 1957, with the cessation of British rule. Jomo Kenyatta <ne 
Kamau wa Ngengi>, one of the first African editors in Kenya under the 
British, became his country's first president, while in exile, in 1960. 
All of these men rose to national prominence through their Journalistic 
activity. 
6. In the 1960s, the eastern Ibo state of Biafra sought to withdraw from 
the federation and establish its own sovereignty. The civil war that 
resulted extended from 1967-70 and ended in the defeat of the 
secessionist movement. 
7. On November 28, 1991, Nigeria undertook a new census. Seven hundred 
census takers across the country conducted the canvass, during which time 
shops, factories, and schools were closed, borders, sealed, and a curfew 
imposed to keep people at home. The last official census was conducted 
in 1973 and its results nullified because of charges that figures had 
been inflated artificially (''Nigeria: Census Taken," 1991). 
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8. As Dennis Wilcox obse~ves, NThe Kenyan p~ess is an anomaly among the 
p~ess systems of the Black Af~ican states in that p~ivate and camme~cial 
lnte~ests still cont~ol and ope~ate the mass and popula~ p~ess• <1982: 
569) 
9. In Janua~y 1992, a new cabinet was swo~n in by P~esident Babangida 
and Momoh was ~eplaced as ministe~ of info~mation and cultu~e by Sam 
Oyovbai~e. 
CHAPTER VII 
CASE SUMMARIES OF IDEA-ORIENTED PRESS SYSTEMS 
--IRAN 1977-1982 AND THE SOVIET UNION 
1900-1991 
Introduction 
In the concluding chapter of Four Theories of the Press. Wilbur 
Schramm wrote that, to the Soviets, uthere are not 'two sides to every 
question.' There are only a focused and an unfocused lens on reality 
..•• [Tlhe basic concepts and goals are regarded as absolute and 
unchangeable •••• a <1956: 120-121>. Schramm's assertion that the Soviet 
press was subordinate to an all-encompassing idea system and that its 
guardians were seen as holding a monopoly on the ability to discern 
absolute truth is basically accurate for most of the country's history. 
The dynamic theory breaks with Schramm over his assumption that this 
pattern was or is unique to the communist bloc or to Marxism-
Leninism-Stalinism. 
As shown, Idea-motivated action is exhibited by all nations and 
informs press behavior in all systems to same degree. However, 
ideational vocabularies of motives prevail in societies in which the 
value order is given priority over economic and material goals and in 
situations in which survival concerns are not paramount or can be 
subsumed by the idea--as, for example, in Israel, where Zionism and 
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national security are inexorably linked, or in South Africa, where 
apartheid and the preservation of the minority white government are 
perceived to be concomitant. 
227 
Because all information, morals, ethics, beliefs, philosophies, and 
rules of behavior fall within the purview of the overarching idea, any 
activity that is not prescribed is regarded as heretical or at least 
suspect. For this reason, ideationally-dominated systems exhibit less 
tolerance for pluralistic thinking than survival- or 
instrumentally-oriented systems, and they display the most antipathy 
toward press independence. Day-to-day media activities typically reveal 
little fluctuation from the ideal type on the motive triangle. One 
indication of this is that though examples of ideational media behavior 
are present in survival and instrumental systems, press features commonly 
found in the other types of media may be totally absent in ideational 
systems. For example, until Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost' 
Soviet newspapers carried no society news, no pictures of brides, no 
astrological advice, no cartoon caricatures of Soviet public officials, 
no top-40 radio, no sexually-titillating photos, no daily stock-market 
reports, and almost no display advertising. In contrast, economic news, 
nature and travel features, crossword puzzles, sports scores, winning 
lotto numbers, letters-to-the-editor, television documentaries, morning 
exercise shows, and virtually all other items in the Soviets' media 
repertoire, including occasional features on happy, productive workers, 
can be found somewhere in the vast assortment of U.S. media fare. 
Ideationally-motivated systems are illustrated first in a case 
summary of the Iranian press from the beginning of the Islamic Revolution 
in 1977 to the triumph of the grassroots opposition two years later and 
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the ~outinization of the theoc~atic gove~nment in the ea~ly 1980s. 
!~an's p~ess activity appea~s to mo~e closely app~oximate the ideal type 
than the Soviet Union's, the subject of the second study, because its 
sho~te~ histo~y has p~ovided less time and oppo~tunity fo~ dlve~gence, 
and because the belief-system itself is mo~e pe~vasive and int~usive than 
Ma~xist-Leninism. !~an's expe~ience is also info~mative because it 
indicates the effectiveness of t~adltional and •small" media and 
ho~izontal modes of communication in the mode~n o~, pe~haps, post-mode~n 
e~a. 
The scope of the Soviet p~ess analysis, 1917-1991, pa~allels that of 
the U.S. p~ess study, fo~ an attempt is made to summa~ize p~ess activity 
ove~ the cou~se of its 84-yea~ histo~y. It was the dete~mination to 
develop a theo~etical st~uctu~e that could accommodate the Soviet p~ess 
system along with the ~est of the wo~ld's systems that ultimately led to 
the const~uction of the dynamic theo~y. Since this lengthy p~oject began 
with the Soviet p~ess, it seems only fitting that it should end with the 
Soviet p~ess, albeit du~ing the cou~se of this wo~k both that supe~powe~ 
and its media system have ceased to exist--at least in thel~ p~evious 
fo~m. 
One featu~e of ideationally-dominated nations that played an 
undeniable ~ole in the selection of subjects fo~ this chapte~ is the 
difficulty a fo~eign-based ~esea~che~ encounte~s in attempting to gathe~ 
phenomenological accounts o~iginating in the media of idea-o~iented 
nations. Xenophobia and ideaphobia, inhe~ent in such systems, ~aise 
ba~~ie~s ~a~ely encounte~ed even in the most ~ep~essive su~vivalist 
count~ies. The temptation to ~ely on the mo~e accessible commenta~ies of 
vocal opponents, e.g., Soviet-Jewish dissidents, anti-apa~theid activists 
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abroad, and Iranian monarchists in exile--is to be resisted in data 
gathering, though these views may add depth to the interpretive component 
of the research process. 
The focus on two countries whose sovereignty was established by 
social/political revolution is not meant to imply that only nations born 
of revolution are motivated primarily by ideas. The controlled press 
activity of South Africa, particularly between 1986 and 1991, is 
rationalized as essential to the maintenance of a reactionary idea firmly 
rooted in the nation/s historical memory. Again, it must be noted that 
it is not only the primacy of an overarching idea or action that begets 
the motive vocabulary, but challenge to the idea and the activity it 
inspires. 
Iran and Revolution 
National Situation and Motive 
The overthrow of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in January 1979, closely 
followed by the return of the exiled Shi/a leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini, and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran came as 
an unexpected surprise to outside observers, despite the fact that these 
events had been preceded for two years by a highly-visible urban 
revolution. As the noted scholar of revolutions, Theda Skocpol, 
acknowledged in 1982, the Iranian experience "challenged expectations 
about revolutionary causation that I developed through 
comparative-historical research on the French, Russian, and Chinese 
Revolutions" <1982: 266>. The overthrow shook Skocpol and others/ 
assumption that successful revolutions evolve from a confluence of social 
forces which includes economic discontent at home, military pressures 
from abroad, and political splits between the ruling apparatus and the 
economic elite. 
The triumph of a mass rebellion fueled and organized by 
old-fashioned uturban-headedu clerics <ularoa >over an efficient modern 
police state with powerful foreign friends forced Skocpol to rethink her 
conviction that revolutions are not umade," but simply come 
uunintentionally on all concerned." For, she explained, it was the 
strength and cohesion of the Shi'ite belief system that ultimately 
brought down the Pahlavi dynasty. 0 [Tlhis remarkable revolution also 
forces me to deepen my understanding of the possible role of idea systems 
and cultural understandings in the shaping of political action,n Skocpol 
said <1982: 268>. 
Iran's <or Persia's> 2700-year history chronicles the competition 
for land and power that continues to define political relations in the 
Middle East. Located at the center of a number of ancient empires, the 
region has witnessed a succession of invading and occupying Macedonians, 
Turks, Arabs, and Romans who vied for control with ambitious Persian 
emperors. In the 19th century Britain and Russia competed for political 
influence, culminating in both countries occupying Iran during World War 
II. In the 20th century, superpower and other core attention was drawn 
to Iran because of its plentiful oil resources; however, its underlying 
attraction was strategic--proximity to its next-door neighbor to the 
north, the Soviet Union. Although its last foreign occupation had ended 
almost 35 years before, the hands-on intervention of foreign powers 
continued to have an impact upon domestic agenda up to the 1979 
revolution when the U.S.-backed Shah was forced out. 
The Pahlavi dynasty came into being in the 1920s with a successful 
coup d'etat led by Colonel Reza Kahn against the 130-yea~-old Quja~ 
dynasty. The colonel c~owned himself Shah Reza Pahlavi in 1925 and ~uled 
ave~ an anach~onistic constitutional-feudal state that combined 
cent~alized gove~nment with a landed a~istoc~acy. It was the Reza Shah 
who changed the count~y's name f~om Pe~sia to I~an in 1935. 
Du~ing the late 19th and ea~ly 20th centu~ies, fo~elgn influence 
combined with domestic agitation had sped the count~y's adoption of 
seve~al mode~n political and social institutions, including the 
Constitution of 1906, the fo~ation of political parties, the 
establishment of a National Assembly in 1925, and the eme~gence of an 
active and public-minded p~ess--all of which at~ophied somewhat du~ing 
the cou~se of Reza Shah's dictato~ship. In 1941 B~itish occupie~s fo~ced 
Reza Shah, a Ge~man-sympathize~, to abdicate, and by the end of the wa~ 
the Allied powe~s had established his son, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavl, on 
the peacock th~one. Afte~ almost a decade of pe~sistent domestic 
opposition to the ~esu~~ected mona~chy, the second and last Pahlavi 
Shah's powe~ ave~ ~ivai factions was consolidated in 1953 with the 
assistance of the U.S. Cent~al Intelligence Agency. 
An acute awa~eness of histo~y, kept alive by ~ich w~itten and o~al 
t~aditions, has st~engthened the ethnic and national p~lde of the I~anian 
people and pe~lodlcally renews thei~ fea~ and dist~ust of fo~eigne~s. 
Though acknowledging the influence of thei~ Arab and Tu~kic neighbors and 
the many common bonds they share, I~anians neve~theless do not conside~ 
thei~ nation to be an A~ab state. Sixty-six pe~cent of I~anian citizens, 
acco~ding to a 1970 census, a~e of lndo-Eu~opean descent, ~ecognized as 
the true Pe~sian "~ace"; 25 pe~cent a~e Tu~ks; 5 pe~cent Ku~ds; and only 
4 percent semitic Arabs. The Persian identity thus insulated Iran 
against the pan-Arab enthusiasm that gripped much of the Middle East in 
the period from the 1950s to the 1970s. 
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The last Shah's absolutist reign was characterized by ostentatious 
pro-Western habits and pro-modernization strategies that catered to state 
bureaucrats, foreign investors, and wealthy landowners. The pursuit of 
international petrodollars oriented the country to an export economy that 
employed few domestic workers but lavished large sums on the military, 
modern construction, and on development programs that benefited the 
lifestyles of the economic elite while squeezing the middle and lower 
classes. In the "White Revolution" of the 1960s, selective land reforms 
were implemented that rewarded wealthier peasants, but dispossessed many 
rural workers. Opposition to the Shah's economic policies arose among 
the growing urban population, many of whom retained rural ties. The Shah 
responded by strengthening the arm of the secret police <SAVAK>. Other 
measures to stifle dissent and tighten social control included 
tightening control over the mass media, disempowering the Shi'lte clergy, 
and, when these devices failed, declaring martial law. 
Measures against the clergy alienated a social institution that had 
provided structure and continuity across classes and generations for 
centuries. It was Shi'lte organization that linked the merchants' bazaar 
with urban intellectuals and rural peasants. Land reform in the 1960s 
adversely affected many Shi'ite clerics and institutions, while welfare, 
educational, and legal reforms removed the clergy's traditional 
patrimonial functions and placed these responsibilities under the control 
of state agencies. Islamic religious education was restricted to a few 
traditional centers and influential leaders were sent into provincial and 
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foreign exile. From these sequestered points, their activist messages 
were relayed to less controversial and less suspect clerics in the major 
cities, who conveyed the words on to the masses at public and private 
gatherings. 
Survival Characteristics of the Pahlavi Press 
Blind to the efficacy of traditional communication networks and 
low-tech media used by the Ylsms to mobilize the masses, the Shah and his 
ministers concentrated their attentions on the modern mass media to turn 
aside growing opposition to his policies and calls for ouster. 
Overestimation of the power of mass media and underestimation of the 
impact of traditional modes of communication were indications of the 
extent to which the Shah had cut himself off from daily life in Iran. At 
the time of the Revolution, only 37 percent of the population of 38 
million were literate. The daily newspaper circulation was approximately 
12 per 1000 population, and annual newsprint consumption was less than 
two pounds per capita, less than half that of neighboring Egypt with a 
similar population and 30 percent literacy. Radio receivers numbered 263 
sets per 1000 population and television 55 per 1000 <Kurian, Vol. I: 307; 
Vol. II: 1070>. 
Nevertheless, press activity under the Shah in the late 1970s 
appears to have been fairly vigorous with 20 daily and 21 weekly 
newspapers and more than 70 magazines published in the capital of Tehran 
alone. Eighty-five provincial newspapers were registered. In addition 
to newspapers in the native language, Farsi, a handful of English-, 
Armenian- and French-language papers were also published. With the 
exception of a few political organs and official publications, all 
newspapers were owned by private individuals. Eleven of the most 
influential newspapers were owned by three major groups controlled by 
wealthy Iranian families <Kurian, Vol. II: 1071>. 
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Despite these signs of press profitability, press laws enacted in 
the 1950s and 60s underscored the Shah/s survivalist orientation. One 
law specified the educational and character requirements for journalists; 
another outlawed publication of newspapers with circulations less than 
3,000 and magazines falling below 5,000. The 1965 •Reporters/ Code of 
Journalism" imposed mandatory licensing of all print media with the 
Ministry of Information and banned all communist publications in the 
country. The threats to Iran/s security and the Shah/s legitimacy which 
motivated the Shah to tighten official control over journalistic 
enterprise were perceived Soviet expansionism, intensified by the 
activities of the Communist Party of Iran <Tudeh.> and the appeal of 
Socialist pan-Arablsm, then sweeping Muslim countries. To the 
Western-looking Shah, this movement appeared to be an invitation back to 
the primitive living conditions of the Crusades. 
Interestingly, as the threat of overthrow became imminent in spring 
1978, the tottering regime authorized a liberalization of the press. 
Prime Minister Jaafar Sharlfemami brushed aside the new restrictions 
imposed under martial law in an effort to stop the flood of rumors that 
circulated in the politically-charged environment. 11 [Rumorsl are our 
worst enemy,u a high SAVAK official confided to a Washington fQ§1 
correspondent and •anything,• even an unfettered press, was preferable. 
An editorial in the Tehran Journal noted: "The country/s press enjoys a 
minimal reputation for objectivity and people came not to trust what the 
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press says and rumor mills flourish" <Kandal, 1978>. Prime Minister 
Sharifemami ordered stunned editors to liberalize and expand their 
coverage of all public occurrences, warning them, 8 If you do not report 
such events the BBC <British Broadcasting Corporation >will!" 
<Kanda 1 , 1978 . > 
Thus the •public/s right to know," commonly associated with 
instrumental rationales, was adopted into the survivalist vocabulary of 
motives to justify a desperate action strategy. As the Washington 
Post/s Kandal reported, the papers quickly made up for lost time, 
targeting the rich and powerful and threatening to focus their sights on 
the imperial family itself. Government owned and operated broadcast 
media also participated in the liberalization, adding coverage of 
demonstrations and other protest activity to official releases about the 
Shah. Nevertheless, editors agreed to continue their ban on certain 
taboo subjects, among them uthe banned Tudeh or Iranian Communist Party, 
demonstrators/ slogans such as /Down with - and death to the Shah/ or 
criticism of the Shah himself or the military" <Kandal, 1978>. 
The last-ditch adoption of a Western concept to save his government 
may be interpreted as a further example of the Shah's cosmopolitan 
proclivities, but perhaps better serves as an illustration of his failure 
to comprehend the actual workings of Western political life. 
Kazem Zarnegar, editor of the Kayhan International. took advantage 
of the thaw to discuss previous press policies that prevailed under the 
Shah. 
The minister of information used to call regularly t-o say what 
could and couldn't appear and on what page and with what size 
headline. The prime minister and other ministers used to call 
up at 5 o'clock in the morning and [askl, "Why did you write 
this?" <Kandal). 1 
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During the Shah;s reign, imported Western newspapers, magazines, and 
motion pictures were widely available in major cities. The middle and 
upper classes turned to foreign media for information and even for news 
of their own country. Mowlana reports that nAmerican and European 
;girlie; magazines overflowed Tehran;s newsstands" and that National 
Iranian Radio and Television hired Los Angeles and London disc jockeys 
for their English-language broadcasts <1979: 108>. The liberal policy 
toward imported media fare is consistent with survivalist behavior that 
tends to focus more attention on outgoing reports than on incoming fare. 
It was the failure of the cosmopolitan Shah to focus early enough on the 
domestic threat in the streets of his own city that would be his undoing. 
Ideational Characteristics of the Revolutionary 
.and the Post-Revolutionary Press 
While a plethora of poor judgment calls, policy shortcomings, and 
social insensitivities can be cited to explain the fall of the Pahlavi 
monarchy, the ultimate capitulation of the Pahlavi regime was due to a 
failure to establish legitimacy. In contrast, the Shi;ite clerics who 
led the revolution and would lead the Islamic Republic of Iran never lost 
theirs. 
Shi;a Islam is the more conservative and fundamental of the two 
major branches of Islam, but at the present time Iran and Iraq are the 
only Muslim states in which the majority of believers are Shi;ites rather 
than Sunni. According to the most recent Statesroan;s Yearbook. 96 
percent of Iranians are Shi;ites, 3 percent are Sunnis, and 1 percent are 
non-Moslem2 <Hunter, 1991: 710>. The duty of religious leaders to 
resist unjust secular authority is grounded in the founding myth of the 
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religion, in which the martyr Husayn willingly sacrificed himself in the 
cause of resisting a usurper caliph, Yazid. Skocpol interprets the 
Husayn myth as providing legitimation for efforts against the Shah, 
identified as the evil tyrannical uyazid of the present age.u 
Shi/ite ulama share authority with secular political leaders, and 
Islam recognizes no distinction between religion and state. Mowlana 
writes, "Islam is not a religion per se; it is a total life view with an 
ideology and political economy• <1979: 111>. In an interview with 
Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, Khameini said, •[TJhe word Islam does 
not need adjectives such as democratic. Precisely because Islam is 
everything, it means everything. It is sad for us to add another word 
near the word Islam, which is perfectu <Fallaci, 1979). Many emperors in 
Iran/s history have enlisted the support of the clergy and incorporated 
them as political allies. It was the Shah/s deliberate disembedding of 
the Shi/ite clergy from the state apparatus and the landholding 
aristocracy that drove the ularoa to seek reaffirmation of their influence 
over the masses <Arjomand, 1981; Skocpol, 1982>. 
The intertwining of spiritual and secular spheres is particularly 
apparent in the teeming life of the urban bazaar, which as of 1977 
continued to dominate the growing import trade by which most urban 
Iranians fed and clothed themselves. It also accounted for the 
employment of an estimated 72 percent of all domestic workers in the mid 
1970s <Halliday, 1979: Chapter 7>. "The power of the bazaar is due not 
only to the economic importance of the merchant class, but also to its 
political and social influence,• Mowlana notes <1979: 109>. And it was 
in these narrow-streeted enclaves that the traditional communication 
infrastructure of the Shi/a clergy directed and channeled opposition to 
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the Shah. The collective rituals brought Iranian men together for daily 
and weekly public prayer meetings at the country's 100,000 mosques, as 
well as at shrines, theological colleges, missions and discussion groups 
(doreh.> among other places <Mowlana, 1979: 110>. These familiar and 
well-understood centers for the outpouring of expression provided 
opportunities for unobtrusive participation by the devout and non-devout 
alike. The gatherings, led by clerics, also provided a conduit for the 
ideas passed on to the exiled Khomeini. Other traditional public 
locations for fusing and fomenting revolutionary ardor, Mahmud Bigdely 
maintains, were the tea shops, public baths, and sports arenas. <Bigdely, 
1989). 
In his analysis of the Iranian Revolution,• American academic Hamid 
Mowlana writes, 
11 Sma I 1 media 11 --cassette tapes, xerox, tape recorders, and 
telephone--could be used to communicate and still escape the 
control of the regime. From Paris, Ayatollah Khomeini sent his 
messages through telephone and tapes to Iran, where they were 
copied by the thousands and made their way through the informal 
and traditional communication network to the nation. This 
method of communication provided both the credibility and 
excitement of oral messages and the permanence and accessibility 
of written messages (1979: 111>. 
Mahmud Bigdely, who was a schoolteacher in Iran at the time of the 
revolution, recalls that small media, including megaphones, loudspeakers, 
and wall writing, drew far larger audiences than the mass media, but went 
largely unnoticed by authorities. He writes, 
[tlhe long tradition of secret societies in Iran has made it 
possible for communication networks through small media to be 
less visible. Through the centuries people have learned how to 
maintain the exchange of news and rumors despite considerable 
control and censorship •••• Revolutionary leaders relied 
heavily on small media due to the ability of people to maintain 
their secrecy and security <1989>. 
The primacy of interpersonal communication versus mass communication 
in Muslim society is traced by Islam media analyst Imtiaz Hasnain to the 
habits of Muhammed himself. He writes, 
Oratory Cal khitabah) and letter writing Cal risalah> have been 
the source of communication ever since the advent of Islam. 
They are the forms of persuasive communication used by the 
Prophet Muhammed Cpbuh> and other Muslim savants for the 
propagation and dissemination of the faith of Islam through 
speeches delivered to various congregations and through letters 
written to different kings and Arab chiefs. It was through 
oratory that the Prophet preached his new religion to the Arabs 
<Hasnain, 1988: 187>. 
The return of 11 Imam 11 Khomeini from France established continuity 
between revolutionary strategies and the new political order. For some 
believers the Ayatollah's arrival on the scene fulfilled the messianic 
yearning for the return of the uTwelfth Imam,• destined, according to 
Shi'ite myth, to reappear at the coming of a perfect Islamic 
community. 3 
Two months after the Ayatollah's arrival and the appointing of a 
provisional government, the Islamic Republic of Iran was proclaimed, 
replacing the former Empire of Iran. The constitution, which sought to 
reconcile democratically-elected and clerical authority, was ratified in 
December 1989. Under its provisions, supreme authority was given to the 
Spiritual Leader <wali faqih>. but other clerical bodies shared power 
with an elected president and parliament. Khomeini occupied the position 
of Spiritual Leader until his death in June 1989. 4 
Defending the proposed constitution to newswoman Fallaci, the 
Ayatollah said, 
This law, which the people will ratify, is in no way in 
contradiction with democracy. Since the people love the 
clergy, have faith in the clergy, want to be guided by the 
clergy, it is right that the supreme religious authority should 
oversee the work of the prime minister or the president of the 
republic, to make sure that they don't make mistakes or go 
against the Koran <Fallaci, 1979). 
For Khomeini and other spiritual guardians of the faith, their 
interpretations of the Koran and Islamic divine law <Shar'lah> is 
infallable and not subject to question. As Teheranian notes, 
The Sbar'iah has no life of its own independently of its 
custodians--the Islamic Ulama. There is no priesthood in 
Islam, but for all practical purposes, the community of 
preachers, jurists, judges, and leading Olema--all constitute a 
communication elite of learned people who act as ministers of 
Islam <1988: 196>. 
In 1979 a new legal system, based on the Shar'iah was implemented 
under the new constitution. In this system, court officials are 
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appointed by the Spiritual Leaders. The harshness of the legal codes is 
consistent with the absolutism that typifies ideationally-oriented 
nations. In 1990 economic crimes were added to the 109 offences that 
carry the death penality.u The belief-system and its rituals extend into 
virtually every sphere of human activity in this life and in the 
projected behavior in the hereafter. They also are applied at the most 
personal levels of behavior, resulting in an all-encompassing ideational 
net that surpasses Marxist-Leninist dictates in its detail and scope. 
Not surprisingly, the elaborate motive vocabulary justifies almost 
total clerical authority of the mass media, though the print media remain 
privately owned. Abdullah Schleifer, a Beirut-based former NBC 
correspondent now teaching mass communication in Cairo, maintains that a 
major tenet of Muslim media is the importance of distinguishing good from 
evil. Schleifer claims that the •public's right to know .. and the notion 
that •nothing is sacred" are as inherently anti-Islamic as the 
interest-based core Cusury> of modern banking <Schleifer, 1986: 122>. In 
a similar vein, Siddiqi paraphrases Pakistani Muqhees-ud-din's 
instruction to Muslim journalists to 
not be satisfied merely by putting into print all that is fit 
to print in the common man's interest. Rather, he should 
always fight the evil and promote the right. The criteria for 
the evil and the right should of course be based on the 
principles of Quoran [the Koranl <Siddiqi, 1991: 21; 
Muqhees-ud-din, 1980: 89.> 
These statements attesting to the existence and discernability of 
absolute truths and absolute values are elements in the Islamic 
vocabulary of motives that justify the practice of controlling media 
content. They are responses to the ongoing instrumental challenge, 
implicit in BBC broadcasts and other Western media fare, recalled from 
pre-revolutionary days in Tehran. The absolutist motive weakens the 
force of Article 24 of the 1979 constitution, which states that print 
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media are free to "print all matters except those that are detrimental to 
the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public," 
<Shoar-Ghaffari, 5>. 
During the first few months of the Islamic republic, the provisional 
government, made up mostly of Western-educated liberals, sought to frame 
press guarantees similar to those found in the United States. However, 
growing public opposition to arbitary newspaper policies began to surface 
in the summer of 1979, Shoar-Ghaffari reports. The most concerted 
influence on new press law was exerted by Islamic committees made up of 
media employees pledged to "purge their staff(sl in order to prevent 
publication of stories harmful to the revolution" <Shoar-Ghaffari, 1991: 
4>. A strike against the prominent newspaper, Kayhan. by an Islamic 
committee was reported to the Ayatollah Khomeini, who responded by 
praising the committee and demanding that the press write "what people 
want" not what journalists see fit, Shoar-Ghaffari reports. 
So, during the pre-constitution period despite the disposition 
of the provisional government and some support from moderate 
religious leaders ••• , the government proved ineffective and 
unable to protect the press from mob attacks attacks and 
Islamic pressure groups C1991: 4>. 
The first press law, passed late in 1979, met with opposition from 
media organizations. An open letter of complaint, signed by 258 
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journalists, complained that the new draft legislation was based on the 
constitution of the old monarchy and was more reactionary than press 
policies passed during the previous 60 years. The day the law was passed 
armed members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards occupied the offices of 
the newspaper Ayandeghan. and government officials promised to prosecute 
its staff for counter-revolutionary policies and acts CShoar-Ghaffari, 
1991: 4>. During August and September 1979, 41 newspapers and magazines 
were closed, 33 of them permanently and 18 foreign correspondents were 
expelled. A month later 28 new newspapers were licensed. Especially 
targeted were left-wing publications of Iran's communist and Marxist 
parties that had allied with the revolutionary movement. The government 
Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance was created in 1980 to censor 
and manage the media (Kurian, Vol. II, 1982: 1071>. 
Kurian reports that hundreds of journalists were jailed in 1980 and 
that the now prohibited National Union of Iranian Jour.nalists had 
estimated that more than 75 percent of 4,000 Iranian journalists were 
either in exile, jail, or unemployed by the end of the second year of the 
Islamic Republic. In November of that year, a ban on journalists working 
for U.S. and British news organizations was lifted, but all American 
journalists had left Iran in July when their credentials were not renewed 
CKurian, Vol. II, 1982: 1071). 
The press law that eventually was drafted under provisions of the 
new constitution was not concluded until January 1985. Consisting of six 
chapte~s and 38 a~ticles, among othe~ things the lengthy document 
contains an outline of the ~ole and mission of the p~ess. These a~e to 
enlighten public opinion and inc~ease knowledge; to p~omote the 
constitution and its goals; to deemphasize ~acial, ethnic, and ~egional 
diffe~ences among people; and •to fight against the manifestations of 
colonial cultu~e (i.e., p~odigality, waste, vanity, luxu~y, sp~ead of 
p~ostitution> and to diffuse and p~opagate the genuine Islamic cultu~e 
and to st~engthen the policy of 'Neithe~ East, no~ West'" CShoa~-Ghaffa~i 
1991: 5>. 
In 1987 the majo~ dailies we~e all p~inted in Teh~an and included 
Humho~i-yi Islami, Resalat. Kayhan. Ab~a~. and Etalaat. The Teh~an 
Times and Kayhan Inte~national a~e published in English. Ci~culation 
figu~es a~e unavailable, but Shoa~-Ghaffa~i estimates that Etalaat. the 
leading daily has a ci~culation ~ange between 350,000 to 500,000 copies 
daily, with much highe~ exposu~e assumed because of multiple ~eade~ship 
<1991: 7). 
In these dallies, some latitude is p~ovlded fo~ debate on secula~ 
issues, U.S. gove~nment p~ess ~esea~che~ Helen Metz ~epo~ts. "While all 
these newspape~s a~e conside~ed to be app~op~iately Islamic, they do not 
endo~se eve~y p~og~am of the cent~al gove~nment (1989: 220>. She notes 
that one pape~ p~esents the official gove~nment line of the p~ime 
ministe~, whe~eas anothe~ is consistently c~itical of gove~nment 
policies, especially economic policies. She adds that othe~ newspape~s 
a~e c~itical of gove~nment, but do not espouse a consistent position 
<Metz: 220>. 
Today eve~y newspape~ and pe~lodical must be licensed and these 
documents a~e denied to any suspect publication. Shoa~-Ghaffa~i ~epo~ts 
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additional controls that include strong press laws, control of newsprint 
supply, foreign exchange, governmental advertising, and other essential 
goods and services. He also notes new gatekeeping devices and 
11 centralized news management mechanisms such as the Islamic Republic News 
Agency and a newly formed Central News Unit <Shoar-Ghaffari, 1991: 6>. 
At present, all broadcasting activity is government-controlled and, 
presumably, government-owned. Television and radio stations are located 
in Tehran and the major provincial cities and some broadcasts are 
conducted in Azerl and Kurdish languages. Several banned political 
groups broadcast into the country from stations in Iraq or the Caucasus 
states of Azerbaijan and Armenia. BBC and the Voice of America broadcast 
in Farsi on FM radio channels, Metz reported (1989: 221>. 
The least intrusive government policies appear to govern book 
publishing. No prior censorship of nonfiction exists, though books 
contrary to Islam may be confiscated. Fiction is subject to prior 
censorship. Undoubtedly, the death sentence imposed by the Spiritual 
Leader on Solomon Rushdie upon publication of his Satanic Verses in 
Britain in 1989 has provided a strong incentive for self-censorship among 
would-be novelists, and Metz notes that private publishing houses 
restrict their lists to subjects that "will not arouse official ire.u 
Nevertheless, she writes that numerous new books in history, science, and 
geography, as well as editions of classical poetry and literature have 
been published since 1987. Many traditional manuscripts banned under the 
Shah have appeared in recent years (1989: 220-221). 
As might be expected, the flood of Western magazines, music, films, 
and newspapers have all but dried up. A recent report describes 
occasional confiscation of Newsweek magazine, such as a 1990 issue with a 
cover story on "The Future of Gay America.• The report indicates that 
normally a total of only 500 copies of the magazine are distributed to 
newsstands (Committee to Protect Journalists, 1991: 66). In 1990 a UN 
special representative was permitted to enter Iran to monitor human 
rights--the first such investigator allowed in the country since the 
revolution. At the present time, it appears that virtually no Western 
news organizations have offices in the country. This treatment of 
foreign media and foreign journalists is consistent with the ideational 
distrust of non-believer influences. 
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A final example of the application of the action rationalized by 
ideational motives is the intensified scrutiny of incoming and outgoing 
mail to and from foreign destinations. Though no Iranian source has been 
located to confirm this observation, Bigdely and two other Iranian-born 
graduate students reported to the author in a 1989 graduate class at 
Oklahoma State University that audio tapes and photocopied tracts are 
banned from the mails and that even the playing of music is prohibited on 
Iranian television and radio. These students said that religious 
authorities claimed that such materials are contrary to Islam, though 
students expressed considerable skepticism over this rationale. In any 
event, the attention to the power of the audio cassette and other 
interpersonal means of communication in Iran indicates that the Spiritual 
Leader has learned from the Shah/s mistake. 
Survival Press Characteristics of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran 
In a 1981 assessment of the Islamic republic/s press, Kurian 
cautioned that the Iran-Iraq War which broke out in 1980 "offered the 
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ha~dline~s a f~esh oppo~tunity to dest~oy the ~emaining vestiges of a 
f~ee p~ess" (1982, Vol. II: 1071>. In fact, su~vival motives do not 
appea~ to have been used to justify the conduct of the mllita~y o~ the 
sac~iflces of the people. Rathe~, the conflict was viewed as a gihad 
Choly wa~>, and ideational ~athe~ than nationalist su~vival ~ationales 
we~e used to inspi~e and sustain public suppo~t. It appea~s unlikely 
that the I~an-I~aq wa~ had significant impact on p~ess pe~fo~mance o~ 
policy. 
Ideational motives that had p~oved valuable in the st~uggle against 
the Shah we~e employed to justify gove~nment action th~oughout the 
ten-yea~ wa~ against the Shi'a I~aqis. Islam teaches that those who go 
to thei~ deaths in gihad a~e immediately t~anspo~ted to heaven. 
Additional motivation was d~awn f~om Shi'a's Husayn myth to glo~ify 
ma~ty~dom in the se~vice of a just political cause. Ideational motives, 
Skocpol suggests in he~ commenta~y on the st~uggle against the Shah's 
fo~ces, may p~ove to be mo~e efficacious than su~vival motives in 
st~engthenlng commitment ln battle. 
Thus, the huge mass demonstrations we~e often led by men 
wearing white shrouds to symbolize their ~eadiness to risk 
death at the hands of the army. It did matte~ that the Iranian 
crowds were willing to face the army again and again--accepting 
casualties much mo~e persistently than Eu~opean crowds have 
historically done--until sections of the milita~y ~ank-and-file 
began to hestitate o~ balk at shooting into the c~owds <1982: 
275). 
Su~vival ~ationales do take p~ecedence eve~ ideational motives in 
!~an's ongoing effo~ts to cement ~elations with its Sunni neighbo~s--a 
compromise undoubtedly ~ationalized by passages found in Islam's vast 
rese~voir of holy writ. Iran considers itself to be a leade~ of the 
Islamic and developing wo~lds, °Capable of standing up to Euro-Ame~ican 
economic, political, and cultural power,• as Shoar-Ghaffari observes 
<1991: 5-6>. CThe assumption that Pakistan-born Solomon Rushdie, a 
British citizen, was considered to fall under Iranian jurisdiction 
supports this assessment.> According to Shoar-Ghaffari, 
Islamic Republic leaders make special efforts to express their 
appreciation of the cultural ties between Iran and the Arab 
world. In this regard they deemphasize Sunni-Shi'a differences 
among the Muslims <1991: 5-6>. 
The coming together of Sunni and Shi'ite nations for strategic purposes 
is confirmed in Judith Miller's recent article in the New York Times 
Magazine. "The Islam Wave." Gilles Kepel, a French expert on Islamic 
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extremism, told Miller, "To a certain extent, Islamic forces have already 
won. What we're seeing is the re-Islamization of the entire region, the 
alteration of basic patterns of life" <Miller, 1992: 24). 
Since differences between the two Islam sects are difficult for 
non-Muslims to perceive and distinctions seem to be blurring for 
believers as well, this analysis does not attempt to identify effects 
that the survival-motivated rapproachment might have on Iranian media 
activity. 
Instrumental Press Characteristics of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran 
The social importance of the bazaar reflects the instrumental 
orientation of Iranian society and its compatability with the Shi'a 
belief system. Because the concept of market activity is not challenged 
and was not challenged before the revolution, no strong motive vocabulary 
has been formulated. When instrumental and ideational actions conflict, 
as, for example, if a merchant were to seek to make money selling black 
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market pornographic films~ or if a newspaper were to publish a lucrative 
advertisement for El AI (Israeli) Airlines, the ideational motive would 
be sure to prevail. Harsh penalties for such violations would further 
reduce the likelihood of their occurrence. 
Iran and the Motive Triangle 
Since the Shah was deposed in 1979, the Iranian press appears to 
have not strayed far from the ideational point on the motive triangle 
shown below in Figure 8. The survivalist press of the Pahlavi regime in 
its last two years is contrasted with that of the revolutionary Islamic 





Figure 8. Iranian Press Activity and the 
Islamic Revolution 1977-1982 
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Though a privately-owned press indicates that instrumental activity 
was occurring during the early years of the Islamic Republic, the 
pervasiveness and dominance of the Islam belief system made it unlikely 
that the type of instrumental activities engaged in challenged the 
prevailing motive or required justification. Thus they were largely 
subsumed within the belief system. Survival-motivated activity was 
likewise co-opted by the belief system. 
Lack of information makes it impossible to interpret later 
developments with any degree of confidence. From Western reports, it 
appears that liberalization of attitudes toward other branches of Islam 
and, perhaps, a downshift in animosity toward non-Muslim powers 
represents some retreat from ideational motives to survival motives. 
The USSR--1900-1992 
Cultural Fluidity and Situated Action 
Throughout the Cold War, kremlinologists in the West have looked to 
the Soviet domestic press to track political currents and trace the 
economic course of the massive continental power. If Tsar Peter the 
Great looked upon St. Petersburg as his "window on the West, .. the West 
came to regard the Soviet media as its window on the veiled 
comings-and-goings of the nation Ronald Reagan once called "the Evil 
Empire•• and Winston Churchill described with scarcely more charity as a 
11 a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." 
Trying to understand the workings of this central institution that 
united more than 270 million people, spread across a sixth of the world's 
land mass over a span of 11 time zones, Sovietologists began by examining 
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the character of the Soviet media within the context of the Soviet social 
structures. Deeper insights were sought by linking press development to 
the Russian Empire's long social history, dominated politically by 
Tsarist autocracy, spiritually by the Russian Orthodox Church, 
intellectually by a late-blooming, Westward-looking intelligentsia, and 
economically by agrarian feudalism vested in a landed aristocracy 
presiding over millions of communal serfs and peasants, first legally 
then economically tied to the land. At the time of the 1917 revolutions, 
Russia was only beginning to feel the impact of its entry into the modern 
age of industrializaton and urbanization, which began in the wake of the 
Crimean War a half-century before. Many of the characteristics of the 
pre-Gorbachev Soviet press were attributed to the cultural legacy of 
Russian traditionalism--its servility, absolutism, xenophobia, child-like 
optimism, and paternalism. 
The servility of Soviet journalists was observed in their acceptance 
of hierarchal chains of command that extended party priorities into the 
selection of news and injected official interpretation into its 
presentation from the central media in Moscow down to the smallest and 
most distant raion <ward or precinct>. This abrogation of responsibility 
was traced to centuries of subjugation under foreign invaders and 
oppressive tsarist rule. Marx once dismissed Russia as a locus for 
revolutionary activity because of what he saw as a Slavic proclivity to 
numbly submit to authority. It was held that such passivity, which poet 
Evgenii Evtushenko in 1988 attributed to an overabundance of 
preterpelost' <docile, unquestioning patience> <1988> was responsible for 
the Soviets' "bullet theoryu approach to mass communication, the notion 
(discredited by Hovland's and Lazarsfeld's work in the 1940s> that if the 
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same message is shot at enough people repeatedly it eventually will hit 
home. 
Western analysts identified the monolithic quality of the Soviet 
press as an extension of the belief in absolute irrefutable truths. This 
characteristic was linked not only to communist discipline but to the 
absolutist beliefs of Eastern Christian Orthodoxy and the doctrine of 
Caesaropapism which pievailed for nine centuries in Holy Russia. Whereas 
the church was the revealer of daily truths on the personal and commune 
level, tsarist authority presided over the domain of public and national 
truths. In a 1985 radio interview, just before the advent of dramatic 
press reforms, Soviet Embassy information officer Evgenii Zykov said in a 
radio interview, 
I think that truth is one truth and that rumors and 
speculations sometimes distort truth. But the prestige of the 
newspapers that it conveys and has to convey only one truth and 
nothing but truth, should never be undermined <1985>. 
Ingrained xenophobia, observable in the Soviet media's scant 
coverage and slanted interpretation of international news and in their 
wary and restrictive treatment of foreign journalists was explained by 
centuries of onslaught from Eastern, Western, and Scandanavian marauders 
who took advantage of the fact that the country has no natural protective 
borders. The most pervasive foreign influence on the country's psyche 
and its institutions was the two-hundred year Tatar yoke, from 1238 to 
1480, that left an overlay of Asian values and customs and effectively 
broke commercial and intellectual ties with Europe. This rupture 
distanced Russia from the tumultuous transformations brought about by the 
growth of urban centers, universities, Humanism, the Renaissance, the 
Enlightenment, the Reformation, and the glimmerings of constitutional 
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democracy. The Tatar occupation brought to an end a pattern of economic 
and political growth that had rivaled that of England and Germany. The 
settlement of towns and cities did not return to pre-Tatar levels until 
the 19th century. Coupled with the fear and distrust of foreigners was a 
sense of admiration for their power, and a sense of Russia's own inferior 
position. 
In 1518 Maxim the Greek, invited to Muscovy by Grand Prince Vasilii 
II to revise liturgical texts, was denied permission to return home when 
his mission was completed. He was told, 11 We are in fear: thou a man of 
learning, comest to us and hast seen here of our best and worst, and when 
thou goest hence thou wilt tell of everything." He died in a Muscovy 
monastery 38 years later <Miliukov, 1942: 31-32>. David K. Shipler, for 
several years New York Times correspondent in Moscow, reported a 1977 
incident between a Moscow police lieutenant and a German television 
journalist assigned to cover the giant Rossiia Hotel Fire in Moscow in 
which at least 20 people died. The policeman stopped the filming, 
explaining, 11 We do not want to let foreigners laugh at our misfortune .. 
<Shipler, 1984: 18>. 
The determinedly up-beat and optimistic character of the Soviet 
media and their concentration on good and wholesome stories was said to 
be rooted in an old Russian proclivity to ignore the unpleasant realities 
of life. The Russian diminutive pokazukha is the term commonly used to 
describe "a pretense that all is we11. 11 Interpreted negatively, 
pokazukha means a 11 snow job,u or uwhitewashing;•• in its positive 
connotation it may be seen as 11 putting one's best foot forward." Though 
to foreign observers, the practice of playing loose with the facts seemed 
to fly in the face of absolute truth, from the Soviet standpoint 
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pokazukha. like Aesop~s fictions, pointed the way to absolute truth. 
The prototype of pokazukha was provided by Prince Grigorii Potemkin, 
favorite of Tsarina Catherine the Great and creator of the renowned 
"Potemkin villages." The prince erected stage-prop villages along the 
banks of the Dnieper River to impress the near-sighted sovereign as she 
glided downstream under the illusion that the wilderness surrounding her 
was prosperous and densely populated. When President Gerald Ford visited 
the Soviet Union in 1974, he was brought into the city by limousine along 
highways lined with towering pines, all freshly-cut by the Soviet Army 
and propped upright in the deep Siberian snow <Shipler, 1984: 25>. 
Innumerable similar efforts for the benefit of foreign visitors--such as 
freshly turning the soil in orchards and painting buildings 
overnight--have been recounted by observant dignitaries and tour members. 
In addition, the highly emotive, interpretive nature of Soviet 
journalism, reportazh. utilized patterns of speech that were at once 
patronizing and at the same time imbued with lofty verbal grandure. This 
high style, referred to as krasnaia rech~ <literally, •red" or 
"beautiful" speech>. was the antithesis of efficient, objective American 
journalistic writing. Mark Hopkins, in his ambitious 1970 press classic 
Mass Media in the Soviet Union. noted that in training Journalists, "the 
weight of opinion still favors the broadly educated man of letters, in 
the Russian tradition of writer-journalist, and the committed, activist 
journalist, in the Soviet tradition of political publicist" <1970: 156>. 
The literary tradition framed the academic discipline of journalism at 
the nation~s preeminent College of Journalism, Moscow State University, 
which grew out of the College of Philology in the early 1950s, indicating 
its curricular linkage with the study of language and literature rather 
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than with the social sciences <Schillinger, 1988: 53>. The emphasis on 
interpretation over objectivity was attributed to the inculcation of the 
European publicistic tradition, embedded among the intelligentsia along 
with other French intellectual tastes during the 18th and 19th centuries. 
Former Qgonek magazine editor-in-chief Vitalii Korotich told an American 
interviewer in 1989, "The Soviet press is becoming more interesting, but 
commentary, rather than facts, still predominate <Shabad, 1989: 25; also 
see this work, Chapter 1, Note 2>. 
Of the features noted above, only the preference for commentary over 
fact continues to characterize the Soviet media today. The culturally-
ingrained traits identified with the Soviet press between 1928 and 1985 
seem to have evaporated as national hallmarks during glasnost. The 
radical turnover in official attitudes and ensuing press and political 
activity supports Berger and Luckmann's premise that culture is fluid and 
that language, not culture, °Constitutes both the important content and 
the most important instrument of socialization" <1966: 37). 
It has been customary to consider the Soviet communist press as an 
unchanging, monolithic institution. However, in the accompanying 
analysis the dynamic theory suggests a series of motive combinations 
employed over the course of the nation's history to justify changing 
responses to domestic and international situations. The shifting pattern 
is best followed by referring to the Figures 9A, 9B, 9C, 9D, 9E, and 9F, 
which appear together on the next page. <Precedent for placing the model 
ahead of the account, rather than at the end, as in other case studies, 
is found in the literary practice of introducing the cast of characters 
at the beginning of translated Russian novels to serve as a guide and 
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The Revolutionary Leninist Press--1900-1921 
As previously observed, revolutionary media activity is ideationally 
motivated and its singleminded, fanatic, and reckless devotion to the 
promulgation of an idea system without regard for instrumental or 
survival considerations can make this transitory phase virtually 
synonymous with the ideal type. In Russia, a spine-tingling awareness of 
the precarious position of the 300-year-old Romanov dynasty nurtured a 
flurry of revolutionary press activity beginning in the 1880s. Aligned 
in one broad faction were political parties committed to reform via a 
constitutional democracy; in opposition were an equally insistent group 
of political activists seeking the overthrow of the anachronistic regime 
and the establishment of a totally new social and economic order. Among 
the latter were the Marxists and, chief among them, Vladimir Il'ich 
Lenin, whose views on the overthrow of the tsars were radicalized by the 
1887 execution of his older brother as a terrorist by Alexander III's 
reactionary regime. 
Lenin helped establish the Marxist League of the Struggle for the 
Emancipation of the Working Class and was arrested in 1895 for his 
attempts to publish an underground newspaper, Rabocheye Dele <Workers' 
Affairs>. Four years in jail and exile gave Lenin the opportunity to 
formulate plans and ideas and to begin what would become a collection of 
writings that included 700 pages on the press <Florinsky, 1955: 1186 and 
1238-1239). 
Returning to St. Petersburg from Siberia, the 29-year-old Lenin 
wrote articles and feuilletons for the short-lived Social-Democratic 
newspaper Rabochaia Gazeta <Workers' Newspaper.> and edited Iskra <The 
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Spark,) an illustrious newspaper in revolutionary history. It was 
Lenin's belief that the primary purpose of a newspaper was not to provide 
a forum for the debate of economic philosophies, but to serve as an 
organizational vehicle for coalescing mass revolution. The statement of 
purpose, appearing in the first issue in 1901 announced, 
We do not intend to make our organ an ordinary storehouse of 
diverse views. We will conduct it, on the contrary, in a 
spirit of a strict, definite school of thought. This school 
can be expressed in a word: Marxism <Lenin, 1941-1952, Vol. IV: 
329>. 
Lenin's most famous press diktat appeared in the fourth issue in a piece 
entitled 11 Where to Begin? 11 <us chego nachat'?">: 
The first step toward ••. transforming several local movements 
into a united all-Russian movement is the establishment of a 
national all-Russian newspaper. But the role of the paper is 
not confined solely to the spreading of ideas, to political 
education, and to attracting political allies. A paper is not 
merely a collective propagandist and collective agitator. it is 
also a collective organizer [emphasis added] <Lenin, 1941-1945, 
Vol. V: 11 >. 
Between 1901 and 1912, Lenin edited and contributed to dozens of 
publications and newspapers of various radical stripes. On his passport 
he listed his profession as journalist, though he was a lawyer by 
education. In his writings, however, he referred to his profession as 
11 revolutionary.a 
Over the years, intellectual fervor further fractionalized the 
opposition movement and in 1903, Lenin took up the leadership of the most 
radical wing of the Social-Democratic Party, the self-styled Bolshevik 
<Majority> Party. Significantly, rupture from the main-line party 
occurred over the issue of Lenin and his adherents' belief that political 
activity must be masterminded by an elite intellectual vanguard and not 
by the consensus of a mass-based movement <Lenin, 1941-45, Vol. V: 
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384-392>. The fi~st issue of the official Bolshevik o~gan, P~avda 
<Truth> appea~ed on May 5, 1912, a day that would be celeb~ated as p~ess 
day in the Soviet Union fo~ 89 yea~s. Josef Stalin, an obscu~e Geo~gian, 
was among the newspape~'s o~ganize~s and se~ved b~iefly as edito~. 
Upon seizing powe~ on Novembe~ 7, 1917, the Bolshevik Pa~ty moved 
immediately to close down anti-socialist Pet~og~ad5 newspape~s, and 
on Novembe~ 10 the Council of People's Commissa~s issued a sweeping 
dec~ee autho~izing the supp~esslon o~ closu~e of any newspape~ opposing 
the new gove~nment, to be ~escinded •when no~mal conditions p~evailed. 0 
A month late~ all adve~tising was decla~ed a state monopoly in the hope 
of financially st~angling non-Bolshevik competition. Ea~ly in 1918 the 
seizu~e of p~inting plants was legalized th~oughout Russia, the p~ess's 
cont~ibution to the state ~equisitioning policy of Wa~ Communism. Late~ 
in the yea~ p~ivate p~ess owne~ship was abolished, as well as all othe~ 
p~ivate p~ope~ty ove~ a set value. 
Opposition to the supp~ession of newspape~s came not only f~om 
conse~vative newspape~s, but f~om othe~ socialist pa~ties, who claimed 
the action violated the socialist belief in p~ess f~eedom. Lenin 
~esponded to socialist edito~s, saying thei~ access to p~inting should be 
in p~opo~tlon to thei~ nume~ical st~ength. His justification of seizu~e 
and shutting down of conse~vative pape~s was an a~tlculation of the 
absolutist fea~ of ideational contamination: 
Eve~yone knows that the bou~geois p~ess is one of the most 
powe~ful weapons of the bou~geoisie. Especially at this 
c~itical moment, when the new state, the state of wo~ke~s and 
peasants is consolidating itself, it is enti~ely impossible to 
leave this weapon in the hands of the enemy, at a time when it 
is no less dange~ous than bombs and machine guns <Lenin, 1957: 
24). 
The 1918 dec~ees would ma~k the high-wate~ ma~k of ideational p~ess 
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activity in Lenin's lifetime. The fledgling government had no sooner 
extricated the country from allied participation in World War I, than it 
became caught up in defending its newly-won revolution in a three-year 
civil war, complicated by the intervention of military detachments from 
other countries hoping to topple the new regime, including British and 
Japanese forces and 21,000 U.S. troops. 6 
The Survivalist NEP Press--1921-1927 
In 1921 the Civil War ended with the triumph of the Red Army. Civil 
disruption coupled with War Communism's raids on privately owned goods 
and commodities had brought with them dramatic crises in agriculture and 
manufacturing shortages, and wreaked havoc with the distribution systems. 
Famine struck the Ukraine with special vengeance, and in 1921 5 million 
people died. Peasant uprisings were commonplace and a rebellion at the 
Kronstadt naval base had to put down with armed force. Even Pravda. the 
darling of the party faithful, was plagued by newsprint shortages and for 
a time was forced to go from four to two pages <Berezhnoi, 1956: 12>. 
In this environment the fiery rhetoric of revolution came head to 
head with the hard realities of survival. Establishing a stable 
government and initiating a new economic order required the cooperation 
of more than just the committed party vanguard. The struggle would also 
require compromises in Marxist goals and principles in order to secure 
the new nation's stability and feed its starving masses. Confronted with 
the unraveling of the fragile new state, Hopkins wrote, 11 Creation of a 
'people's press' and press freedom were farthest from Lenin's thoughts 
<1970: 72>. The shift to survival motives was signified by the adoption 
of the New Economic Policy <NEP> in 1921. Drafted under Lenin and Leon 
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T~otsky's di~ection, NEP called fo~ the ~eestablishment of limited f~ee 
ente~p~ise activity and the implementation of financial incentives in 
indust~ial p~oduction in o~de~ to jump-sta~t the declining socialist 
economy. The new policy was ang~lly challenged by Ma~xist idealists, who 
saw NEP and the abandonment of Wa~ Communism as ~et~eats f~om Ma~xist 
beliefs. Lenin sought to justify the shift in p~io~ities to out~aged 
party membe~s in Octobe~ of that year: 
Ca~~ied away by a wave of enthusiasm, ~ousing popula~ 
enthusiasm at first political and late~ military, we thought we 
could achieve di~ectly on the basis of this enthusiasm economic 
tasks just as g~eat [as the political and military ones) •••. 
Life showed us our mistake. A se~ies of t~ansitional stages 
we~e needed: state capitalism and socialism, in o~der to 
p~epa~e--by the wo~k of a long se~ies of yea~s to p~epare--the 
t~ansition to communism .•.• Personal incentive ~aises 
p~oduction; we need inc~eases in p~oduction more than anything 
•.•• <Cla~kson, 1961>. 
Ame~ican co~~espondents ~epo~ted d~amatic changes as a ~esult of NEP. 
Within weeks after Lenin's dec~ee ••• the impact of his New 
Economic Policy could be seen in the city, mate~ially changing 
the lives of the co~~espondents. Shops we~e reopened, 
~epaired, and ~apidly filled with goods that had been hoarded 
o~ lost in the ~ed tape of bu~eauc~acy. Restau~ants with 
elabo~ate menus sp~ang up ove~night, offe~ing F~ench champagnes 
and wines •••• Most impo~tant, for the fi~st time in years, 
peasants came from the count~yside and set up sidewalk stands 
to sell f~esh f~uit and vegetables <Bassow, 1988: 48>. 
NEP would be in effect until 1927, su~viving Lenin by th~ee yea~s. 
Exigency had forced anothe~ policy reve~sal. In August the 
gove~nment agreed to pe~mit Ame~ican jou~nallsts to ente~ Russia and 
t~avel f~eely in exchange fo~ despe~ately needed Ame~ican g~ain, field 
hospitals, ambulances, and medical supplies. Du~ing the Civil Wa~ 
~eporte~s f~om the United States and othe~ countries opposing the Soviet 
state had been banned f~om Russian soil. 
Lenin conceded at a pa~ty meeting that the subjugation of the 
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opposition press and the ban on advertising had been wnaive and in a 
certain sense mistaken,n though consistent with socialist goals <Hopkins, 
1970: 64>. In ~esponse to NEP, beginning in January 1922 the state moved 
to require state-owned newspapers and magazines to become 
self-sufficient, raising revenues primarily through sales and 
subscriptions, an activity managed by the central appa~atus. By July the 
number of newspapers still surviving had fallen to 313, down from 803 at 
the first of the yea~. Immediately state subsidies were app~opriated and 
party members were required to subscribe to at least one state-owned 
paper <Hopkins, 1970: 73>. 
Though laws and decrees had proclaimed an end to the era of private 
press ownership, in fact, of 678 print plants existing in mid-1923, 233 
were privately owned (1961: Sovetskaia pechat' v doumentakh: 212). For 
Lenin, the task of wnation-building,• not yet a term in currency, had 
become the major task at hand~ Educating the masses, 80 percent of whom 
were illiterate, bringing electricity to rural areas and ~emote cities, 
and above all p~oducing a committed, technically-competent work force to 
help realize the potential of a 11 Workers' and peasants' paradise .. were 
the leader/s overriding concerns. 
11 What Lenin wanted at this time was a functional press in the sense 
of a vocational school for building a new society, .. Hopkins observed 
<1970: 66>. Lenin claimed that the newspapers under Bolshevik control 
were boring, full of dull decrees and unappealing a~ticles. Because most 
of the professional journalists who had supported the Bolshevik cause had 
been drawn into the service of the new government, newspapers were being 
run by undereducated novices. Many of the new pressmen, especially those 
working outside of Moscow, the new capital, had no special loyalty to the 
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Bolsheviks or their policies and little direct contact with the hierarchy 
of officially overseers, though Pravda was officially ordered to direct 
the local press. 
Lenin, renowned as the eloquent wordsmith of the revolution, told 
newspaper editors: 
We have begun to make newspapers tools for educating the masses 
and for teaching them how to live and how to build their own 
economy without landowners and capitalists. Less political 
trivia in the press, less general discussion and abstract 
slogans by which the inexperienced are charmed. More 
propaganda for production, but most of all, more businesslike, 
skillful recounting of practical experience fitted to the level 
of development of the masses <Hopkins, 1970: 72>. 
Though legally the press appeared to be totally under the aegis of 
the Communist Party, with agencies and mechanisms regularly being created 
to extend control and censorship, the infrastructure of the press, along 
with other sectors of the economy, was in such desperate financial 
straits that these measures seemed to be of little consequence. From 
1913 to 1918 the number of newspapers fell from 1,055, with a circulation 
of 3.3 million or 21 per 1,000 population, to 884 newspapers totaling 2.7 
million circulation or 18 per 1,000 <Hopkins, 1970: 81>. 
One innovation in communication technology that appealed especially 
to Lenin was radio, and in 1922 the central radio-telephone station 
transmitted the first concert. Regular broadcasting began two years 
later, though its reach beyond Moscow and a handful of other cities would 
not take place until the next decade. As in many of the developing 
nations today, radio listening was a collective experience, and 
loudspeakers were commonly connected to sending stations by telephone 
lines. Lenin looked forward to radio as a tool for educating people in 
isolated rural areas, and he is said to have looked forward to a time 
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when uwe will have hundreds of radio receivers and all of Russia will be 
able to listen to a newspaper read in Moscowu <Fedotova, 1967>. 
Although conclusions vary, evidence suggests that Lenin lost none of 
his zeal for the Marxist ideas he had championed with such passion for 
three decades. However, with the achievement of revolutionary goals, the 
focus of his attention shifted to the more pragmatic concern of survival. 
The task of building a nation called for a different approach to 
planning, action, and mobilizing the masses than tearing down a monarchy. 
Though strong social cohesion was required for both efforts, the building 
of socialism was seen as a deliberate and orderly process, far different 
from the ideationally-motivated strategies of conducting a revolution. 
The shift in priorities and approaches required constant justification 
from Lenin in his final years to win the support of the masses, but more 
importantly, meet the objections and garner the votes of his 
revolutionary colleagues; for many of these still envisioned themselves 
at the Winter Palace, battling against the Romanovs. 
Robert Tucker argues that Lenin's revolutionary goals were realized 
with the unseating of the tsar and the defeat of his supporters <1987: 
72-79>. Leon Trotsky wrote from exile in the 1930s that revolution had 
been fought to bring about the ubreak with the Asiatic, with the 
Seventeenth Century, with Holy Russia, with icons and cockroaches11 <1960: 
94>. 11 0ld Bolsheviku Nikolai Bukharin on the five-year anniversary of 
Lenin's death, claimed that Lenin had warned against a revolutionary 
approach to creating a socialist state by instigating 11 Change which 
breaks the old order to its very foundations, and had enforced policies 
that cautiously, slowly and gradually remodels [the old order], taking 
care to break as little as possible 11 (1929>. 
264 
The issue of press freedom was widely debated within the party 
during the years Lenin was alive. Interestingly, Lenin is said to have 
used the word glasnost in calling for press scrutiny of bureaucratic 
mismanagement, bringing red tape before the 11 Court of glasnost•• <Lenin, 
1986>. After his death, the three-year power struggle among would-be 
successors was waged and reported ln spirited essays and letters ln the 
pages of Pravda and other central newspapers; but the role of the press 
as forum for discussion, permitted and encouraged during the NEP years, 
ended abruptly when Josef Stalin emerged the victor in 1927. 
Change in press activity under Lenin is illustrated on the motive 
triangle shown in Figure 9A on page 255. During the travails of War 
Communism the ideational rationales that had guided the revolution were 
combined with survival and instrumental justifications for expedient, 
non-socialist actions. The abrupt shift to survival-dominated motives 
from 1921 to 1927 denotes the dominance of survival strategies and 
increased instrumental activity during the NEP years. 
The Ideational Press of Stalin and Brezhnev 
In responding to a magazine editor's claim that the press should 
perform a watchdog function by exposing corruption and inefficiency in 
government, Stalin sought to add legitimacy to his views on the press by 
linking them to positions Lenin had espoused during his days as a 
revolutionary and publicist for the Marxist Cause. In 1923 Stalin told 
the editor of the magazine Zhurnalist <Journalist>: 
It is not only that the press agitates and criticizes, but above 
all that it has a large network of workers, agents and 
correspondents throughout the country, in all industrial and 
agricultural areas, in all districts and villages, so that the 
thread from the party, through the newspaper, extends to all 
worker and peasant districts without exception, so that the 
interaction of the party and state, on the one hand, and 
industrial and peasant districts on the other is complete 
<Stalin: 1925: 13>. 
Under Stalin, the ideational orientation that had prevailed during 
the revolution and the period of War Communism once again became 
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dominant. But the cause for which Stalin sought to enlist the masses and 
arouse devotion was a radical strategic vitalization of Soviet industry 
and military sectors described in a Communist Party publication, edited 
by Stalin himself, as 11 a profound revolution, a leap from an old 
qualitative state of society to a new qualitative state, equivalent in 
its consequences to the revolution of [November] 1917 <Short Course, 
1945: 305). The changes in focus and priorities, American Sovietologist 
Stephen Cohen observes, "were not simply amendments but a new ideology 
that was changed in its essence and that did not represent the same 
movement as that which took power in 191711 <1985: 52>. Even though the 
activity of the "second revolution .. was essentially instrumental, it was 
rationalized by Marxist-Leninist vocabularies of motive, which, as an 
economic-based belief system, subsumed instrumental action. Thus, the 
building of the socialist state was explained not as a strategy to 
increase the standard of living for the people, but as a means of 
realizing ideational goals. 
In 1931 Stalin declared, ·nwe are 50 or 100 years behind the advanced 
countries. We must make good this distance in ten yearsu <Hopkins. 1970: 
92). The effort centered on the collectivization of agriculture, in the 
belief that more efficient social organization would increase 
agricultural productivity and create surplusses for export that would 
fuel the other sectors. Consolidation of 25 million individual 
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farmsteads into 200,000 collective and state farms resulted in millions 
of deaths from famine and brutality. The kulak class of the more 
successful, wealthier peasants was especially targeted, and millions were 
killed or sent to prison camps in Siberia. At the same time, industrial 
structures and priorities were revamped to maximize the production of 
military and capital goods, resulting in new shortages in consumer goods. 
The austerity program was enforced by heightened internal police activity 
and the "purging" of dissenting party policy-makers. 
If the knock on the door in the dead of night brought the bad news, 
the newspaper each morning could be counted on to provide the good news, 
for the ideational press presented a persistently up-beat message to 
shore up public confidence in Stalin~s undertakings. Show trials in 
which 11 0ld Bolsheviks11 were prosecuted for 11 crimes against the people 0 
were played in the press as great victories for the cause; persecution of 
rank and file dissenters and saboteurs of the party~s efforts were not 
reported. By the early 1930s, the mechanisms of control were 
institutionalized--vested in the centrifugal party organization that 
incorporated all administrative levels and social organizations. Among 
the most effective and essential agents of party control were the 
internal police and the press. 
This nsecond revolution" was, in fact, a revolution imposed from 
above, a recurrent pattern in Russian history that could be traced back 
to Ivan IV and Peter the Great Cor projected forward to Mikhail 
Gorbachev>. Its legitimacy was grounded in Marxism-Leninism and in 
Lenin, the father of the country, whose early revolutionary writings were 
exhumed to strengthen the ideational rationale. At the same time, the 
threat of foreign invasion, heightened by the country~s isolated 
political position as the world/s only Marxist state, raised fear that 
intensified national paranoia and increased social cohesion. 
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Stalin believed that the mass media must be utilized to mobilize the 
masses and shape their commitment. As he saw it, the informational 
function of the press was extraneous to the essential business of 
educating and inspiring the masses. He was equally adamant in believing 
that ideas from beyond the borders (za granitsei> not be allowed to 
dilute the force of these beliefs. Foreign periodicals were banned, 
except for a few socialist publications, such as the British communist 
newspaper, Daily Worker. Likewise foreign literature was confined to a 
handful of works that portrayed the rapaciousness and "soullessness" of 
capitalist societies, such as the selected writings of Theodore Dreiser, 
Mark Twain, and Jack London. 7 
During the decade the number of newspapers increased almost tenfold. 
The total circulation of dailies and weeklies combined rose from 9.4 
million to 34.7 million in the first five years CPechat/ SSSR za sorok 
let: 123>. Much of the growth resulted from the establishment of 
hundreds of factory and farm newspapers, which were more like 
newsletters. Radio broadcasting likewise developed fairly rapidly and by 
1940, 90 radio stations and about 7 million registered receivers brought 
radio to most urban locations and some rural ones (Hopkins, 1970: 94). 
Just as capital goods received priority over consumer goods in the 
manufacturing sector because of their strategic importance, so the media 
were developed and funded disproportionately over other sectors of 
society, such as education and health care. 
The success of the austerity program was vindicated when the country 
found itself prepared to resist the German onslaughts of World War II. 
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Soviet military might, backed by a resolutely stubborn and patriotic 
citizenry, endured mammoth civilian suffering and an estimated 20 million 
deaths to achieve Allied victory on the Eastern Front virtually 
unassisted. The Soviets' reward was hegemony over the Eastern European 
countries they had marched through and fought in enroute to Berlin. 
During the course of the war, less central control was exerted on 
the civilian media because of lack of manpower, resources, and attention; 
but also because the survival motive vocabulary was revived and became 
dominant, for Marxism-Leninism proved less efficacious than nationalism 
in rallying support for the war effort. Even the name of the conflict 
reflected this motive shift, for in the Soviet Union it is called the 
Great War of the Fatherland <Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voina or V.O.V.>. 
The number of newspapers and magazines fell precipitiously from 1941 to 
1945 and, though no figures are available for 1941 to 1945, the total 
number of newspapers dropped from almost 9,000 in 1940 to less than 6,500 
in 1946. Circulation levels would not equal the pre-war levels until 
1952 <Pechat' SSSR za sorok let: 123>. Mother Russia, rather than 
Marxism-Leninism, clearly found resonance among the masses, and during 
the war the party press became strongly nationalistic. Other concessions 
to the national survival orientation were the opening of churches closed 
since the Bolsheik takeover and the expansion of collective farm lands 
that could be devoted to private farming. 
After the war, the press rapidly returned to its ideational 
orientation and the scope of its activity caught up with and surpassed 
pre-war levels. Threat to the belief system was now focused on the 
capitalist West, the recent allies that had celebrated together victory 
over the Fascists. Shunning offers of Marshall-Plan aid and the 
ideational strings attached to it, Stalin now targeted war recovery and 
reindustrialization as primary goals, using the reestablishment of a 
Marxist-Leninist state to justify ongoing sacrifice from the Soviet 
people and stepped-up purging and persecution of party heretics and 
dilatory citizens. Stalin emerged from the war as the beloved and 
lionized "Greatest Genius of Geniuses,u •Leader of Nations," "The 
Omnipotent," and "Nearest and Dearest Little Father• CSolzhenitsyn, 
1969>, who had foreseen the coming calamity and prepared his backward 
children to handle it. 
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It was during the pre- and post-war decades of Stalinist rule that 
the single-minded, ideationally-dominated Soviet media acquired the 
traits that dominated world perception until the mid 1980s. This 
characterization was reinforced during the long tenure of the Brezhnev 
government, particularly the last decade of that 18-year span. In the 
interim between Stalin's death in 1953 and Brezhnev's ascension in 1964, 
Nikita Khrushchev reigned over a comparatively tumultuous period that 
included the triumphant launching of the world's first artificial 
satellite in 1957 and the disgrace of capitulation to U.S. demands to 
stay out of the Western hemisphere. However, Khrushchev's most dramatic 
and long-reaching act was the denunciation of Stalin in the 
never-published "Secret Speech," delivered before a stunned session of 
the 20th Party Congress in February 1956. Almost immediately word gushed 
down the hierarchal party pipeline into the republic and oblast' 
organizations, and from there to the rank-and-file. Soon accounts of 
Stalin's brutality began to surface and make their way into the central 
press. Intimation of the possiblity of fallability in the leadership of 
the party, especially the absolutist Stalin, called into question the 
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validity of the belief system the guardians were entrusted to interpret 
and protect. For the first time in two decades a murmur of dissent 
arose, fostered and encouraged by a perceptible shift in motives that 
rationalized the press as a forum of debate. Reforms in press and 
publishing of that period, known as the 11 Thaw," are discussed in the next 
section, where their significance is assessed as precursor to Gorbachev's 
glasnost era. 
Ascending to power following the forced retirement of Khrushchev, 
Leonid Brezhnev and his lieutenants set out to restore stability and 
order to a society they believed to have been traumatized by Khrushchev's 
11 hare-brained" schemes and erratic attempts at social and economic 
reform. It was recognition of a 11 Crisis in belief, .. and not Soviet 
humiliation at the handling of the Cuban missile crisis or the paring 
down of the party and military structure, that justified the removal of 
Khrushchev by a coalition of highly-placed members of the Politburo. 
As Brezhnev saw it, the situation called for a reassertion of the 
primacy of Marxism-Leninism and the infallability of its guardians. He 
had participated in Stalin's 11 second revolution, .. joining the Communist 
Party at the age of 25 in 1931 and working as an engineer and party 
activist in his native Ukraine. He had served in Stalin's army as well, 
rising to the rank of major general during the War of the Fatherland. If 
Stalin's ideational strategies had succeeded in turning a backward, 
semi-feudal society into a world industrial-military power within a 
decade, Brezhnev would adopt Stalin's strategies to achieve less 
ambitious goals of social stability and cohesion. To be sure, striking 
differences existed between the two regimes, but as Tucker has observed, 
"[sJtructurally, they restored the system to something close to the form 
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it possessed in Stalin's time, minus the autocracy at the top and police 
supremacy over the party hierarchy <1987: 126>. 
The focus of Brezhnev's ideational revitalization in the 1960s and 
1970s was the restoration of party authority. The strength of the 
country's war machine, despite cutbacks in military appropriations under 
Khrushchev and a shaky detente with the West, allowed Brezhnev to bring 
the ideational orientation into even sharper focus than had Stalin, since 
survival activity resumed a low profile and instrumental activity came to 
a virtual standstill. A depiction of press activity under Stalin and 
Brezhnev is shown on the motive triangles in Figure 9B and 9D on page 
255. The broadening of motivations and the dilution of the idea system 
during Khrushchev's 11 Thaw 11 are illustrated in Figure 9C. 
Stalin's reputation was partially restored, in particular, his 
contribution to victory in the war. The aparatchiki. that is, the 
professional party workers, made skittish under Khrushchev's sporadic 
assaults, were reassured of their tenure, and their ranks were swelled to 
the point that Stalin's bureaucratic legions appeared lean and mean by 
comparison. Full-time paid party officials rose to an estimated 
half-million, spread across an overlapping party-government flow chart 
that linked 23 Central Committee departments and 60 ministries to the 
general secretary of the party and the political bureau <politburo>. 
Whereas the general secretary was thought of as the 11 first secretary, 11 
the "second secretary .. was the politburo member in charge of ideology. 
11 Trust in cadres, 11 one of an on-going stream of imperative that typified 
domestic propaganda and sloganeering campaigns, was Brezhnev's way of 
reassuring the people that their belief system was in good hands. 
Thus, the strengthening and expansion of the political organization 
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was rationalized as necessary to reestablish the legitimacy of 
Marxism-Leninism that had eroded during Khrushchev/s eight-year tenure. 
The same motive justified the enlargment and extension of the mass media. 
Whereas Lenin, and more markedly Stalin, had used the media to implant 
the belief system and strengthen commitment to the achievement of 
essentially instrumental and survival goals, Brezhnev employed the media 
to revitalize and shore up an aging ideational system that had lost its 
luster. Under Brezhnev, the Soviet media infrastucture came to be among 
the most pervasive in the world. 
As in Stalin/s day, the Soviet mass media system outstripped other 
sectors of the economy in efficiency and technological sophistication, 
reflecting the importance that the government placed on the press. The 
national or all-Union media, centered in Moscow, pervaded the entire 
country with same-day distribution of All-Union newspapers and magazines, 
made possible by computer transmission of type. Pravda. for example, 
was printed in 43 different locations during the Brezhnev era, and 
simultaneous and delayed broadcasts of selected programs on the two 
all-Union channels in Moscow were transmitted across all time zones, 
supplementing local and ethnic offerings. 
Surveys indicate that during the Brezhnev era reading newspapers was 
the number-one leisure time activity of Soviet citizens, even 
outdistancing television viewing CShlapentokh, 1970a). There were 25 
All-Union newspapers, all published in Moscow. These included Pravda. 
with a circulation of 11 million; Izvestia. with 8 million; and other 
papers targeted for various segments of society: young people, farmers, 
sports fans, and trade unionists--all with circulations in the millions. 
The aggregate circulation of daily papers reached almost 104 million, or 
400 newspapers per 1,000 persons in 1978, making it the second most 
newspaper-rich country, behind Japan CKarch, 1982: 901>. 
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Newspapers were also published at the republic, province, city, and 
district levels, as well as by factories, collective and state farms, and 
the military. A total of more than 8,000 newspapers were printed daily, 
compared with about 1,800 in the United States. Weekly newspapers 
numbered more than 7,600. 
In addition, over 500,000 wall newspapers were produced by amateur 
journalists, including some 5 million worker-peasant correspondents. The 
local party bureau was responsible for this pervasive, if not 
particularly skillful, form of mass communication, and a committee of 
five to seven people was assigned usually to get them out. Wall 
newspapers were typed or handwritten, sometimes illustrated with 
snapshots and original art. They appeared, sometimes in a glass display 
case, as often as a dozen times a year. 
Television grew increasingly pervasive during the 1970s, although 
outlying sections of the country received fewer channels. In addition to 
the All-Union channels originating in Moscow, stations which produced 
local programming and relayed selected All-Union broadcasts were located 
in 90 provincial capitals. Sixty-seven percent of Soviet households 
possessed a television set, and 6.5 million sets were being purchased 
each year. Ninety percent of households in urban areas--"zones of secure 
reception"--had televisions. Surveys indicate that 3 percent of 
households did not want a television and the rest could not afford one 
(Mickiewicz, 1981: 19>. 
Spravochnik Zhurnalista (The Journalist/s Handbook>. written by 
two obscure party functionaries, was published for the first time in 
274 
1965. It set forth in rank order of importance the six ethics of Soviet 
journalism, that is, those traits to which Soviet journalists and their 
organizations should aspire in their daily work. These are to be 
distinguished from the 11 functions 11 of the press--propagandizing, 
agitating, and organizing--which Lenin enshrined in his 1901 editorial. 
The book came out a year after Leonid Brezhnev came to power. Its timing 
is important because it signaled the end to Khrushchev's tentative press 
experiment and a return to the classic pattern established by Stalin •. 
The ethics book presents and then cites examples to illustrate the 
vocabulary of motives that rationalized press behavior under Stalin and 
Brezhnev, and beyond. Viewed in retrospect, it also offers some 
understanding of the discomfort experienced by many Soviet journalists 
when Gorbachev suddenly replaced the six ethics with a single 
concept--openness or glasnost. 
The six ethics that were to inform the work of Soviet journalists 
were party orientation <partiinost'>. high moral substance <vysokaia 
ideinost'>. truthfulness <pravdivost'>. popular orientation 
<narodnost'>. mass character <massovost'>. and criticism and 
self-criticism in the press <kritika i samo-kritika v pechati). 
As the first of the Soviet press codes, party-orientation was the 
most important and pervasive of the journalistic ethics because it served 
to legitimize the party leadership and thereby Marxism-Leninism. 
The party values highly the press, as its faithful and powerful 
ideological weapon, as a genuine national platform for the 
building of communism, and considers the work of the press a 
very powerful partner in social realization <Bogdanov and 
Viazemskii, 1971: 21>. 
Party orientation was guaranteed by state ownership of media, party 
administration and control of all media, the education and politicization 
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of jou~nalists, and censo~ship. 
Thus, even though the ideational motive shifted slightly du~ing the 
Kh~ushchev yea~s, and was mo~e ~esponsive to public demand and mo~e open 
to public debate, the old patte~n t~iumphed again unde~ B~ezhnev when 
p~ess activity, if anything, adhe~ed even mo~e closely to the 
p~omulgation of the belief system. B~ezhnev ~esponded to the detente in 
East-West ~elations, which he enginee~ed, by stepping up ideational 
activity, offe~ing mo~e slogans, mo~e exho~tations, and mo~e optimistic 
accounts of Soviet life, since it was thought that the ~eduction of 
milita~y th~eat might weaken public ~esistance to alte~nate belief 
systems. Jou~nalists we~e p~ohibited f~om ~iting on sco~es of sensitive 
issues enume~ated in a widely-documented list Cpe~echen'>. that included 
c~ime, suicide, alcohol and d~ug abuse, ecological th~eats, emig~ation 
f~om the count~y, public health, accidents and disaste~s, as well as mo~e 
conventional cove~age const~aints on milita~y activity, the schedules of 
top leade~s, and othe~ issues of national secu~ity. Sociologist Tatiana 
Zaslavskaia suggested that du~ing the B~ezhnev e~a, p~ohibited topics 
outnumbe~ed the pe~mitted ones (1987>. These ~est~ictions we~e enfo~ced 
not only by the official censo~ship agency, Glavlit, but by savvy edito~s 
and media p~ofessionals who censo~ed themselves. 
B~ezhnev's conse~vative policies led inc~easingly ave~ the cou~se of 
his ~ule to the p~io~itlzing of stability and the maintenance of the 
status quo in the pa~ty hie~a~chy. This policy, bolste~ed by the fi~st 
ethic of the Jou~nalist's Handbook. pa~tiinost'. would ~esult in the 
B~ezhnev pe~iod being labeled the ·E~a of Stagnation 11 cnE~a Zastoia 11 >. 
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The Reform Press and Glasnost 
Western sovietologists and government kremlinologists have had 
difficulty understanding 11 WhY 11 Gorbachev would jeopardize a·prestigious 
and virtually unassailable sinecure by assailing the belief system that 
brought him to power. The reason for their bafflement stems from a 
deeply-rooted instrumentalist and utilitarian conviction that rational 
beings always act in their own best interest. Evidence suggests, 
however, that Gorbachev, indeed, may fiQi have been acting in his own best 
immediate interest, but rather in what he perceived to be the best 
long-term interest of the kollektiv. a concept in which he was 
well-schooled. The significant difference between Gorbachev's press 
reform policy and others that preceded it lay in the fact that it 
represented an unprecedented shift in primary motive, from ideational to 
instrumental--that is, a major paradigm shift. 
Reforms initiated by Nikita Khrushchev, beginning in 1956, focused 
on encouraging literary experimentation, but also had several profound 
effects on the media. In retrospect, the policies that produced the 
11 Thaw 11 seem timid and halting, but Hopkins, writing from the perspective 
of 1970, interpreted the era as 11 a political and cultural evolution in 
Soviet society as dazzling as the economic revolution under Stalin 11 
( 1970 : 102) . 
For without an iron-willed, singleminded Stalin reigning over 
it, the press showed a spark of individuality. It underwent 
its own partial rehabilitation. If the press was servile in 
Stalin's time, it became more of a servant in Khrushchev's. 
But the transition was made in a remarkably few years, and it 
seemed irreversible (1970: 104>. 
In fact, many of Khrushchev's moves toward a less absolutist, less 
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ideationally-determined press were rolled back during the Brezhnev years, 
but the notion of the press as a forum for discussion of issues was to 
remain, though the content of those exchanges grew progressively less 
heated and narrower in scope after Khrushchev/s removal. 
Of some significance, though not widely noted, was the reemergence 
of the academic discipline of sociology, which had been conducted "on a 
relatively large scale not only before the revolution, but also in the 
first decade thereafter" (Sh 1 apentokh, 1987: 14-15>. Suspected as a 
"bourgeois" science because of its potential for challenging political 
authority and manipulating social policy, sociology nevertheless emerged 
as independent from Marxism-Leninism under Khrushchev, and would not 
return to its ideational constraints until Brezhnev had been in power for 
seven years. This development is significant to press analysis because 
the study of the mass media falls under the auspices of sociology in the 
Soviet Union CShlapentokh, 1987: 13-32 and 167-180). 
A rather impressive series of studies utilizing Western 
methodologies were undertaken and their results published during the 
early Brezhnev years, 1965-1972, which sociologist and media scholar 
Vladimir Shlapentokh describes as the "golden age" of Soviet sociology 
(1987: 13>. Among the findings were indications that the tactic of 
bombarding the airwaves and printed page with the same repeated 
moralistic messages was not as effective as had been supposed. 
Furthermore, it was revealed that both newspaper and television audiences 
were bored with the daily diet of economic news, features on 
manufacturing and farming, and "how-to• lectures on topics ranging from 
child rearing to home health care to conserving electricity CKogan and 
Skvortsov, 1970; Lubsanov et al .• 1972; Shlapentokh, 1970a and 1970b; 
Strukov, 1971; and Vooglaid, 1967, among others>. 
Writing during the final years of the Brezhnev era, Mickiewicz 
noted: 
It is no longer assumed that just because a message has been 
broadcast, televised, or printed, it has been received, 
understood, and assimilated •••• [Tlhe Russian public when 
examined scientifically, turns out to be much less homogenous, 
monolithic, and malleable than the Soviets <and Western 
observers who were, perhaps, persuaded by the Stalinist 
theories of their communication efficacy) had thought <1981: 
6>. 
One effect of the proliferation of media studies launched under 
Khrushchev was the recognition by Brezhnev of the stultifying and 
ineffective use of the media <Fisher; 1979: K2>. The attack, delivered 
in a 1978 televised address, was taken to heart by media professionals 
and their party overseers. Within weeks of Brezhnev 1 s criticism, the 
press, but especially television, began to undergo a surprising 
278 
transformation that within three years would include a heavy infusion of 
game shows, cartoons, talk shows, dramas, and in the early 1980s, music 
video. 
The period between Brezhnev 1 s death in 1982 and Gorbachev 1 s 
ascension in 1985 is generally regarded as a time-marking interregnum 
during which the aged World War II generation of leaders competed for 
power against the younger 11 Twentleth Congress 11 generation--a reference to 
younger party aparatchiki who came of age during and after Khrushchev 1 s 
denunciation of Stalin at the party meeting in 1956 <Doder, 1986>. 
Nevertheless, the short period of Yuri Andropov 1 s rule also saw a change 
in press policy, as he used the media to publicize and draw attention to 
widespread graft and corruption that had come to dominate the political 
structure on Brezhnev 1 s dozing watch. AndropOV 1 S unexpected illness and 
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death b~ought about the b~ief, ~eactiona~y tenu~e of Konstantin 
Che~nenko, who died afte~ only a year in office. His passing cleared the 
way for Mikhail Gorbachev, who, at the age of 54, was not only a 
generation younge~ than his predecessor, but the first national leader to 
have been too young to serve under· stalin in World War II. 
The centerpiece of Gorbachev/s agenda was the making over of the 
economy, the acceleration of p~oductivity, and improvement of the 
standa~d of living. Other policies he pursued were ancillary to this 
instrumental agenda--political reform and democ~atization; 
institutionalization of the legal process and the dismantling of a 
justice system based on connections, influence, and b~ibery; and the 
creation of a press forum for the exchange of views. The primacy of the 
inst~umental motive as a justification for glasnost, rathe~ than the 
Weste~n ideational motives of "press f~eedom11 and 11 the public's ~ight to 
know, 11 was exp~essed by a p~ovincial pa~ty secretary, Boris Volodin, who 
wrote in September 1986, 
It goes without saying that all our wo~k in expanding glasnost. 
improving informedness, is not an end in itself. In the last 
analysis it should actively contribute to the accomplishment of 
[the economic] tasks set by the Twenty-seventh Party Congress, 
the June 1986 Central Committee Plenum, and develop the 
initiative of labor collectives, ~ousing in people the 
aspi~ation to achieve higher results 11 <1986: 24>. 
In his 1987 book, Perest~oika. Go~bachev wrote that the 
implementation of glasnost was essential to arrive at a b~oader vision of 
"truth." In a ve~y ~eal sense, glasnost was a diffusion strategy to 
inculcate new p~ocesses fo~ determining economic policy, based on 
~ealistic assessments of national st~engths and weaknesses. 
T~uth is the main thing •••• As never before, we need no da~k 
corners whe~e mold can reappear and whe~e everything against 
which we have started a resolute struggle could start 
accumulating •••• We have come to realize the necessity of 
learning to overcome the inveterate discrepancy between the 
reality and the proclaimed policy. It is this major shift in 
the moral sphere that makes up the emotional content and the 
essence of the present socialist revolutions in our society .•. 
so that all citizens have a say, so that socialist pluralism, 
as it were, is represented in each publication in its entirety 
<1987: 77>. 
At a meeting of editors and journalists at the Central 
Conunittee of the CPSU early in 1988, Gorbachev advised: 11 Publish 
everything. There should be a pluralism of opinions11 <Gorbachev, 
1988: 2>. The confusion this injunction caused in the minds of a 
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people steeped in the absolutism of Stalin and Brezhnev is revealed 
in a question to Gorbachev from the floor of the first session of 
the Congress of Deputies, covered on Soviet television: "Pluralism, 
pluralism! Tell me, Mikhail Sergeevich, what is this new word that 
is suddenly so popular? 11 
In a 1989 issue of Moskovskie novosti < Moscow News>. a Soviet 
historian wrote: 
Not so long ago the word "pluralism11 was mainly heard among 
scholars. Other mortals who looked it up in the dictionary 
discovered that it was a "false, idealistic philosophy." 
Pluralism seemed to be something abstract and outlandish. Now 
it seems to be an essential quality of our life, a quality each 
of us has. For a long time we were made to believe that there 
was only one truth, only one spiritual value, only one 
progressive trend in art, only one main road of development. 
The rest was heresy, alien, vicious and to be eradicated 
<Shastiko, 1989: 3). 
In the normal progression of human events, social change 
precedes dogma, creating a new set of social conditions out of which 
new realities emerge and are articulated, justified, and 
legitimized. But when an existing belief system has been 
insistently propagated and inculcated over a long period of time, 
the new reality may have to be invented first in order to make way 
fo~ social change. The possibility of this t~ansposition is 
suggested by Be~ge~ and Luckmann. 
Theo~izing about identity will [no~mallyl then seek to take 
cognizance of the t~ansfo~mations of identity that have 
actually occu~~ed, and will be t~ansfo~med in the p~ocess. On 
the othe~ hand, identity may become p~oblematic on the level of 
theo~y itself, that is, as a ~esult of int~insic theo~etical 
developments. In that case, psychological theo~ies will be 
concocted 11 befo~e the fact 11 , so to speak <1966: 164-65>. 
Fu~the~ suppo~t fo~ this scena~io is found in Mannheim/s suggestion 
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that plu~alism is c~ucial fo~ the functioning of ma~ket-d~iven economies, 
a belief that Go~bachev may have sha~ed. Mannheim w~ote, 
Success on the f~ee competitive ma~ket demands a continuous 
awa~eness of social change. The necessa~y adaptation to these 
shifts ~equi~es immediate ~esponses and independent judgment 
f~ee f~om conventional o~ mythological delusions. The 
individual who must live by his wits and seize his 
oppo~tunities as they a~ise no Ionge~ feels committed to a 
p~esc~ibed way of life. The immediate effect of this new state 
of affai~s is an inc~eased ~ationality, fi~st in economic 
behavio~, then in ce~tain de~ivative situations, and finally in 
the conceptualization of one 1 S own interests. These situations 
teach men to orient themselves from their own point of view 
the first step towards social self-awa~eness <1936: 99>. 
Whereas Brezhnev 1 s ideationally-motivated administration had 
concentrated on revitalizing existing Marxist-Leninist beliefs, 
GorbacheV 1 S policies were motivated almost totally by instrumental goals. 
From his perspective, focus on mate~ial conditions of life was consistent 
with the socialist priorities, and in the early years of his rule 
Gorbachev repeatedly grounded his ideas in Lenin and in the NEP prog~am. 
The continuity Gorbachev sought to affirm, however, was overpowered by 
the social trauma that accompanied the dramatic shift in p~imary motives. 
From 1985 until the time of the failed coup in August 1991, the 
glasnost press g~ew, first gradually and then in ~eat leaps, to rival 
and then overtake the influence of the ideational press that p~oved 
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stubbornly resistant to change. The primary characteristics of the 
instrumental press that separated it from the ideational press were: 
emphasis on criticism and sensationalism over 11 high idea-ism 11 and social 
harmony; the questioning of central authority and direct attacks on the 
Marxist-Leninist belief system; and, above all, the publlc/s right to 
know and be informed of both the current condition of society and the 
history of the country. 
From the Soviet audience/s point of view, an obsession with national 
self-criticism was the primary hallmark of the liberal and radical press. 
In 1987 economist Shmelev wrote in the political and literary journal 
Novyi Mir <New World.> . 
There is such a disgusting proliferation of [industrial 
ministries] and they are so top-heavy with administrators that 
they frequently have to invent something to do and actually end 
up interfering with the work of the enterprises. The 
ministries themselves have become a serious political problem 
demanding the swiftest, most radical solution. 
In his time Lenin wrote: "Everything is sinking in the 
lousy bureaucratic swamp of the ministries .•.. The ministries 
are all shit, and so are their decrees .... 11 {1987: 151>. 
In a 1989 article appearing in Moskovskie novosti <Moscow News> a 
woman published a first-person narrative of her recent legal abortion and 
attacked the lack of sex education and contraceptives in the country. An 
adjacent article addressed the widespread problem of divorced fathers/ 
refusing to pay child support. Homosexuality, AIDS, prostitution, and 
drug abuse were other subjects addressed routinely in the later years of 
the decade <Schillinger, 1991: 139). Even the national hymn was subject 
to criticism, as journalist and literary critic Stanislav Rassadin asked 
in an editorial reprinted in the monthly British edition of Moscow News. 
"Why is the [Soviet) national anthem so insipid? 0 <1988: 3>. 
Religion and tales of the fantastic and supernatural (ekstrasents>. 
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previously taboo, were also given liberal coverage by many glasnost 
publications. An account in Literaturnaia gazeta (Literary Newspaper> 
reported that on the first anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, 11 the 
face of the Mother of God appeared in Grushevo, 11 her features emerging 
from an arrangement of the roof tiles of a villager/s house, and that 
thousands of pilgrims went there to witness the miracle. The writer then 
chastised local authorities who ordered authorities to disperse the crowd 
and make arrests CSergeiev: 1987). An article in the government 
newspaper Izvestia. reported proceedings from the All-Union Conference on 
Mental Health Problems in Moscow and noted: 
The conference concluded that the country needs to create a 
network of mental health centers and develop a system of care 
by medical psychologists. They protect people from 
stress-related breakdowns. This occupation has long existed 
abroad. Nor should we close our eyes to the fact that the 
church and specialists in psychoanalysis are quite active 
there. But here, even mental-health 11 hot lines11 are very rare 
CManucharova, 1989>. 
A near obsession with reexamining Soviet history represented a sharp 
break with Soviet press tradition during the glasnost period. The weekly 
newspaper Argumenty i fakty (Arguments and Facts> emerged from obscurity 
as an organizational newsletter to become the world/s highest circulation 
newspaper, after the Ministry of Education ruled that it would serve as 
the serialized history text for the nation/s schools while textbooks were 
being rewritten. (Schillinger, 1991: 146). At its peak in 1990 
circulation was reported to be 31 million. Typical of the kind of 
revelation to be found in press accounts was a 1989 article in Moskovskie 
novosti (Moscow News> that noted, 11 It has long been necessary to admit 
openly what the whole world as known for many years, but what for 
millions of Soviet people only has been a secret--that Trotsky was 
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murdered on Stalin/s order and its immediate executor was Ramon Mercader 
del Rio 11 <Cobo, 1989: 15>. An Izvestiia article revealed in 1987, 
There are currently 340 million items in the USSR State 
Archives. How accessible is this treasure to researchers 
studying our past and present? What must be done to strengthen 
the information base of the social sciences? Of the 1,109,086 
files to which access is restricted in the central state 
archives, 767,195 will now be avilable to researchers upon 
request, for use in reading rooms, of course <Andreev, 1987>. 
The glasnost phenomenon was a domestic phenomenon that had little to 
do with the international community, though great international interest 
was focused on the process. Glasnost was manifested primarily in a score 
of national newspapers and magazines typified as 11 radical. 11 A few 
television programs also reflected the change in motive, though effects 
were less dramatic in broadcasting than in print. The effects of 
glasnost were magnified because they were accompanied by massive shifts 
in subscription pattern as Soviet readers abandoned the traditional 
favorites, of Pravda and Sovetskaia Rossiia <Soviet Russia) and even the 
more moderate liberal newspapers, Izvestiia and Literaturnaia qazeta 
<Literary Newspaper>. for the more controversial print offerings, such as 
Moskovkie novosti. Oqonek <Little Flame>. Arqumenty i fakty and Nash 
sobesednik <Our Fellow-Conversationlist>. and others <Schillinger, 1991: 
146-150>. Still more political and polemical were hundreds of 11 informal 0 
or unregistered newspapers and newsletters nominally attached to a 
proliferating number of political organizations of various political 
persuasion. 
On the whole, it was the national press that carried out the press 
revolution and the provincial press that remained resistant and under the 
ideational influence of provincial party officials. !\.disgruntled Kievan 
wrote in a 1988 letter to Pravda. 
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If in Moscow the barometer of glasnost points to a gale, in 
some union republic capitals it only shows breakers, in 
province capitals it predicts ripples, and as for the regional 
level, the pointer there shows ·dead calm. In my opinion, the 
farther you get from Moscow the more the level of glasnost 
changes, and not for the better CKorevich, 1988: 1> 
However, proxmity to Moscow did not necessarily guarantee probing press 
activity. A comparative study of two local Moscow newspapers, the 
morning dally Moskovskaia pravda <Moscow Pravda) and the evening 
Vecherniaia Moskva (Evening Moscow>. both organs of the Moscow City 
Committee, revealed significant differences between them. The morning 
paper was found to be far more negative in its reporting of domestic 
events and significantly more likely to publish in-depth reports and 
analyses of substantive economic and political issues than the evening 
paper (Schillinger, 1989>. Likewise, a Soviet press critic noted that 
the conservative nature of Vecherniaia Moskva (Evening Moscow) was 11 far 
closer to the classic type of publication., than the livelier Vecherniaia 
Odessa <Evening Odessa>. published in the Ukrainian port city, which 
confined its content to "only that which is really interesting., 
CDerevitsky, 1988: 38). 
Not only did many journalists find it difficult to adopt the new 
instrumental orientation, many Soviet readers were discomfited by the 
shift in motives and the activity it sanctioned. In a letter appearing 
in Izvestia. a Leningrad teacher, N. Shchurokova, pleaded for a return to 
the more positive journalism of the past: 
Our children are growing up and their personalities are being 
shaped in a setting in which supreme values, such as homeland, 
labor, society, history, revolution, citizen, comrade, old age 
and love are increasingly derided. They are growing up in an 
atmosphere in which all those who have abandoned our homeland 
in search of 11 the good lifeu are revered. They see all people 
of greatness and all authorities being brought down. Teenagers 
and young adults are awash in a heavy flow of licentiousness 
and vulgarity •••• Children don't realize that the men and 
women who have scrabbled their way to pen, publishing house, 
editorial board, screen and stage are concerned not aout the 
11 truth" but about lining their pockets (Shchurokova, 1989.) 
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Perhaps, as eloquently as any scholarly analysis, Shchurokova's letter 
spoke to the social disequilibrium brought about by the shift in motives 
and the role played by the press in effecting that transformation. 
The widely and highly polemical nature of many Soviet journalists' 
response to glasnost makes it clear that the ideational orientation did 
not disappear, but pluralized and diffused the ideas. The media, decrees 
and bold statements of intention to the contrary, were never able to 
survive on the basis of subscriptions; and the concept of advertising as 
a revenue source made little sense in a country where consumer goods were 
in such short supply they would vanish from the shelves before ad copy 
could be written. 
The glasnost press was an ideational press, in much the way that the 
early American press was an ideational press, with each newspaper 
expressing one-sided views and accepting financial and political support 
from patrons eager to encourage views similar to their own. The forum 
for the exchange of diverse ideas was not offered by any individual 
newspaper or periodical in this strongly partisan environment, though 
Gorbachev had wished "socialist plurallsm11 to be "represented in each 
publication in its entirety <1987: 77>. Rather, pluralism and the 
"marketplace of ideasu existed in the totality of press activity. At the 
same time, the preoccupation with instrumental and economic concerns, the 
increasingly bitter attacks on centralized power, and the espousal of a 
belief in pluralism indicate that the press had adopted many elements in 
the instrumental vocabulary of motives. 
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Most interesting, from the perspective of history and the dynamic 
theory, is the fact that almost no press activity was motivated by 
survival--either the newspapers' own survival or that of the government. 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union following the failed August 1991 coup 
and the utter chaos of today/s media environment in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States is, in large part, a consequence of the rejection of 
the survival vocabulary of motives. Figure 9E on page 255 summarizes 
press activity during the glasnost period. Media activity since August 
1991 is not analyzed here, although it continues. The fact that no 
coherent motive unites the press, the audience, or the country/countries 
of the former Soviet Union would be represented by a totally-shaded 
triangle, indicating the competing action-strategies now struggling for 
dominance. 
It was the swiftness of the motive transformation, a swiftness made 
possible by "revolution from above, .. as much as by the scope of the 
transformation of a centuries-old mindset, that made Gorbachev's press 
policy such a daring and, ultimately, dangerous one. Writing almost 150 
years ago, Auguste Comte observed, 
The social destiny of government appears to me to consist 
particularly in sufficiently containing, and preventing, as far 
as possible, this fatal disposition towards a fundamental 
dispersion of ideas, sentiments, and interests, ••• so as to 
recall to [the people] unceasingly the feeling of unity and the 
sentiment of common solidarity <1842:430-431>. 
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Endnotes 
1. According to Kanda!, during the liberalization period, the 
circulation of Kayhan. the most popular Persian-language daily, doubled, 
going from 350,000 to 700,000 or more. He noted than in August 
circulation went over a million, occasioned by the printing of a 
four-column front-page article on Khomeini. Copies of the issue sold for 
$2. 50 ( 1978) . 
2. At the present time, the only other Muslim nation with a militant 
Islamic government is Sudan, a Sunni nation. The Sudanese government 
recent I y has undertaken to estab 11 sh peacefu 1 ties with Sh i' i te I ran, "a 
development that reflects the closing of a historic rift," according to 
Arab analysts <Miller, 1992: 40). 
3. Belief in the 0 Twelfth Imam," that is Imam Mahdi, represents an 
important distiction between the Shi'ites, "the so-called Twelvers," and 
the Sunni Muslims, who believe in the "Four Rightly Guided Caliphs," who 
prepared the ground for Prophet Muhammad by achieving military and 
political victories over the Byzantine and Persian Empires. Thus, 
Teheranian concludes, "A belief in the unity of spiritual and temporal 
authorities is thus common to both Sunni and Shi'a Islam," although, he 
notes, the problem of positioning authority gave rise to the great schism 
between the two powerful branches of Islam (1988: 198>. 
4. Khomeini was succeeded by Ali Kharnenei, the third popularly-elected 
president who resigned his elected post to assume his new duties the day 
following Khomeini's death. The new president is Hojatolislam Ali Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani, was sworn in on August 3, 1989, as the nation's 
fourth president. The president appoints a cabinet of ministers, subject 
to the approval of the Assembly of Experts <Majlis) . The 
popularly-elected Majlis is comprised of 83 members, whose candidacies 
are approved by the Council of Guardians. 
The republic's first president, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr served from 
February 1980 to June 1981, when he was deposed by the clergy. The 
newspaper he owned, Enquelaab Eslami. was one of three closed down at the 
time of his forced exile in an effort to silence the last opposition 
papers, Kurian reported <1982, Vol. II: 1071-1072>. The second 
president, who preceded Kharnenei, was assassinated a month after he took 
office in July 1981. 
5. The name of the Russian capital city was changed from the Germanic 
St. Petersburg to the Slavic Petrograd by the Fourth duma when Russia 
entered the war in 1914. 
6. A study of British and U.S. newspaper coverage of the Bolshevik 
takeover indicated no in-depth questioning of the political implications 
of a projected Bolshevik society. "Only two questions were confronted: 
how long would these 'fanatic pacifists remain in power' and were they 
really going to take Russia out of the war in repudiation of the Pact of 
London <Schillinger, 1967: 15>. Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz 
reported in a famous study that between November 1917 and November 1919, 
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the New York Times reported that the Bolshevik government had fallen or 
was about to fall 91 times; that Lenin and Trotsky were preparing to flee 
or had fled the country seven times; that Lenin had been imprisoned three 
times; and that Lenin had been killed once <1920>. 
7. In the mid-1980s, a harbinger of Gorbachev's policies was the 
appearance of a Russian translation of Margaret Mitchell's Gone With the 
Wind in Soviet bookstores. It was received with the same tumultuous 
enthusiasm that had rocked the United States at its the time its initial 
publication 50 years before. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
Theoretical Relevance and Validity 
In the opening chapter of Communication Theory: The Asian 
Perspective. editor Wimal Dissanayake addresses the issue of Asian and 
African dependence upon Western communication theory and reports that 
more than 70 percent of materials used in communication courses taught in 
universities in South and Southeast Asia are American in origin. After 
acknowledging the substantial contributions of scholars such as Schramm, 
De Fleur, and Lasswell, and the value of such classic works as Four 
Theories of the Press. Dissanayake quickly turns to his main point and 
the theme of the book: 11 If Asian communication scholars are to engage in 
more productive and relevant research, it is indeed imperative that they 
address their minds to the question of forumulating alternative theories 
and models 11 <1988: 7). 
Dissanayake 1 s call for Asian perspectives on communication theory is 
predicated on two cultural biases that he believes permeate U.S. 
constructions and make them less than appropriate frames for the study 
and understanding of much of the world1 S media. The first bias, he 
argues, is the 11 essentially conservative and status-quo-maintaining 
nature" of American communication theory, which, because of its 
functionalist bent, is ill-equipped to "handle, and indeed stimulate 
social change" (1988: 6-7). The second problem with American theory, he 
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continues, is its positivistic assumptions, resulting from its 
methodological identification with the natural sciences. 
It is precisely because of this discrepancy that I think Asian 
communication scholars should turn more towards philosophical 
approaches like phenomenology which do not accept the rigid 
division between appearance and reality and which, in addition, 
emphasize imagination, intuition and values. The fact that 
Western social scientists are increasingly beginning to 
question the validity and usefulness of functionalism only 
underlines the need for Asian communication scholars to shake 
off this influence <1988: 7). 
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If the dynamic theory succeeds in transcending the functionalism and 
positivism that has previously limited the utility of world press theory 
it is because it has incorporated Dissanayake's interpretation of Asian 
epistemology. It would be argued, however, that the perspectives he and 
his colleagues advance are not alien to American or Western thought and 
need not be alien to American communication theory and certainly not to 
American world press theory. 
Ideally, a world press theory should be international in its 
conceptualization and its method. Ideally, it should be temporally 
neutral, politically neutral, culturally neutral. The formulation of 
ideal types based on actions and behaviors, rather than on types of 
political systems subscribed to, is one manifestation of the 
determination to retain theoretical neutrality and enhance validity. The 
phenomenological approach to discerning and signifying action is another 
mechanism employed to minimize observer bias. Timeless, horizonless 
neutrality is or should be the aim of any formal or grand theory . But 
perhaps even this assumption carries with it the imprimatur of its time 
and place--American relativism, 1990/s globalism, academic liberalism, 
and a post-Cold War euphoria that may one day caricature and date current 
truths. And then again, there is another catch--one that Max Weber mused 
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upon in his final writings--that any theory sufficiently broad to 
encompass all events and eventualities may be also so vague as to provide 
little meaningful understanding of them <Weber, 1904: 80>. 
A central element of the dynamic theory is its attempt to 
incorporate and identify change, certainly one of the most salient 
consideration in its evolution and in the creation of the motive triangle 
model. As Dissanayake observes, social change is an essential and 
natural component of national policy and everyday life in developing 
countries; however, it is an intrinsic characteristic of all 20th century 
societies. 
Thus, while the construct provides theoretical tools for identifying 
and examining dramatic change, as shown in the Soviet analysis of 
Gorbachev's reform press, it also suggests sensitizing devices for 
detecting more subtle social evolutions and fluctuations, such as the 
U.S. press's growing ideational-motivated activity beginning in the 1960s 
in response to Great Society idealism and the move toward more 
interpretive news reporting. The dynamism of the construct also can be 
applied to the discernment of significant distinctions between press 
systems conventionally described as similar, such as the those of the 
United States and Britain. Perhaps the greatest contribution of the 
motive triangle is that it demonstrates that no two national media 
systems align perfectly within its perimeters, and that indeed no single 
system or organ within that system occupies the identical position on two 
consecutive days. For comparisons of the model summaries of the six 
nations analyzed in this work, see Figure 10 on the next page.> 
An appraisal of the validity of the case summaries here can offer no 
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Figure 10. Comparative Analysis of National Press Systems 
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suggesting that the analyses greatest value may lie in the challenge they 
present to others inspired to add to their data bases or reinterpret 
their recent findings. The intent of the case reports was partially to 
illustrate the dynamic theory/s validity, but more importantly to 
demonstrate that theory can and should play an essential part in framing 
empirical research. As Dissanayake notes, "Theory unites research and 
research refines theory" <1988: 7). But all too often, particularly in 
the comparative studies of international communication, the two exist as 
two separate entities--one a body of knowledge to be memorized, the other 
a skill to be practiced. 
Throughout the empirical process of presenting data in the 
case-summary chapters, overweaning care was taken to avoid the use of 
value-laden words--a time consuming and artificial precaution. Even such 
terms as "free press" and "suppression" were employed sparingly, usually 
appearing in quotations. This was done not because it is believed that 
value judgments should not accompany and interpret international press 
study, but to show that judgment should not be inherent in a theoretical 
frame. "Survival," "ideational," and "instrumental" motives carry with 
them no moral or political taint. They are simply ways to identify 
action prompted by situation. But the voluntarism inherent in all 
motivated human action invites interpretation and challenge, and with it 
the approbation or condemnation of the researcher. 
Methodological Considerations 
The dynamic theory was constructed in the belief that it would 
provide cognitive structure to empirical study of the world/s media, an 
activity that is widely agreed to have been particularly atheoretical. 
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And while it appears to have achieved this goal, the procedures it 
entails do not lessen the demands of the researcher, but, on the 
contrary, expand them. For the hermeneutical fixation on deep 
description, context, and wholeness inextricably links examination of the 
media to their social, political, economic, and historical milieux. Thus 
the scholar who sets out to examine the press of a nation, a region, or 
an era must also address the multifaceted 11 situation 11 in which that press 
is embedded. The challenge for any student of the communication is to 
extricate the media from the tangled nest of its national culture and 
institutions. 
The emphasis on articulated motives, drawn from the media 
themselves, their intended audiences, and those who oversee or control 
them raises the possibility of researcher bias and the deliberate or 
unintended skewing of the 11 Sample 11 collected. The only guard against 
this likelihood is the thoroughness of the data gathering and its 
limitation to indigenous, native sources in the empirical stage of the 
research process that precedes and attends interpretation. 
The holistic, phenomenological approach suggests a further 
imposition on international media scholars that may be compared to a 
professional expectation of international correspondents undertaking to 
report and interpret events abroad. High quality international 
journalism is best achieved when reporters immerse themselves in a given 
culture or region and make it their specialization. Criticism is aimed 
at 11 parachute 11 journalists who land in unfamiliar news 11 hot spots 11 with 
their mini-cam lights aglow and their tape-recorders whirling and attempt 
to tell the world what's going on. 
While international correspondents and international media scholars 
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need not be rooted to one area of specialization for a lifetime, 
acquiring an understanding of a society and its structures is not an 
overnight assignment. Interestingly, however, the insights of non-native 
analysts may be ultimately richer and more instructive than those 
provided by domestic commentators inured to the unlquenesses of their own 
familar turf, as international news organizations have long ago 
discovered. In the case summaries presented here, the author's 
intellectual commitment to Soviet studies produced a more textured and 
interpretive analysis of the Soviet press than of any of the other 
systems examined. Experience in the country and knowledge of the Russian 
language contributed substantially to that analysis. In contrast, daily 
immersion in her own media-saturated American culture from birth 
complicated and slowed and perhaps muddied the empirical process. 
The conclusion to be drawn, then, is that while the processual and 
holistic assumptions and methodology of the dynamic theory enable the 
search for understanding and rich, highly-textured interpretation, they 
also impose a heightened burden of commitment on the researcher. While 
the press characteristics associated with each ideal type of press 
activity, as defined in Chapter IV, make it possible for researchers to 
flag some significant patterns of press behavior, they in no way 
delineate the investigative trail, which must be mapped anew to fit the 
terrain of each analysis. 
The World Press and World Press Scholarship 
When the rudiments of the dynamic theory wete first presented at a 
professional meeting in 1988, the response of those in attendance 
encouraged the author's belief that the time was at hand for the 
297 
introduction of a new, phenomenological, hermeneutical approach to 
researching and understanding the world/s press. Subsequent world events 
and students' experience in applying the theory in graduate school 
classes at Oklahoma State University, Iowa State University, and Mount 
Vernon College have strengthened that conviction and also contributed to 
refinement and expansion of the theory. 
The arguments offered here do little to confirm the validity of the 
dynamic theory. The interpretations of one individual, especially one 
who has grown perhaps overly committed to the theory, mean little in the 
intellectual life of a new idea. For the past several years the social 
sciences have been experiencing a major paradigm shift, perhaps of 
Kuhnian proportions, from a positivistic, quantitative, functionalist, 
objective approach to a phenomenological, hermeneutical, interpretive, 
post-modern perspective. Though the dynamic theory was derived according 
to the emerging perspective, it has yet to be shown that it will be 
incorporated by media scholars into the new paradigm. 
That determination will be made by the packaging and marketing of 
the dynamic theory and by the utility of its application to empirical and 
theoretical researchers who have the temerity to test it. Thus the 
invitation is extended to specialists in various geographical regions of 
the world's press to reexamine again their previous data and findings and 
to engage in new studies using the dynamic theory as a guide; to scholars 
of narrower media topics, such as advertising, public relations, film, 
international broadcasting, or local newspapers, to explore the capacity 
of the theory to provide stronger societal grounding for their 
observations; and to sociologists, political scientists, and historians 
to stretch the theory's potential to shed new light on other social 
institutions and phenomena over time and space. Only then, when these 
findings are in, would it truly be appropriate to draw conclusions 
concerning the lasting value of the dynamic theory. 
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